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Abstract
The 2001 anthrax attacks heightened awareness of the possibility of weaponizing
biological agents such as Ebola, anthrax, and smallpox and hence, the Bioterrorism Act
of 2002 to prevent biological attacks and reduce bioterrorism threats and vulnerabilities.
However, the 2014 Ebola epidemic raised concerns about unpreparedness for
bioterrorism within the healthcare community and about secondary infections from
healthcare workers. Using Kingdon’s conceptualization of multiple streams as the
foundation, the purpose of this case study was to explore the nature of bioterrorism
threats and the level of preparedness of Emergency Medical Technicians (EMTs) who
were involved in the 2014 Ebola epidemic in a New Jersey County for biological attacks
and avoidance or reduction of secondary infections. Data were collected from 18
individuals through interviews and from emergency response documents. The data were
inductively coded and subjected to thematic analysis. The emergent themes indicated that
although there was an abundance of bioterrorism preparedness policies and programs
dating back to the 2001 anthrax attacks, the response to the 2014 Ebola epidemic
revealed inadequate bioterrorism preparedness practices. The study participants identified
insufficient knowledge of bioagents and lack of regular training as factors that prevented
enhanced preparedness practices. Participants suggested that improved training
opportunities, interagency collaborations, and better funding would improve bioterrorism
preparedness practices. The social change implications of this study include increased
funding for bioterrorism preparedness to harden EMTs and the creation of public
awareness of bioagents for improved 911 calls and emergency response practices.
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study
The 2014 Ebola epidemic and the varied responses from local and state
governments raised public concerns about the capability of healthcare workers (HCWs),
especially emergency medical technicians (EMTs), to provide emergency services if
pathogens such as Ebola virus disease (EVD) were weaponized by terrorists. Studies
showed that the threats of potential bioterrorism attacks are real, and the question was
when rather than if they will occur (Cenciarelli et al., 2015; Fernandez et al., 2011;
Hodge, 2002; Rokach et al., 2010; Song et al. 2013). These and other studies pointed to
the 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States; the 2001 inhalational anthrax incidents; the
increasing number of countries and terrorist groups engaged in active bio-warfare
programs; the lack of uniformity, and inadequate training in emergency preparedness
within EMTs population in the United States (Barras & Greub, 2014; Dudley &
Woodford, 2002; Fernandez et al., 2011; Klein et al., 2016; Poland, Jacobson, Tilburt, &
Nichol, 2009; Potter et al., 2012).
EMTs are the first medical responders in disaster situations, including
bioterrorism attacks. It is, therefore, necessary to examine HCWs’ and EMTs’ level of
preparedness for bioterrorism in the areas of risk mitigation and response-time strategies
(Kabir, Naik, Kumar, & Bhas, 2016). When disasters occur, the immediate challenges
EMTs confront are stabilizing patients and transporting them to designated acute
healthcare facilities for medical treatments without putting themselves, their families, and
their immediate communities at further risks. To protect themselves from pathogens
transmitted through bodily fluid, EMTs knowledge of personal protective equipment
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(PPE), adequate training, and additional education are necessary (Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC), 2015). Also, transporting patients to acute healthcare
facilities poses unique problems and challenges (CDC, 2015).
In 2000, the CDC initiated comprehensive strategic plans with law enforcement
and first responders on the need to prepare for possible bioterrorism attacks. The five
strategic plans were preparedness and prevention; detection and surveillance; diagnosis
and characterization of biological and chemical agents; response; and communication for
bioterrorism prevention and readiness (CDC, 2000). Also, in 2002, the United States
Government (USG) enacted the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness
and Response Act (PHSB&R) of 2002, Subtitle A of Public Law 107–188, and the
Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act (ABPA) of 2002, in order to identify and
categorize the biological agents and toxins that have the potential to cause public injury if
weaponized. However, Markenson, Reilly, and DiMaggio (2005) indicated that only a
small percentage of the 823 participants who returned their questionnaires had been
trained in chemical, biological, or radiological terrorism from the health department
(6.3%–14.9%). The number, however, increased in other areas of emergency response:
13.5%–22.5% for suspicious case reporting, 15.1%–25.6% for public health emergencies,
and 17.3%-31.8% for mandatory infectious disease reporting. These dismal results were
years after the PHSBR and ABP Acts of 2002 and the 2003 Hazardous Site Response Act
(HSRA), which was designed to train HCWs in emergency disaster responses, including
bioterrorism.
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In 2010, a U.S. Congressional Report addressed the bioterrorism threat, and
President Barack Obama highlighted the threat in a State of Union address (Gottron &
Shea, 2011). While the Congressional Report acknowledged the Federal Government’s
preparedness for a possible bioterrorism attack, it questioned the adequacy of existing
mechanisms among other stakeholders involved in emergency response, including state
and local governments, and others (Gottron & Shea, 2011). Also, in a 2011 report, the
National Science and Technology Council Committee on Homeland and National
Security noted the disparities and lack of uniformity and knowledge of chemical,
biological, radiological, nuclear and explosives (CBRNE) among HCWs including
EMTs. Similarly, other studies (Fernandez et al., 2011; Rickles & Catarious, 2015),
highlighted HCWs inadequate training on PPE, inconsistent protocols for handling
infected patients, and lack of uniformity in training and education. Protection from
pathogens for medical emergency services operators (EMSOs) and EMTs are necessary
because of the growing threats of bioterrorism from countries and terrorist groups whose
intentions are to inflict maximum harm, destruction, and death on humans, animals, and
plants (Burnette, Hess, Kozlovac, & Richmond, 2013; Kadlec, 2013).
Similarly, following the recommendations from the Federal Emergency
Management Authority (FEMA), the New Jersey Office of Emergency Management
(NJOEM) and the Disaster Management Act of 2000, the New Jersey County Office of
Emergency Management (ECOEM) initiated the All-Hazard Mitigation Plan (HMP) to
prevent, mitigate, respond to and recover from disasters to guide all emergency
responders, including EMTs (ECOEM, 2018). In 2015, the HMP was reviewed to
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identify and reduce vulnerabilities to all hazards, including terrorism and infectious
diseases (ECOEM, 2018).
Despite the bioterrorism preparedness plans, the 2014 Ebola epidemic showed
unpreparedness against Category A biological agents, such as EVD, which has a high
mortality rate of between 50-90% and requires appropriate responses and preparedness
from HCWs and EMTs (Aquino & Wu, 2011; Sarah, 2016). The lack of adequate
preparedness and practices (called bioterrorism hardening) within the HCWs and EMTs
population pose impediments to effective biodefense (Khan, 2011; Gerstein, 2017;
Gostin, Waxman, & Foege, 2015; Sylvia & Danita, 2013).
How prepared are EMTs in the face of the current global bioterrorism threat?
What are the community-wide implications of a bioterrorism attack for which EMTs
appear ill-prepared? Incidentally, little research has examined the bioterrorism policy,
practices, and preparedness for EVD and other cutaneous diseases within the EMTs’
population (Barnett et al., 2010; Gerstein, 2017; Lurie, Manolio, Patterson, Collins, &
Frieden, 2013). By simultaneously examining EMTs’ practices and, preparedness, and
identifying lapses, and policy implications, and by using the multiple streams theory
(MST), the result of this study will provide data to help policymakers initiate policy
changes. The policy changes will, by extension, contribute to improving bioterrorism
hardening within EMSO and EMT populations. The bioterrorism hardening within
EMSO and EMT population will have further implications for social change through
policy formulation for enhanced and up-to-date, community-level bioterrorism
preparedness awareness programs. The nature and level of HCWs and EMTs
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involvement in bioterrorism policy implementation will form the theoretical basis for the
examination of bioterrorism preparedness within the EMT population, as will be
discussed in the subsequent chapter.
In this chapter, I discussed the background of the study, provided the need for the
study and the history of bioterrorism preparedness before and after the 2001 terrorist and
anthrax attacks. The inadequate preparedness and varied responses following the 2014
Ebola epidemic further heightened the need for the study. And the inadequate
bioterrorism preparedness makes both the emergency responders and the citizens
vulnerable to biological attacks and unable to mitigate the effects of bioagents. I then
cover the following topics: the statement of the problem, purpose of the study, the
theoretical framework that guided the study, the research questions, nature of the study,
definitions of major concepts, the assumptions, the scope and delimitations, the
significance of the study, and the implications for social change.
Background of the Study
Global concern for biological terrorism or weaponized pathogens in the modern
era dates to the 1925 Geneva Protocol that prohibited the use of biological or chemical
weapons in warfare (Pedraza, 2012). In 1967, the World Health Organization (WHO), in
recognition of potential biological attacks, issued guidance (updated in 2004) on how to
prepare for such incidents to minimize the casualty rate (Jansen, Breeveld, Stijnis, &
Grobusch, 2014). The WHO document (Public Health Response to Biological and
Chemical Weapons) was issued to guide HCWs such as EMTs and national governments
on how to respond to incidences of weaponized pathogens on human beings. Again, in
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1972, WHO got 103 countries including the United States to sign the Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and their Destruction (BTWC) to prevent the use of
biological agents as weapons of warfare (Barras & Greub, 2014). Despite the historical
global awareness and agreements, the threats posed by bioterrorism persist (Jansen et al.,
2014; Weant, Bailey, Fleishaker, & Justice, 2014). Studies show that some countries and
terrorist groups, such as Al-Qaeda, have active biowarfare programs and/or have the
financial capability to procure biological agents (Cenciarelli et al., 2013; Dudley &
Woodford, 2002; Maras & Miranda, 2016).
Kadlec (2013), noted that in the event of a bioterrorism attack, the USG’s
assessment put the casualty rate at 1.2 million. However, the historical study by Jansen et
al. (2014) found that preparedness for bioterrorism by HCWs minimized the casualty
level by about 75%. Jansen et al. (2014) undertook a historical overview of pathogens as
weapons of warfare and terrorism and the initiatives by the international community to
curtail the weaponization of bioagents by both states and nonstate actors. The high rate of
casualties has inherent problems and challenges for HCWs, including, EMTs (Maras &
Miranda, 2016), and hence the need to harden EMSOs and EMTs because of their
frontline roles when pathogens such as EVD are weaponized. The high rate of deaths
among HCWs in the four affected countries of Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Nigeria
during the 2014 Ebola epidemic illustrate the need for bioterrorism preparedness and
practices among HCWs. For instance, in 2014, 7.9% of Ebola cases in Guineans, ages 15
and above, were HCWs, which amounted to 42.2 times more than non-HCWs (Grinnell
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et al., 2015). Similar higher percentage cases among HCWs were reported in Guinea,
Liberia, and Sierra Leone during the Ebola epidemic, with 490 HCWs’ dead out of 837
HCWs infected (Maras & Miranda, 2016). This higher percentage rate is an indication of
the risk HCWs confront when highly infectious disease (HIDs) strike, as they mobilize to
minimize the risk in the community, care for the patients, and/or transport them to AHFs.
In 2001, Bacillus cereus anthracis or anthrax, a Category 1 agent, was released in
the United States resulting in the death of five patients and many more hospitalized
(Poland et al., 2009). The anthrax attack of 2001 and the resultant deaths were wake-up
calls that further illustrated the inherent danger of a biological attack (Suk et al., 2011).
Also, the lack of uniformity and uncoordinated approach to the EVD epidemic further
underscores the need for the study of bioterrorism preparedness of emergency medical
workers (Shultz, Baingana, & Neria, 2015).
This study intended to help prepare EMTs for bioterrorism threats and/or attacks
by examining their level of knowledge of PPE, training, and education for cutaneous
forms of infectious diseases such as EVD. What EMTs can do or what knowledge they
need to acquire to adequately show bioterrorism, chemical and nuclear readiness have not
been adequately investigated (Fernandez et al., 2011). Furthermore, the critical
emergency roles HCWs and EMTs perform require policy initiatives for adequate
bioterrorism preparedness and practices such as those proposed by Berger and Moreno
(2010). Moreover, EMTs’ roles involve not only stabilizing victims of disasters but also
transporting them to immediate facilities for further treatments and, this process of
transporting disaster victims to HCFs has its unique challenges (CDC, 2015). The CDC
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recommends that suspected cases of EVD infections be transported to Ebola assessment
hospitals and frontline healthcare facilities, while confirmed cases are transported from
Ebola assessment hospitals and frontline healthcare facilities to Ebola treatment centers
(CDC, 2014). How EMTs handle these challenges (stabilizing patients and transporting
them to HCFs) without jeopardizing community-level safety in the event of bioterrorism
attacks are the focus of this study.
In 2000, the CDC organized a Strategic Planning Workgroup (SPW) that studied
the bioterrorism preparedness and response strategies involving first responders
especially EMT personnel (CDC, 2000). The CDC workgroup noted that critical to
bioterrorism preparedness are (a) early detection of biological and chemical terrorism;
and (b) adequate awareness of potentially deployable pathogens among frontline healthcare providers that could lead to serious illnesses and injuries during and after
bioterrorism attacks. However, the 2015 EVD epidemic revealed inadequate
preparedness and awareness within the HCW and EMT populations despite many
regulations and legislation since the 2001 anthrax attacks (Maras & Miranda, 2016;
Shultz et al., 2015).
Studies have shown that (a) adequate knowledge of PPE, (b) education, (c)
citizens’ participation, and awareness, (d) the perception of bioterrorism threats among
HCWs and (e) their readiness to confront biological attacks are essential elements in
HCWs and EMTs’ practices and preparedness (Clancy, 2008; Sarah, 2016). Following
the 2001 incidences of anthrax incidents, the United States. committed vast sums of
money to biodefense (Cole, 2012). Despite an enormous financial outlay, the level of
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preparedness for possible bioterrorism appears inadequate as evidenced by the haphazard
reactions from various state governments to the EVD epidemic (Rickles & Catarious,
2015). Although, research exists on such pathogens as anthrax and H1HI, as well as
influenza pandemic preparedness, what past research has not shown is how current
EMTs’ readiness, practices, and preparedness aligns with the overall community, state,
and national bioterrorism programs and policies concerning cutaneous forms of
biological agents such as EVD. This study addressed the gap in the literature.
Problem Statement
Despite the over $60 billion spent on biodefense since the anthrax attacks of 2001
and up to the Ebola outbreaks, and the improvement in biodefense and emergency
responses, bioterrorism preparedness continued to pose unique challenges for HCWs in
the United States (Bitlauer, 2017; Bouzianas, 2009, Cole, 2012, Olsen, 2013; Katz, AttalJuncqua, & Fischer, 2017). Biological attacks are targeted at humans, animals, and plants
to inflict maximum fatality, and cause economic, agricultural, and health problems
(Anderson & Bokor, 2012). In 2014, Zaire Ebola Viral (EBOV), a potentially deployable
biological agent for bioterrorism, manifested in four West African countries: Liberia,
Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Nigeria. EBOV, one of the five known species of EVD that
caused thousands of deaths in those West African countries have a high fatality rate of up
to 90% (Baize, Pennetier, Oestereich et al., 2014; Choi, Hong, Hong, & Lee, 2015). In
the first 9 months of the Ebola outbreak, about 7,388 or 40% of the patients were
confirmed dead (Choi et al., 2015).
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That EVD reached the United States in 2014 was an indication of its potential as a
national and global health threat, and possible weapon for biological warfare. In the event
of bioterrorism, HCWs, and their families are at higher risk of infection despite the huge
expenditure on biodefense since anthrax (CDC, 2016a; NJDOH, 2014). The higher risk
was evident in the case of the 513 HCWs who died during the EVD epidemic in the West
African countries out of the 881 infected by November 2015 (CDC, 2016a). EVD, a
Category A pathogen, transmitted through direct bodily fluid and blood contact with a
sick patient or deceased victim has a high potential for use in biological terrorism in the
United States given the successful 2001 anthrax attacks.
Research has shown that only 6% of healthcare facilities in the United States
confirmed adequate preparedness to handle Ebola cases (Boscarino & Adams, 2015).
Also, there is the challenge of managing large-scale disaster as the response of HCWs to
the 2014 Ebola epidemic demonstrated. These were evident in the varied reactions from
many states (including New Jersey and Texas) to the EVD epidemic, and they revealed
apparent unpreparedness and vulnerabilities within the HCWs’ community (Rickles &
Catarious, 2015). Rickles and Catarious (2015) attributed the unpreparedness and
vulnerabilities to the lack of uniformity and inadequate training for PPE. These
vulnerabilities manifested despite the 2011 report of the National Science and
Technology Council of the consequences of ill-prepared emergency personnel to CBRNE
attacks. Despite the huge expenditure on biodefense, there was apparent unpreparedness
and vulnerabilities within the HCW community during the Ebola epidemic. The current
study examined EMTs’ post-2014 Ebola vulnerabilities, preparedness, and knowledge.
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These previous studies and reports also raised the need to explore the policy and
political implications regarding EMSOs and EMTs preparedness or unpreparedness for
biological attacks in the aftermath of the 2014 Ebola epidemic. Studying EMSOs and
EMTs bioterrorism preparedness was important because in the event of bioterrorism,
EMTs are the first medical responders who transport patients to acute healthcare facilities
despite the challenges involved in the process (English et al., 1999; CDC, 2015). Acute
healthcare facilities are designated by the CDC for the management of HIDs such as
EVD. So, protecting EMTs from HIDs and bioagents are critical to mitigating the
potential effects of bioterrorism on HCWs, and will enhance community-level
bioterrorism preparedness and protection.
On one hand, Abatemarco, Beckley, Borjan, and Robson (2007); Galada, Gurian,
and Hong (2013); Hughes and Gerberding (2002); Patidar, Singh, Jaiswal, Chaudhary,
and Samadi (2013); and Smith and Hewison (2012) conducted studies on inhaled
biological agents such as anthrax, policy and collaborative initiatives between federal and
state governments and agencies, and their readiness for bioterrorism attacks. On the other
hand, Rickles & Catarious (2015) studied EVD preparedness among HCWs. However,
to date, little research has examined the bioterrorism preparedness of EMSOs and EMTs
regarding their knowledge and use of PPE, training, and education for bioagents such as
EVD in New Jersey. The lack of adequate knowledge in the use of PPE, bioagent
training, and education among EMTs are hindrances to HCWs safety and communitylevel bioterrorism preparedness and hardening. Also, little research has examined how
PPE, training, and education may enhance EMTs’ and community-wide bioterrorism
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preparedness and hardening for EVD in the State of New Jersey. This study helped fill
the gap in the literature.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this qualitative case study was to examine and understand the
nature and level of bioterrorism preparedness among EMTs in New Jersey, for cutaneous
forms of biological agents such as EVD, and the attendant policy and political
implications for inadequate or lack of preparedness. The study sought to identify critical
factors that New Jersey’s policymakers, and EMSOs management may consider in
bioterrorism preparedness within EMTs operations for community-wide bioterrorism
hardening. The study’s findings will contribute to both EMTs’ safety, effective
bioterrorism response and hardening, and community-level bioterrorism readiness.
Furthermore, this study identified what factors accounted for the inadequate bioterrorism
preparedness and response against EVD in 2014: What challenges plagued, and continue
to plague, EMSOs and EMTs? To achieve these purposes and address the gap in the
literature, I conducted face-to-face interviews with 18 EMTs operating in four EMSOs in
the selected County in New Jersey. I also reviewed scholarly works on emergency
preparedness and practices among healthcare workers.
Research Questions
The following two research questions guided the study:
1. Are EMSOs and EMTs in New Jersey prepared for a cutaneous form of biological
attack such as EVD?
2

And, what are the policy and political implications of lack of preparedness?
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Theoretical Foundation
The theoretical framework used for this dissertation was Kingdon’s (1984)
multiple stream theory (MST). MST’s three streams are these: problem stream, policy
stream, and political stream. MST originated from the garbage can model (GCM)
propagated by Cohen, March, and Olsen (1972). The GCM had four streams: problems,
solutions, participants, and choice opportunities. Kingdon, in 1984 narrowed the four
streams into three streams and came up with the MST. The major tenets of MST are that
the three streams operate independently and at opportune times they must co-exist for
policy changes to occur (Alcantara & Roy, 2014; Kattikireddi, Hilton, Bonnell, & Bond,
2014).
The theory addresses policy changes that occur when the streams converge
through a window of opportunity, although the streams operate independently. According
to Sabatier and Weible (2014), “the problem stream consists of various conditions that
policymakers and citizens want addressed,” policy streams are projected solutions
seeking acceptance; and the political stream “consists of three elements: the national
mood, pressure groups campaigns, and administrative or legislative turnover” (p. 32-34).
A detailed explanation is discussed in Chapter 2.
MST, for this study, rested on the assumption that, by identifying the
vulnerabilities of EMSOs and EMTs (problem) and proffering different possible
perspectives for EMTs hardening (policy), policymakers can be pressured to enact laws
or policies that will bring about EMSOs and EMTs bioterrorism readiness initiatives
(politics). The make-up of the political streams for this study consisted of policymakers at
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the state, county, and city levels, and interest groups. MST was primarily designed for
analyzing the decision-making process of the federal government, but it has proven a
useful tool for analyzing policy changes within state governments and federal agencies
(Larkin, 2012). Kingdon used the framework to discuss how the federal government in a
policy-making arena advanced policy changes in the context of the interplay of the three
streams. MST has also been applied to study local problems. Walhart (2013), in a study,
further advanced the argument for multiple streams application in agencies decisionmaking processes. Walhart (2013) analyzed how MST was applied to improve patients’
outcome through problem identification, making the problem a policy issue before
policymakers, and influencing the development of new healthcare initiatives.
The theory is germane to this study given the national and global agitation for
terrorism and CBRNE preparedness after the 2014 Ebola epidemic. Therefore, the
window of opportunity was available to be exploited to create appropriate bioterrorism
preparedness policies. The theory also helped the study in examining and proffering
strategies for bioterrorism prevention, protection, mitigation and response of EMTs in
New Jersey. Therefore, MST is a useful analytical tool for the examination of the
operations of EMSOs, the experiences, and vulnerabilities of EMTs, and identification of
factors that could help harden them in their responses to biological attacks.
Nature of the Study
The study used the qualitative research design approach to examine the
bioterrorism preparedness and practices of selected emergency and protective services
(ERP) in the selected County in New Jersey. The target population for data collection
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was EMTs who have varied experiences in emergency medical responses in their
respective organizations. The data were collected through a face-to-face interview of
EMTs selected using the purposeful, snowball sampling technique and the data were
analyzed using a thematic approach. Data were also collected from policy documents.
Qualitative research was suitable for this study because of its flexibility and probing
technique, and the potential for helping discover new leads (Hyett, Kenny, & DicksonSwift, 2014). The qualitative case study was, therefore, ideal for examining the current
level of bioterrorism preparedness, protection, and response (PPR) practices (bioterrorism
hardening) and discovering how they may be improved upon given the challenges
bioterrorism PPR pose to EMTs’ emergency response capability, and uniformity. By
undertaking this study and interviewing the study’s participants (EMTs) involved in the
medical health emergency operations and responses, the study sought to provide an
understanding of the extent of PPE knowledge and uniformity in operations within the
EMTs’ population for bioterrorism hardening.
A case study approach was chosen because it makes room for an exploratory
study and in-depth description of the phenomenon using data from various sources,
thematically analyzed (Baxter & Jack, 2008). The mode of data collection was a
purposeful sampling technique through snowball/chain referral because of its
effectiveness in getting information from those who should know (Patton, 2002).
Definition of key Concepts
Bioterrorism: For the purposes of this study, bioterrorism is defined as the
intentional act by either a country or terrorist groups (also known as nonstate actors)

16
often inspired by ideological, national, religious, and political beliefs to inflict harm,
death, and create terror, societal disruption and/or economic loss (Jansen et al., 2014).
Bioterrorism is not the conventional use of explosives but pathogens such as anthrax,
EVD, smallpox, influenza virus on humans, animals or plants to instill fear, harm, illness
and death (Wurtz, Grobusch, & Raoult, 2014). The 2001 anthrax incidents in the United
States illustrates how devastating biological agents can be if weaponized and the need to
invest in preparedness initiatives (Gursky & Bice, 2013). Both anthrax and EVD fall
within the CDC, Federal Select Agent Program (FSAP) Category 1 or Tier 1
classification because of their fatality rates (CDC-FSAP, 2014).
Emergency medical technicians (EMTs): EMTs are the pre-hospital emergency
medical services providers responsible for attending to patients during disaster situations
and transporting them to hospitals (Chen & Yu, 2016; Lin, 2013). EMTs provide basic
non-invasive treatment to minimize health risk or harm to the patients, stabilize the
patients, and transport them to AHFs (CDC, 2015). They are the direct implementers of
government bioterrorism preparedness policies, and, therefore, are most at risk in times
of biological attacks as front-line-healthcare workers (CDC, 2000). EMTs fall within
what is referred to as emergency and protective services (EPSs) (Sanders, 2013). Other
groups within the EPSs are emergency medical responders (EMRs); advanced emergency
medical technicians (AEMTs), and paramedics (Garner, Baker, & Hagelgans, 2016;
National Registry of Emergency Medical Technicians (NREMTs), 2017).
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1.

EMRs are first responders with knowledge of life-saving skills. EMRs include
firefighters, EMTs and law enforcement officers with basic knowledge of lifesaving techniques (Kelly & Hassett-Walker, 2016).

2.

AEMTs have a little more knowledge than EMTs. They perform all the activities
that EMRs and EMTs do and a little more. They provide minimal and basic but
limited advanced medical and pharmacological treatments (National Registry of
Emergency Medical Technicians (NREMTs), 2017).

3

Paramedics, on the other hand, have higher skills and provide invasive medical
and pharmacological treatment. Paramedics also receive more advanced training
of about 1200 hours more than EMTs, to acquire enough knowledge to provide
intravenous treatments (Bureau for Labor Statistics, 2019; Waldrop, Clemency,
Maguin, & Lindstrom, 2014).
Category A Pathogens: These are pathogens or biological agents that have been

classified by the CDC-FSAP as having the capabilities to cause the most severe harms to
humans, animals, and plants if used as weapons for biological attacks (CDC-FSAP,
2014). Ebola virus falls into this Category A or what the FSAP also called Tier 1. Other
pathogens in this Categories include Marburg Virus, Bacillus cereus Biovar anthracis
(anthrax), Botulinum neurotoxins, and Botulinum neurotoxin producing species of
Clostridium among others (CDC-FSAP, 2014). Other categories are B and C. Our focus
is on EVD. EVD reached the U.S. at the height of the Ebola epidemic in 2014 (Monson,
2017).
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Bioterrorism hardening: Bioterrorism hardening for this study is the preemptive
preparations for protecting the emergency workers such as EMTs who will be deployed
to disaster areas (Kabir, Naik, Kumar, & Bhas, 2016). In other cases, it may involve the
entire population. For instance, in 2003, the President Bush Administration began a pilot
program to harden 500,000 HCWs through vaccination against the potential use of
smallpox as a biological weapon (Allison, 2003). Bioterrorism hardening is all exercises,
actions, training, precautionary measures that are put in place to prevent or minimize the
impact of biological attacks on targets (Abrol, 2016; Henderson, 2014). One of the
actions needed is getting EMTs educated on potential bioagents. For instance, Rokach et
al. (2010) discovered in a quantitative study of 76 nurses and physicians, the relationship
between the willingness to treat patients during biological attacks and medical knowledge
of the pathogen.
Hardening also involves protecting vulnerable targets such as malls, churches,
schools and theaters. Target hardening is best illustrated by the measures the aviation
industry especially in the US, have put in place to secure airspace and airplanes (Hasting
& Chan, 2013). Some of these measures include the introduction of Air Marshalls, the
creation of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), and the x-ray scanning
technologies (Hasting & Chan, 2013).
Ebola Virus Disease (EVD): Ebola virus disease is a biological agent that
terrorists can weaponize. It is a pathogen that can be transmitted through bodily fluid
contact with a patient or a dead victim (Passi, Sharma, Dutta, Dudeja, & Sharma, 2015).
EVD, a highly infectious disease (HID) is classified as a Category A pathogen because of
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its high rate of fatality of between 50% and 90% (Maras & Miranda, 2016). Other
Category 1 pathogens agents include Anthrax (bacillus cereus anthracis), Marburg virus,
variola major virus (smallpox), varilola minor virus (alastrim), and botulinum
neurotoxins (Cenciarelli et al., 2015). Other species of EVD are Sudan ebolavirus;
Bunchbugyo ebolavirus; Restron ebolavirus; and Tai Forest ebolavirus and their
symptoms include muscle pains, fatigue, vomiting, diarrhea, fever, weakness and malaise
(Choi, Hong, Hong, & Lee, 2015).
Personal Protective Equipment (PPE): PPE are special equipment, respiratory
and clothing protective tools designed to minimize the exposure to hazardous materials
and agents in the work environment (United States Department of Labor – Occupational
Safety and Health Administration, USDOL-OSHA, 2004). Protective equipment includes
gloves, masks eye protection and face shields. In 2008, the National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), enacted Title 29, Code of Federal Regulations
(CFR), Part 1910.120 (Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response Standard
– HAZWOPER) to ensure the availability of PPE for emergency responders (CDC –
NIOSH, 2008). The selection of a PPE depends on the hazard, and the impact the hazard
will have on the victims (CDC – NIOSH, 2008; USDOL-OSHA, 2004).
Assumptions
This study made the assumptions that EMTs are the first medical responders in
emergency or disaster situations that may not include typical first responders such as
firefighters. For instance, in some organizations, some first responders have dual roles
such as EMTs and fire-fighters. This clarification is important because first responders is
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a loose term applied to all emergency workers, including the medical and military
personnel, police, fire-fighters, mobile intensive care nurses, EMTs, EMRs, advanced
emergency medical technicians, and paramedics, and disaster rescue volunteers (Garner,
Baker, & Hagelgans, 2016). Second, the study assumed that the participants would
provide data as truthfully as possible and grant access to their respective organizational
policies to make this study more reliable. However, this was not the case as participants
were reluctant to provide all needed data due to organizational policies and fear of
divulging confidential information. Finally, the study assumed that all EMTs joined the
emergency services at different times, received various training, and therefore, had an
adequate understanding of the bioterrorism preparedness and practices in their respective
workplaces. Although all participants acquired minimum training for certification, there
appear to be disparities in the level of their training, knowledge of PPE, and lack of
uniformity in training (NSTC, 2011).
Scope and Delimitations
The qualitative approach aligns very well with understanding how multiple stream
theory (MST) can be used to examine the potential threat of bioterrorism in New Jersey
and the emergency responses from EMTs, who are first medical responders, in the event
of possible biological attacks. Data were derived from interviews and government
documents. The scope of the study’s participants was limited to EMTs in a particular
County to the exclusions of other medical emergency responders in the area such as
paramedic and mobile intensive care nurses. The research focused on the County EMTs’
bioterrorism preparedness because of the county’s large population and the organizations’
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proximity to potential terrorist’s targets such as the Newark train station and the Newark
International Airport. However, the study’s findings may have the problem of
extrapolation to other counties because of local policies and practices that may differ
from county to county and city to city.
However, this limitation would still not prevent the study findings from possible
applicability to other counties. The study’s findings may be applied to understand the
bioterrorism preparedness of other HCWs, especially mobile intensive care nurses and
other first responders because they are among the first medical responders to disaster
areas. For instance, the police and firefighters are among the first to provide first aid
treatments to victims when disasters occur (Abatemarto et al., 2007).
Limitations
The overarching intent of this study was to examine and understand the
bioterrorism preparedness of EMTs. The aim was to explore the factors that can be put in
place for bioterrorism hardening of EMTs and extrapolate the findings to the other
emergency responders and HCWs.
The first limitation of this study is that it focused specifically on EMTs in one
county to the exclusion of EMTs in other counties who may have more informed views
of bioterrorism preparedness and hardening for Category A pathogens such as EVD. An
example is the County of Camden, which witnessed the anthrax attacks in 2001.
The second limitation was access to information such as the organizations’
emergency response manuals. Access to information such as emergency response
protocols are essential to the understanding of bioterrorism preparedness and indeed, all-
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hazard emergency response practices. I was under the impression that the study
participants would be eager to share information for better bioterrorism response
practices and policies.
The third limitation was that the study’s participants were EMT populations
outside the hospital because of the challenges they encounter as the first line of medical
defense against HIDs. The study could have gained from the experience of EMTs who
operate hospital-based emergency response services. Also, the study would have
included advanced emergency medical technicians who have greater knowledge in
providing basic medical treatment to patients.
Finally, I held the uninformed judgment that EMTs only transport patients to
hospitals with no authority or knowledge to offer basic medical treatment to patients.
When conducting the research, I was open-minded and never allowed my assumptions to
affect follow-up questions or data transcription. However, I established a trusting
relationship with the participants which created a good interview atmosphere for the
participants to provide accurate and detailed information.
The Significance of the Study
The significance of this study is that it helped bridge the gap in the literature by
(a) identifying factors that may contribute to bioterrorism hardening; (b) examining
factors that pose challenges in hardening EMSOs and EMTs; and (c) exploring how
policymakers can facilitate EMSOs and EMTs bioterrorism preparedness for cutaneous
biological agents such as EVD. The study examined the policy and political implications
of inadequately hardened EMSOs and EMTs. This research, therefore, contributed to the
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field of bioterrorism hardening by proffering a template for emergency response practices
by EMTs in the event of biological attacks or release of pathogens. The varied responses
during the 2014 Ebola epidemic demonstrated the need for a new approach to bioagent
preparedness policy among HCWs. The research findings provided needed data for
policy changes in bioterrorism preparedness and emergency response practices in the
County used for the study and possibly to other counties in New Jersey.
The CDC recommended the availability of appropriate AHFs, training of HCWs
and first responders, and policy guidelines for bioterrorism preparedness (CDC, 2015).
However, many AHFs and HCWs, including EMSOs and EMTs, appear not to conform
to the CDC’s guidelines for bioterrorism preparedness (NSTC, 2011; Rickles &
Catarious, 2015). Although some states’ agencies have developed collaborative initiatives
for bioterrorism hardening in response to the CDC’s recommendations (Smith &
Hewison, 2012), little research has been conducted to examine the EMSOs’ and EMTs’
bioterrorism preparedness, protection, and response for EVD in New Jersey. By
simultaneously examining EMTs practices and preparedness, by identifying lapses and
policy implications, the results of this study provided urgently needed data for policy
changes that would improve the bioterrorism preparedness and practices of EMSOs and
EMTs.
Significance to Theory
The study contributed to the advancement of the theoretical knowledge in
bioterrorism hardening among HCWs for HIDs or biological agents because of the
inherent threat they pose as possible weapons for biological attacks (Aghaei & Bagheri-
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Nesami, 2013; Jensen et al., 2014). Previous studies (Abro, 2016; Clancy, 2008; Gursky
& Bice, 2013; Hunter, Yang, Crawley, Biesiadecki, & Aragon, 2013; Katz, AttalJuncqua, & Fischer, 2017) have addressed government initiatives and HCWs
preparedness for inhaled biological agents such as anthrax, use of PPE and their
willingness to respond to bioterrorism attacks. The qualitative case study will help
advance the theoretical knowledge of bioterrorism through policy formulation, training
and education of EMTs in acquiring adequate knowledge of various infectious pathogens,
their characteristics, prevention strategies, and uniformity in bioterrorism response
practices.
Significance to Social Change

HCWs, especially EMTs in their roles as emergency responders, have limited
time to make decisions about caring for their patients while protecting themselves
from harm, infection and possibly infecting their colleagues (Ahmad et al., 2016). It is,
therefore, critically important that EMTs have bioterrorism preparedness readiness,
training, and PPE knowledge to protect themselves. This study is expected to bring about
attitudinal change, increased awareness and knowledge of biological agents among EMTs
and the public. The recognition of biological agents would increase stricter application of
precautionary measures when responding to emergencies, especially in this age of the
proliferation of biological agents.
The collateral social benefit is that EMTs’ bioterrorism response readiness will
protect the community from possible contamination and risk through secondary infection.
The study will bring about improvement to EMSOs and EMTs bioterrorism preparedness
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and practices while accounting for local needs and challenges. These improvements in
bioterrorism preparedness and practices have implications for social change through
policy formulation for enhanced community-level bioterrorism preparedness programs in
the local communities and the county as a whole.
Summary and Transition
Studies have shown that HCWs knowledge of PPE, training, and education are
critical to an effective bioterrorism preparedness (Abatemarco et al., 2007; Clancy, 2008;
Kabir, Naik, Kumar, & Bhas, 2016; Smith & Hewison, 2012). Critical to this
preparedness plan is uniformity across the levels of government in disaster response
plans, and EMTs’ awareness and knowledge of the potential bioagents. Following the
varied responses from various governments in the United States during the 2014 Ebola
epidemic, there was the need to examine bioterrorism preparedness of HCWs (Maras &
Miranda, 2016).
I used Kingdon’ MST to explore the nature of bioterrorism threats given that
terrorist groups are exploring the means to weaponize biological agents and the failed
response to the 2014 Ebola epidemic further exposed the vulnerabilities of HCWs to such
threats. The study noted that despite the huge financial commitments to bioterrorism
preparedness after the 2001 terrorist and anthrax attacks, bioterrorism preparedness
among HCWs continued to pose challenges. Also, few studies have addressed these
challenges in bioterrorism hardening and the continued threats from possible biological
attacks. The qualitative study’s findings were expected to help fill the gap in the literature
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by providing an understanding of the nature of the bioterrorism preparedness for
cutaneous diseases such as EVD.
I examined the problems and challenges confronting EMTs, identified the factors
for bioterrorism hardening, and explored how policymakers could help facilitate the
bioterrorism hardening processes using the theoretical framework of MST. In addressing
these challenges and preparedness, the study sought to answer the research questions:
How prepared are EMTs for cutaneous diseases, and what are the policy implications?
The study’s findings also sought to help increase understanding of the growing field of
bioterrorism preparedness. The findings, if implemented, may help policymakers
formulate policies and programs that would not only increase safety practices among
EMTs, but increase bioterrorism response readiness, and community-wide preparedness
in New Jersey. The findings can be extrapolated to other counties in New Jersey, and
nationally because when EVD struck, it was a national rather than New Jersey and Texas
problems. The study would help institute uniformity in EMTs’ policies and practices,
increase EMTs’ knowledge of pathogens and their characteristics, and mitigate secondary
infections.
In chapter 2, the literature review helped this study identify the challenges of
bioterrorism preparedness and policy actions that have been explored in the past. The
review of the literature also assisted in narrowing the study problem. To achieve this
goal, Kingdon’s MST facilitated the study’s understanding of the problem, the policy
choices, and policy implementation options for bioterrorism hardening.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Introduction
Bioterrorism preparedness and practices continued to pose unique challenges for
HCWs in the United States as was evident in the varied responses to the 2014 EVD
epidemic despite the policies and programs, and funding since the 2001 anthrax attacks
for biodefence initiatives (Cole, 2012; Wurtz, Grobusch, & Raoult, 2014). For instance,
in response to the 2014 – 2015 Ebola outbreaks, the United States Congress allocated
about $5.4 billion for preparedness and response both internationally and locally (Katz,
Attal-Juncqua, & Fischer, 2017). However, the varied responses from various state
governments during the Ebola epidemic raised public concerns about the preparedness of
HCWs for cutaneous forms of biological agents such as EVD, anthrax, and smallpox if
weaponized by terrorists (Gonsalves & Staley, 2014; Shultz, Baingana, & Neria, 2015).
The purpose of this qualitative case study was to examine EMTs’ bioterrorism
response practices and challenges and to identify factors that may influence policy
makers in formulating policies geared towards biodefense preparedness and practices
(bioterrorism hardening) for EMTs in New Jersey. This study was significant because
HCWs are often at higher risk of contracting any epidemic disease not known at the time
of the epidemic (Walker & Whitty, 2015). The higher risks within HCWs have often
resulted in more deaths within the HCW population relative to the general population, as
was evident in the 2014 EVD crisis in the West African sub-region (Fasina, Adenubi,
Ogundare, Shittu, Bwala, & Fasina, 2015). Also, EMTs exposure to any pathogen may
jeopardize community-wide public healthcare safety. Therefore, this study would help
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mitigate the risk of secondary infection among the EMT population and reduce potential
community-wide infection. Mitigating the secondary risk requires preparedness.
Preparedness or countering bioterrorism if efficiently planned and executed can reduce
casualty rates to 75% based on a simulation conducted by the Center for Nonproliferation
Studies (Jansen, Breeveld, Stijnis, & Grobusch, 2014).
In this chapter, I emphasize the relationship that the study’s theoretical framework
had with the research problem and questions. The theoretical framework for this study
was Kingdon’s MST. MST illustrates the inter-connectivity of problems, competing
solutions for these problems, and the politics involved in making policy decisions. The
basic tenets of this theory are the idea that, as the existing problems gain the attention of
policymakers, competing solutions begin to emerge, policymakers acknowledge the
problem, and agree with the proposed solution which they turn into policy (Cairney &
Jones, 2016).
There is an abundance of literature on bioterrorism preparedness policies and
plans since the anthrax attacks (Gursky & Bice, 2013; Lall et al., 2017; Smith &
Hewison, 2012). The literature reviewed showed the level of involvement of emergency
medical workers and HCWs in general in bioterrorism mitigation, and the impact of past
and current bioterrorism preparedness plans. However, the 2014 Ebola outbreaks and the
responses to the confirmed cases in the United States showed that all the years of
bioterrorism preparedness plans, programs and policies were inadequate (Stratton, 2014).
Stratton (2014), while acknowledging the failure of political leadership, laid the ultimate
blame on the healthcare community for the unpreparedness. The study, however, failed to
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acknowledge the pivotal roles that government policies and preparedness plans play in
establishing emergency response protocols and building critical public confidence
(Rosoff, Siko, John, & Burns, 2013).
Organization of the Review
The review of the literature began with an examination of the theoretical basis for
the study. This study explored the need for further research on EMTs bioterrorism
preparedness as threats from lone-wolf terrorists and terrorist groups, and bioterrorism
intensify. The subsequent sections of this chapter illustrated the literature review
strategies, the theoretical framework for the study, and the segments covered in the
literature review. The review of the literature section included the in-depth examination
of the history of bioterrorism; pathogens, bioterrorism, and HCWs’ preparedness
understanding of bioterrorism preparedness, history of emergency preparedness, policies,
and legislation in the United States, participants’ knowledge of cutaneous diseases, the
importance of bioterrorism preparedness, EMTs’ training, readiness and hardening, threat
assessment, vulnerability assessment, and bioterrorism preparedness in New Jersey.
Finally, the chapter reviewed the main issues covered in the literature. The essence of the
review of the literature was to understand how the existing literature aligned with this
study, identify the gap in the literature, and help address the literature gap.
Literature Search Strategy
The literature review focused on scholarly works on the questions of potential
weaponization of pathogens for terrorist attacks, the origin of bioterrorism, understanding
the meaning of bioterrorism preparedness, the preparedness of EMTs for bioterrorism,
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and policies about bioterrorism preparedness and response in post-2001 anthrax attacks
and post-Ebola epidemic. The major source of the literature review was from the Walden
University library databases: Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost, Sage Premier,
ProQuest Central, ProQuest, Political Science Complete, Google Scholars, Thoreau:
search multiple database, peer-reviewed journals retrieved from websites. Other sources
of the literature review included government agencies’ documents and policies from the
Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Department of Homeland Security
(DHS), the New Jersey Department of Health (NJDOH), and a county Office of
Emergency Management.
The keywords used in sourcing the study materials were biological agents,
threats; disaster preparedness, vulnerabilities, disaster; target hardening, terrorist
signaling; bioterrorism, response, preparedness; bioterrorism preparedness, qualitative
case study research; Ebola, Healthcare Workers, fatality; Ebola, Response, United
States; emergency medical technicians; bioterrorism and Ebola virus disease;
bioterrorism, pathogens, policy; qualitative, healthcare workers; bioterrorism,
preparedness response, policy; John Kingdon, multiple stream framework, problem
broker, policy and bioterrorism. The literature review showed the abundance of literature
on inhalational pathogens such as anthrax following the 2001 anthrax attacks, the
subsequent bioterrorism preparedness initiatives, and the safe handling of pathogens in
laboratories. There was also an abundance of literature on nurses and physicians’
bioterrorism training and preparedness in a hospital environment. However, there is the
scarcity of research on the protocols and practices involved in transporting patients to
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acute care facilities and the risks EMTs confront and the challenges in responding to
disaster victims.
The key search terms that resulted precisely in relevant and current articles from
Google Scholar and Thoreau: Search multiple databases include multiple stream theory;
bioterrorism, preparedness, Europe initiatives; bioterrorism, anthrax, United States;
anthrax, history, United States; policy; multiple stream theory, bioterrorism;
bioterrorism, Ebola, vulnerability; bioterrorism, policies, EMTs; infectious disease,
bioterrorism, United States; The Ebola Virus and the threat of bioterrorism;
Bioterrorism, qualitative research, healthcare workers, training, uniformity. Other
keywords that were useful in the iterative search for current and relevant articles include:
Bioterrorism; Bioterrorism, preparedness, policy; anthrax, United States; bioterrorism,
vulnerability, risk; bioterrorism, preparedness, response, policy; Emergency response,
Hurricane Sandy; Ebola, healthcare workers, fatality; Bioterrorism preparedness and
response act of 2002; Infectious disease, threat assessment, bioterrorism; bioagents,
diseases, bioterrorism; bioterrorism, Acts 2002; bioterrorism, Ebola, preparedness; and
bioterrorism, emergency, responses.
Theoretical Foundation
The theoretical foundation for this study was John Kingdon’s multiple stream
theory (Kingdon, 1984). MST emerged out of Kingdon’s inquisition to understand how
problems get solved through policies in the contest of competing solutions, and the
factors that influence decision-making at the national level. Knaggård (2015) viewed
MST as a useful tool for agenda-setting but noted that often studies using the theory laid
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less emphasis on the problem stream of the theory. MST origin was traced to the work
(garbage can model – GCM) of Cohen et al. (1972) as Brunner (2008) observed. GCM
has four streams: problems, solutions, participants, and choice opportunities (Brunner,
2008). Kingdon narrowed these streams to three: Problem, policy, and politics.
However, for MST to be a useful analysis for policy changes, there must be an
awareness of the existence of a problem usually after a disaster or an incident such as the
threat of bioterrorism and the question of EMTs’ preparedness to respond to possible bioattacks (Hayle, 2015; Hoeijmakers, De Leeuw, kenis, & De Vries, 2007; Katikireddi,
Hilton, Bonell, & Bond, 2014). The next step will be to seek for solutions to the problem
(policy stream). Finally, a window of opportunity such as a political change must exist
for both the problem and policy streams to converge and bring about desired policy
changes (Sabatier & Weible, 2014). Put differently, the problem stream refers to the
policy problems that need attention, the policy stream relates to the many policy solutions
from many sources including policymakers, experts and pressure groups, while the
politics stream pertains to the happenings within the government circle including change
in political leadership and pressures from public opinion that create the window of
opportunities for policy changes (Howlett, McConnell, & Perl, 2015).
The utility of the MST lies in the interconnectivity of a problem (problem stream),
competing solutions proposed by interest groups (policy stream), and existing events or
the public dispositions to the events (political stream) and the policymakers’
understanding of their constituents’ dispositions (Hayle, 2015). The theory addresses
policy changes that occur when the streams, though operating independently, converge
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through a window of opportunity. The basic tenets of MST are as follows: The presence
of issues that the public and policymakers want addressed (problem stream); the various
existing programs and competing solutions seeking acceptance (policy stream); and the
three elements: the national mood, pressure groups campaigns, and administrative or
legislative turnover that compete in the political stream (Sabatier and Weible, 2014). The
theory provides the theoretical foundation for analyzing the context and interplay of the
three streams in which policymakers make policies.
Many studies have used MST to address societal problems and policymakers have
used it to develop policies to solve problems. Avery (2004), used the theory to illustrate
how mismatching the streams can have larger policy implications. The study showed how
policy entrepreneurs mismatched the problem and a policy solution to a wrong political
stream following anthrax 2001 attacks. Avery (2004) argued that the mismatch arose by
labeling bioterrorism a security issue rather than a public health concern. The result of the
mismatch, Avery (2004) noted was that the United States lost a window of opportunity to
bring about health policy reforms that would have addressed health problems related to
the anthrax bio-attacks. Could a similar mismatch be responsible for the poor handling of
the Ebola epidemic in the US?
In another study, Brunner (2008) applied the theory in the case study of
Germany’s 2007 adoption of the low-carbon economy proposed by the European Union
(EU). The EU adopted the Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) in 2005. The ratification
of the ETS occurred despite the oppositions from interest groups within EU. One of such
interest groups was the chemical producers. In any event, the new policy emerged
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because there was an awareness that a problem existed that needed a solution;
suggestions on how to go solving the problem followed; and the window of opportunity
presented when German Chancellor became the EU President (Brunner, 2008). Germany
was forced to follow the wind of change sweeping the world for carbon reduction
measures. Brunner (2008) demonstrated the utility of MST, although, the study
recommended using it in combination with other approaches. MST was also applied to
examine local problem issues. Supporting the application of the theory to local problems,
Walhart (2013) advanced the argument for MST application in agencies’ decisionmaking processes. Walhart (2013) analyzed how MST was applied to improve patients’
outcome through problem identification, making the problem a policy issue before
policymakers, and influencing the development of new healthcare initiatives.
MST is also a useful theoretical framework because of its adaptability to many
public policy issues areas and changes within subnational governments and federal
agencies and not only for analyzing national government policy issues (Cairney & Jones,
2016; Larkin, 2012). Kingdon used the framework to discuss how the federal government
in a policy-making arena may advance policy changes in the context of the interplay of
the three streams. In this study, MST helped this qualitative case study identify
bioterrorism preparedness challenges or problems, threats, vulnerabilities, key players in
bioterrorism preparedness, emergency medical responses and policy making, and who or
what posed impediments to identifying factors necessary for bioterrorism hardening.
MST, for this study, rested on the assumption that, by identifying the
vulnerabilities of EMSOs and EMTs (problem) and proffering different possible
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perspectives for EMTs hardening (policy), policymakers can be pressured to enact laws
or policies that will bring about EMSOs and EMTs bioterrorism readiness initiatives
(politics). The make-up of the political streams for this study consists of policymakers at
the state, county, and city levels, and management of EMSOs.
The importance of the theory to the current study was in its ability to help
examine and understand the “objective condition” that opened policy windows for
solutions to solving the inadequate bioagent preparedness among HCWs (Hayle, 2015).
MST was, therefore, a useful tool in the examination of the bioterrorism preparedness
and practices among EMTs in New Jersey, especially in a post-Ebola epidemic. The
existing literature demonstrated the need to examine bioterrorism preparedness among
HCWs after the Ebola epidemic. The MST as a theoretical framework was a useful tool
to examine the challenges of bioterrorism preparedness and emergency response practices
(BT/ERPs) for cutaneous disease such as Ebola. As a result, the interview and research
questions were framed to get adequate information from the research participants to
reflect on the current practices and identify areas of improvement for the safety of EMTs
and the community. Finally, MST was a useful analytical tool for examining problems,
exploring available policies/solutions, and the politics involved in making policies
choices. Overall, the theoretical framework, the research questions and the methods of
inquiry assisted the study in examining and understanding the threats posed by
bioterrorism, the vulnerabilities, and the need for bioterrorism hardening.
Literature Review
A Historical Overview
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This section began with a description of the history of bioterrorism, and
emergency service operations in the United States. Bioterrorism has existed for centuries
dating back to the 14th century BC (Barras & Greub, 2014). Bioterrorism, the intentional
introduction of infectious diseases or biological agents into food, water or air (Maras &
Miranda, 2016) or for biological warfare (use of cadavers and contagions, and pollution
of wells for enemy armies) could be traced to 600 B.C through to the 20th century
(Taylor, 2015). In the 14th Century, during the Roman civilization and as the wars raged,
water supplies were poisoned with dead rodents; and in the 1700s, British soldiers used
blankets infested with smallpox to attack French soldiers (Patidar, Singh, Jaiswal,
Chaudhary, & Samadi, 2013).
It was suspected that infectious diseases were deployed in the World War I and
that prompted the 1925 Geneva Protocol to curtail the use of bioagents as weapons for
warfare (Cenciarelli et al., 2013). Commonly used bioagents are anthrax and smallpox,
and they were deployed during World War I and World War II (Barras & Greub, 2014;
Berger & Moreno, 2010). Other historical incidents, attacks or warfare that utilized
bioagents included Anthrax and Bubonic plague deployments of 1937 by Japan’s Unit
731, the 1984 Rajneeshee Religious Salmonella typhimurium attack, 1995 Aum
Shinrikyo Cult sarin gas of 1995, and the 2001 anthrax attacks in the United States
(Tambunam, Parikesit, &, Saputro, 2014). And the threats of, and actual biological
attacks have progressively increased since 1970 (Greub & Grobusch, 2014).
Pathogens are threats to both HCWs and the community because they are easier to
procure and can be transmitted from a human to another human covertly (Maras and
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Miranda, 2016). Hence, EMTs capability to identify when biological attacks happen is
critical to their understanding of how to contain the pathogens and avoid further risk to
themselves and the community (Cenciarelli et al., 2013).
In 1976, another highly infectious disease (HID) Ebola viral hemorrhagic fever
(VHF) or Ebola virus disease (EVD or Ebola), and a potentially deployable bioagent with
a fatality rate of between 50% and 90% first manifested in Sudan (Maras & Miranda,
2016; Passi et al., 2015; Taylor, 2015). In 2014, the disease manifested in West African
and the United States (CDC, 2016b). And some studies (Caro et al. 2015; Cenciarelli et
al. 2015; Maras & Maranda, 2016) have noted the potentials of Ebola as a biological
agent and the difficulty in identifying its’ manifestation as was the case with the Liberian
(Tim Duncan) who was treated in a Texas hospital. The responses to Mr. Duncan’s case
further heightened the public concerns of the state of preparedness in the United States
for an epidemic or release of biological agent despite the PAHPR Act of 2013 (Monroe,
2014).
Pathogens, Bioterrorism, and HCWs’ Preparedness
Pathogens are threats to both HCWs and the community because they are easier to
procure and can be transmitted from a human to another human covertly (Maras &
Miranda, 2016). Hence, HCWs’ and EMTs’ capability to identify when biological attacks
happen is critical to them understanding how to contain the pathogens from further
risking themselves and the community (Cenciarelli et al., 2013). Multiple studies
(Burnette, Hess, Kozlovac, & Richmond, 2013; Hasan, 2014; Klein et al., 2016;
MacIntyre, 2015; Menrath, Tomuzia, Frentzel, Braeunig, & Appel, 2014; Oladimeji et
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al., 2015; Rickles & Catarious, 2015) agree on the bio-threats from terrorist groups and
the lack of adequate training, education, and uniformity among EMTs and HCWs.
MacIntyre (2015) recognized the increasing threats posed by the scientific developments
and the accessibilities of terrorist groups and state-sponsors of terrorism to potential
bioagents especially dual-use research of concern (DURU). Another issue of concern was
EMTs’ knowledge of potential bioagents and insider threats from research biologists.
MacIntyre (2015) further argued that these issues are compounded by the lack of
adequate training and policies and recommended bioterrorism response strategies against
unnatural pathogens. In another study, Menrath et al. (2014) noted the high probability of
bioterrorism but acknowledged the lack of clear assessment of the threats posed by
bioagents. Menrath et al. (2014) used the semi-quantitative risk evaluation approach. The
authors measured the risk using probability - impact analysis factors including access to
the bioagents, production probability, and historic use. The usefulness of the study was
the usage of ranking to develop an effective bioterrorism response strategy. However, the
study unlike the study by MacIntyre (2015) did not recognize the difficulty in evaluating
emerging or new infectious diseases.
Similarly, the study by Oladimeji et al. (2015) went beyond the theoretical
preparedness for an emerging disease to use the 2014 Ebola incidence to assess the
preparedness, practices, and knowledge of HCWs for such potential bioagents. The crosssectional design study in Nigeria used stratified sampling technique and conducted a
semi-structured interview process to assess the occupational health hazards HCWs face in
their daily activities. The study assessed respondents’ knowledge of Ebola and their
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precautionary measures to avoid personal risks and community-wide infections during
the 2014 Ebola epidemic. The study found discrepancies among HCWs knowledge of
Ebola and inadequate and ineffective response practices. The study’s finding suggested
that higher knowledge of Ebola and better practices were located among medical doctors.
This qualitative case study focused on EMTs, a sub-group of HCWs, who are not as well
educated as medical doctors, and the study was conducted post-Ebola epidemic.
Although the qualitative research study by Hasan (2014) aligned largely with the
study by Oladimeji et al. (2015) they, however, deferred from each other because Hasan
(2014) emphasized more on both state and nonstate actors developing hybrid biological
agents such as black pox (a hybrid of smallpox and Ebola). The study pointed to the ongoing hybrid development of bioagents in countries such as Syria, Iran, and North Korea
who are in coalition with terrorist groups in the Middle East region. The usefulness of the
study by Hasan (2014) to this case study was essentially on its recommendations for preand post-bioterrorism preparedness responses and practices, and training of medical staff
including emergency workers given the existence of active bioweapon programs by state
and nonstate actors.
Murali, Ordóñez, and Dessouky (2012) noted that a major preparedness response
strategy and practice is the question of distributing strategic national stockpile to address
huge demands in the event of a large-scale biological attack. Such preparedness included
training medical personals such as EMTs. Another preparedness response strategy would
involve a partnership between public environmental health and emergency preparedness
and response (EPR) programs in collaboration with local communities of which
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emergency medical workers are major components (Gamboa-Maldonado, Marshak,
Sinclair, Montgomery, & Dyjack, 2012). Although Gamboa-Maldonado et al. (2012)
focused on environmental health and EPR strategies for emergency workers, the findings
could be used in response to biological attacks if EMTs have adequate knowledge of
bioagents and are well trained. The study found that environmental health professionals
are not trained in disaster emergency and bioterrorism responses.
The study by Potter et al. (2012) mirrored the study by Murali, et al. (2012) but
focused on strategic national stockpile distribution preparedness and strategies among
states in response to potential disaster situations such as epidemics. The study used the
CDC recommended strategic national stockpile scores to assess states’ preparedness for
influenza and stockpile distribution within a reasonable time frame. The CDC study
found disparities in training, exercising and distribution of medical and pharmaceutical
supplies among states. Potter et al. (2012) recommended increased funding towards
improving the scores of the low-scoring states to improve the national preparedness for
strategic national stockpile distribution. The study is important because it reflected the
disparities in the States’ Ebola responses when the disease emerged in the US. EMTs,
though charged with emergency medical response responsibilities lacked adequate and
uniform training and education (Klein et al., 2016; Rickles & Catarious, 2015).
In an earlier study, Keranen (2011) found that the reemergence of formally
eradicated potential bioagents such as smallpox was a source of concern and indicated the
need for preparedness and planning. The reason Keranen (2011) adduced for the potential
reemergence of the bioagents are the available stockpiles in various laboratories.
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However, the importance of the research is in its acknowledgment of diverse views on
the possibility of bioterrorism attacks: high and low probabilities. Despite the
polarization, Keranen (2011) noted the overwhelming view among policymakers and the
general population that the chances for biological attacks were higher than lower, and,
therefore, the urgent need for bioterrorism preparedness policies and practices.
Klein et al. (2016) survey design analyzed 403 completed and returned
questionnaires on the use of a triage system to assess mass casualty incident in
emergencies response among emergency medical providers. Triage knowledge
(protocols, transportation of patients, and life-saving interventions) among EMS
personnel is essential for the mitigation of risk in emergencies. Although the study found
the importance of triage experience for medical emergency response, it recommended a
follow-up qualitative research on what influences EMS initial triage decisions. The
strength of the Klein et al. (2016) was in using triage assessment to get HCWs and EMTs
ready for mass casualty incident and transporting patients to healthcare facilities. Second,
a similar assessment strategy may be used to evaluate bioterrorism preparedness of
EMTs.
Understanding Bioterrorism Preparedness
Preparedness or public health emergency preparedness and response (PHEPR)
presupposes getting ready for the unknown happening, preventing the occurrence of
emergency situations, and planning to respond appropriately to mitigate the effect of the
emergency (Hedman, Knutsson, Ansell, Radstrom, & Rasmusson, 2013; Nemane, 2012;
Revere et al., 2011; Washington State Department of Health, 2016). Bioterrorism, on the
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other hand, is the intentional release of pathogens by state actors and nonstate actors
using micro-organism (pathogens) to create terror, cause injuries and death (Streatﬁeld,
Kushnir, & Yusibov, 2015; Tambunan, et al., 2014). For bioterrorism to happen, there
must be what Cenciarelli et al. (2013) referred to as two actors or activities: pathogens in
the forms of bacteria, viruses or toxins, and means of dissemination.
Bioterrorism preparedness requires unique knowledge acquisition on bioterrorism
management; is a continuous process and the knowledge needs to be updated
intermittently. Hedman et al. (2013) while describing bioterrorism preparedness focused
on a different area of bioterrorism: agroterrorism. A subset of bioterrorism, agroterrorism is the use of bioagents to attack animals and plants. The study’s approach to
bioterrorism preparedness against agro-terrorism was a diagnostic preparedness response
strategy against overt and covert bio-attacks.
In a study on building community resilience in a large urban county, Plough et al.
(2013) noted that after 9/11 and the subsequent post-2001 anthrax incidents, emergency
preparedness took center stage in public healthcare practice. Some of the elements of the
emergency preparedness initiatives of the CDC PHEPR included building preparedness
capabilities for emergency responses and responders and HCWs having knowledge of
potential bioagents and their respective characteristics. The strength of Plough et al.’s
study rested on its focus on community resilience through community cohesion, trust, and
acquiring and transferring knowledge, similar to the study conducted by GamboaMaldonado et al. (2012). Though both studies (Gamboa-Maldonado et al., 2012; Plough
et al., 2013) did not particularly address bioterrorism preparedness in-depth, they were
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significant in providing an understanding of the way forward for EMTs and HCWs’
bioterrorism preparedness and knowledge acquisition because EMTs operate in local
communities.
Improving preparedness capabilities and bioterrorism responses are major
concerns within the public health system because HCWs and emergency responders
appear unprepared for disasters or bioterrorism response (Whetzel, Walker-Cillo, Chan,
& Trivett, 2013). An important population of HCWs for bioterrorism preparedness and
responses is EMTs because they are often the first emergency workers in mitigating the
impact of disaster including bioterrorism.
Therefore, this study examined bioterrorism policies and practices of EMTs in the
selected County to understand how it would contribute to improving bioterrorism
preparedness, responses, and practices in New Jersey. The study also has implications for
EMTs safety and community-wide protection in the event of biological attacks by
terrorists. There is was equally the need to update EMTs’ knowledge of PPE, potential
bioagents regularly, and characteristics of bioagents to be able to prevent or mitigate the
impact of the bioterrorism and loss of lives among EMTs’ population and the wider
community.
The literature review further demonstrated the importance of bioterrorism
preparedness policies, and the need to harden EMTs through uniformity in training,
education, and response strategies and practices. EMTs’ hardening would have the added
implications for community-wide bioterrorism preparedness in New Jersey. Studies
indicated that EMTs face numerous challenges in disaster responses including lack of
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uniformity in training, inadequate training, poor knowledge of potential pathogens’
characteristics, and inadequate response strategies or practices (Gilmore, et al., 2007;
Taschner, Nannini, Laccetti, & Greene, 2016).
Taschner et al. (2016), used a qualitative case study approach and snowball
technique and interviewed 12 participants on emergency responders’ preparedness in the
hospital environment. Taschner et al. (2016) used the systems framework for catastrophic
disaster response to analyze the problems inherent in medical emergency responses in
hospitals and the need for standardized training. The study recommended further research
on standardized training for HCWs and emergency response because emergency response
practices are dynamic. The evident failure of the emergency preparedness plans during
the Ebola epidemic supports the findings and recommendations of Taschner et al. (2016).
The strength of the Taschner et al. (2016) was in its recommendation for continued
training for emergency responders. Unfortunately, the study did not include bioterrorism
preparedness and response in the study. Taschner et al. (2016) demonstrated the literature
gap in the field of bioterrorism hardening among HCWs and especially EMTs.
After the 2001 anthrax attacks and 2014 Ebola epidemic, many studies examined
bioterrorism preparedness among HCWs and government preparedness policies, and
found lapses and unpreparedness (Khan, 2011; Smith & Hewison, 2012; Staiti, Katz, &
Hoadley, 2003; Steed, Howe, Pruitt, & Sherrill, 2004; Taylor, 2015). Khan (2011)
informed that HCWs and the United States governments were ill-prepared for the 2001
anthrax attacks. The American Academy of Family Physicians (AAFP) and the Agency
for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHCRQ) further noted that public health care
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providers were largely unprepared for bioterrorist attacks and disasters (Abraham et al.,
2012). Abraham et al. (2012) conducted five tabletop scenarios to assess the level of
bioterrorism preparedness among HCWs including EMTs, and how they can benefit from
practically simulated scenarios on preparedness, threats, and potential biological attacks.
The study (Abraham et al., 2012) was a departure from most studies on
bioterrorism preparedness because the participants’ pool of HCWs were from different
healthcare backgrounds and were mixed in each tabletop scenario. The problem with this
study was that the result might not have accurately reflected preparedness in each HCWs’
group such as EMTs. This assumption was because each group of HCWs, depending on
the services they provide, operate differently and at different stages of the healthcare or
disaster responses. For instance, EMTs largely function in a pre-hospital environment,
unlike other HCWs who function in a hospital environment.
Interestingly, the study by Markenson, Reilly, and DiMaggio (2005) examined the
effects of inadequate training of EMS providers for bioterrorism, chemical, and
radiological terrorism. Markenson et al. (2005) observed that EMTs and paramedics
received few and inadequate CBRN training (6.5%) compare to other disaster response
areas. Studies conducted by the National Science and Technology Council Committee
(2011) and Rickles and Catarious (2015) supported the findings by Markenson et al.
(2005). Although other areas of disaster response training performed better, they were
nonetheless inadequate despite the 2001 anthrax attacks and the significant resources
committed to biodefense (Cole, 2012; Markenson et al, 2005). Similarly, in 2007,
Abatemarto et al. (2007) researched with 18 certified EMTs that showed lack of
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preparedness protocol among EMTs in New Jersey during the anthrax attacks of 2001.
The study noted that the lack of bioterrorism preparedness put the EMTs in high-risks of
exposure in the event of bio-attacks and potentially create a community-wide
bioterrorism risk. My qualitative case study built on the study by Markenson et al. (2005)
and following the 2014 Ebola epidemic with a focus on EMTs’ bioterrorism preparedness
practices including uniformity in training, education, response protocols, and knowledge
of potential bioagents and their characteristics.
The inadequate CBRN training for operators of EMS has not changed despite the
2001 anthrax attacks as Markenson et al. (2005)’s longitudinal survey sampling study
showed. The report of AAFP and AHCRQ shared similar conclusions (Abraham et al.,
2012). Similarly, following the 2014 Ebola epidemic, Maras and Miranda (2016)
examined the epidemiology of Ebola, and its possible weaponization, and further noted
the lack of preparedness for large-scale Ebola attack or outbreak and inadequate training
of HCWs for bioattacks or infectious diseases. Though Markenson et al. (2005) and
Abraham et al. (2012) helped our understanding of the state of HCWs bioterrorism
preparedness; they did not conduct small studies on cutaneous forms of pathogens that
have potentials for weaponization unlike Maras and Miranda (2016). On the other hand,
Gamboa-Maldonado et al. (2012), examined how environmental health and emergency
preparedness response (EPR) can help build the enabling environment for community
disaster responses. Gamboa-Maldonado et al. (2012) demonstrated the important roles
local communities and emergency responders play in disaster management and
recommended doing so in collaboration with other levels of government. The qualitative
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study was conducted with semi-structured interviews approach and non-probability
sampling methods that involved 14 study participants. The study found that little
attention had focused on the training needs for bioterrorism responses and practices. The
study’s findings were particularly relevant to my study because it supported the need to
further examine and understand the training needs of EMTs in bioterrorism response and
identify factors for instituting best emergency response practices.
Rokach et al. (2010) conducted a qualitative inquiry that examined the
relationship between the HCWs having accurate and up to date knowledge of a disease
(anthrax) and their willingness to respond to disaster situations. The inquiry concluded
that HCWs with less knowledge of an infection disease are more likely to doubt their
ability and therefore less willingness to respond to bioterrorism. Despite the finding of
the research, the study had one critical limitation: It focused on non-contagious disease.
Nonetheless, the study was significant to my qualitative case study by its
recommendation for further studies that would examine how PPE can enhance HCWs’
willingness to treat biological attack victims.
Though Fernandez et al. (2011)’s quantitative survey study highlighted the
training of EMS operators, the research focused on terrorism and disaster preparedness
with little attention to biological, chemical and nuclear preparedness. The study noted
that insufficient funding for terrorism and emergency preparedness and lack of
uniformity in education were key issues militating against adequate preparedness among
EMS workers despite the finding that there was a positive relationship between training
and emergency responses. Fernandez et al. (2011) concluded by recommending
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performing real-world disaster assessment of the impact of training on disaster response
performance and preparedness. However, the study was limited by the high number of
respondents who provided insufficient responses because of the method of data
collection: mail-in survey technique. In another research, Henderson (2014) discovered
that training on counterterrorism measures among first responders focused on chemical
weapons and explosive devices with little examination of biological weapons and the
control of outbreaks of infectious diseases.
In conclusion, Abraham et al. (2012); Cole (2012); Fernandez et al. (2011);
Gamboa-Maldonado et al. (2012); Henderson (2014); Maras and Miranda (2016);
Markenson et al. (2005); Rokach et al. (2010); and Taschner (2016) contributed to
knowledge by highlighting the need to further examine and understand how HCWs
especially EMTs can be further hardened for potential biological attacks. These
recommendations were significant given the varied, incoherent, and inadequate Ebola
epidemic response from the various level of governments in the United States (Maras and
Miranda, 2016; Stratton, 2014).
History of Emergency Preparedness, Policies, and Legislations in the United States
Threats of potential biological attacks from some nations and terrorist agents have
increased since the 2001 terrorist and anthrax attacks (Gamboa-Maldonado et al., 2012;
Khan, 2011; May, Jochim, & Sapotichne, 2011). Cenciarelli et al. (2013) and Maras and
Miranda (2016) conducted studies that underscored the continuous research by terrorist
groups to acquire bioweapons despite the 1925 and 1972 Conventions and protocols that
prohibited the use of bioagents. Hence the increased policies, programs, and legislation
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on bioterrorism preparedness in the United States since the anthrax incidents in 2001 and
the increased need for collaborations between the levels of governments (GamboaMaldonado et al., 2012).
The 2001 terrorist and anthrax attacks raised public concerns and brought about
increased terrorist and bioterrorism policies, programs and legislation. In 2002 after the
anthrax attacks, the Bush Administration enacted the Bioterrorism Act: The U.S. Public
Health Security and Bioterrorism Act (U.S. BTA) of 2002 (Cinturati, 2014). The U.S.
Bioterrorism Act marked a strategic shift towards bioterrorism prevention, preparedness,
response, mitigation, and recovery. However, before the 2002 BTA, there were other
Acts created to prevent the use of bioagents in the United States. Examples of the Acts
enacted for bioterrorism preparedness and response plans included the 1995 Biological
Weapons Antiterrorism Act (BWA Act) and The Defense Against Weapons of Mass
Destruction Act (DWMD Act) of 1996. Also, in 1995, the USG promulgated the
Presidential Decision Directive No. 39 (PDD-39) for bioterrorism preparedness following
the sarin gas attack in Japan, and the Russian Government manipulation of smallpox for
potential bioterrorism (Avery, 2004). In 1996, the PDD-39 was followed by the DWMD
Act, Public Law 104-201 to prepare and train state and local agencies against WMD
(Seiple, 1997). The DWMD Act recognized the inadequacy of emergency responders for
chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear agents and materials. Despite these Acts,
the 2001 anthrax incidents occurred with the resultant casualties and injuries: 5 deaths
and 17 injuries (Bush & Perez, 2012).
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In 2000, following the rise of infectious diseases such as variola virus, the
contagious causative agent of smallpox, the CDC Strategic Planning Workgroup (CDCSPWG) initiated bioterrorism preparedness strategies. The CDC-SPWG, noted the
importance of early detection in bioterrorism preparedness as did the study conducted by
Seiner et al. (2013). The group added that preparedness for bioterrorism depends on the
federal, state, and local governments with a strong public health system, especially for
first responders who are most at risk. The CDC-SPWG also recognized the critical roles
emergency workers perform at the local government level in disaster management,
mitigation, recovery and response, and their important roles when responding to strange
illnesses and injuries (CDC, 2000). Seiner et al. (2013) conducted a quantitative study
that used polymerase chain reaction (PCR), a detection system to identify genetic
characteristics of bioagents. The study and the findings of the use of PCR (PCR:
minimized errors in pathogen identification) are significant because they have the
potentials to help mitigate secondary infections.
Although the issue of weaponized HIDs had been of concern to successive United
States governments, it was President Bill Clinton’s Administration that elevated
bioterrorism preparedness to a national security priority (Fidler, 2003). Grundmann
(2014) discussed preparedness after the 2001 anthrax attacks among the levels of
government and the challenges preparedness posed to HCWs in detecting the nature and
characteristics of pathogens and in responding to biological agent dissemination or
attacks. Although, public health emergency preparedness (PHEP) for HIDs and other
hazards pose challenges to HCWs, Khan et al. (2015), however, informed that effective
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PHEP and response practices are critical to mitigating the community-wide impact of allhazards emergencies. Hence, the understanding of the preparedness and response
readiness of EMTs is important.
The U.S. BTA of 2002 was in response to the 2001 anthrax attacks, and aimed to
prevent, prepare and respond to future acts of bioterrorism (Nemane, 2012). Additional
goals of the 2002 BTA included proper training through the conduct of exercises to
ascertain the response readiness and capabilities of emergency responders, and the public
health system (United States Congress, 2002). Are EMTs in New Jersey knowledgeable
enough, adequately educated and trained to meet these national preparedness
requirements of the 2002 BT Act? I explored this question which aligned with the
research questions for this study.
In 2003, the USG issued the Homeland Security Presidential Directive-8 (HSPD8) for the DHS to create a national domestic preparedness plan for human-made and
natural disasters. The results of the HSPD-8 directive were the 2007 National
Preparedness Guidelines: National Preparedness Vision; National Planning Scenarios;
Universal Task List, and Target Capabilities List (Fry-Pierce & Lenze, 2011). The Target
Capabilities List (TCL) contained 37 capabilities for which all levels of government,
communities and the private sector must collectively engage in for adequate disaster
response. Although the TCL focused on terrorism and disaster response capabilities, the
capabilities list can be extrapolated to bioterrorism preparedness and response capabilities
(Fry-Pierce & Lenze, 2011). Despite these changes in the government bioterrorism
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program, policies, and preparedness plans, Fry-Pierce and Lenze (2011) noted that there
was still inadequate preparedness for potential biological attacks.
Also, in 2004, the U.S. Congress enacted the Project Bioshield Act of 2004
(P.L.108.276) and earmarked $5.6b for stockpiling drugs to combat bioterrorism
(Monroe, 2014; Gottron, 2014). Project Bioshield was enacted for bioterrorism
preparedness countermeasures against bioagents including Bacillus anthracis, Ebola
virus, and Variola virus. The United States government classified these agents Bacillus
anthracis (anthrax), Ebola virus (hemorrhagic fever) and Variola virus (smallpox)
as posing substantial national threats (Gottron, 2014).
In 2011, the Obama Administration enacted the Presidential Policy Directive-8
(PPD-8) to strengthen HSPD-8. The PPD-8 that replaced the Bush Administration’s
HSPD-8 was enacted to identify potential threats and create integrated approaches for
mitigating terrorism threats (Caudle, 2012). These Presidential Directives further
reaffirmed the need for preparedness programs and policies. The PPD-8 also developed
national preparedness capabilities for preventing, protecting against, mitigating the
effects of, responding to, and recovering from “those threats that pose the greatest risk to
the security of the Nation” (Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 2015). The PPD-8
also targeted pathogens that have been weaponized in the past and those that have the
potentials for use as biological weapons. Again, in 2013, the Congress re-authorized the
Project BioShield procurement program with The Pandemic and All-Hazard
Preparedness Reauthorization Act PAHPR Act (P.L. 113-5) and allocated $2.8b for the
2014 – 2018 fiscal years. Despite the BTA of 2002, the Project BioShield of 2004, the
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HSPD-8, PPD-8, and the PAHPR Act, when EVD struck, the U.S. health emergency
response systems appeared unprepared and inadequate.
Biological weapons are pathogens that have potentials for conversion into
biological agents (Ananthula, Sama, Pamukuntla, & Adepu, 2012; Anderson & Boker,
2012). They include smallpox, anthrax, Ebola, influenza, and Botulism. These pathogens
pose greater risks than conventional attacks by explosives because they are often covert
and difficult to detect before they become fatal (Gunaratne, 2015). The covert mode of
disseminating pathogens make them both challenging and dangerous for HCWs. Using
the Presidential Policy Directive-8 (PPD-8) as a guide, one approach to mitigating the
effect of weaponized biological agents is knowing their respective attributes (Patidar et
al., 2013). Although the threat of bioterrorist attacks has heightened and protection
against bioagents and detecting the agents are also difficult, but HCWs’ ability to
recognize, manage diseases associated with bioterrorism events and stay abreast of new
developments would help mitigate the effects of bioterrorism (Southern Illinois
University, School of Medicine, 2017).
How knowledgeable are EMTs of cutaneous biological agents’ characteristics?
This study explored this question as one of the preparedness practices for bioterrorism
hardening. Although some studies (Hayman, 2010; Galada et al. 2013) demonstrated that
hardening HCWs, EMTs, and first responders are the first step towards saving lives and
reducing casualties in bio-attacks, none examined EMTs’ preparedness against cutaneous
forms of pathogens in New Jersey.
The Literature on Knowledge of Cutaneous diseases or HIDs
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The terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001, by the terrorist
group, al Qaeda, and the subsequent anthrax attacks shattered the aura of invincibility and
(bio)terrorism preparedness and also created global apprehension (Toomey & Singleton,
2014). The terrorist group’s attacks on the New York World Trade Center, the Pentagon
in Washington DC, and Pennsylvania and the 2001 anthrax attacks jolted policymakers
and brought about the 2002 Bioterrorism Act (Cinturati, 2014). Also, the 2001 anthrax
attacks raised further concerns that other bioterrorist attacks were imminent (Hunger,
2014). Significantly, the 2001 terrorist attacks showed the extent to which terrorists
would go to create panic and destabilize the socio-economic well-being of any nation.
Potential weapons for bioterrorism are highly infectious diseases (HIDs), and they
include Ebola, anthrax, and smallpox. The European Network for Infectious Diseases
(EUND) described HIDs as diseases that can be transferred from persons to persons, can
cause death, and cause serious hazards that would require unique control measures
(Schilling et al., 2009).
The terrorist attacks galvanized not only the USG but also world and regional
leaders and organizations. For example, following the 9/11 and anthrax attacks, the
European Union (EU) initiated bioterrorism preparedness programs and health security
framework that focused on prevention, preparedness, and response strategies (Elbe,
Roemer-Mahler, & Long, 2014). The EU commission’s bioterrorism preparedness
program was similar to the U.S. Bioterrorism Act and other subsequent U.S. bioterrorism
programs and policies such as the pharmaceutical stockpiles for antiviral medications
(Elbe et al., 2014). The EU bio-program viewed bioterrorism readiness as a public health
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policy issue that required adequate responses to bio-incidents in the following areas:
prevention, protection, first responders’ readiness, prosecution, surveillance, research,
recovery (Casale, 2010). Other aspects of the EU bioterrorism preparedness initiatives
like the U.S. BTA was the EU CBRN Action Plan that sort to put into action the CEN
Workshop Agreement 15793: 2011, (CWA 15793) also known as the “Laboratory biorisk management”, and the development of emergency response templates (Sundqvist et
al., 2013). Canyon (2009) conducted a ten self-assessment survey of public health
professionals’ bioterrorism preparedness and competencies in Australia. The research
showed that clinicians in Australia were ill-prepared for biological attacks which had
serious implications for HCWs safety, management of biological attacks, and prevention
of the endangerment of the larger population. Canyon (2009)’s quantitative study and the
EU initiatives were indications of global apprehension of potential bioterrorism. Despite
the apprehension, few studies addressed EMTs’ preparedness and community-wide
readiness for possible biological attacks.
In another work, Berger and Moreno (2010) conducted a study on healthcare
professionals’ bioterrorism response based on two possible policy approaches. Berger
and Moreno discussed the two bioterrorism response approaches namely, coercive model
and cooperative model. The coercive model includes quarantines, confinements,
mandatory vaccinations, and other measures public health workers may choose to contain
the effects of biological attacks. An example of a coercive model is the Model State
Emergency Health Powers Act (MSEHPA). The cooperative model involves the use of
information to educate public health workers and respect for civil right even as public
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officials attempt to contain the disaster. Berger and Moreno (2010) concluded that
although the cooperative model is more effective in bioterrorism response, a combination
of both models would be most appropriate.
Berger and Moreno (2010) focused on bioterrorism preparedness, prevention,
response and mitigation from the point to view of policymakers’ bioterrorism policy. The
study as compelling as it was, did not address how HCWs and EMTs fit into any of the
approaches or a hybrid of both. In a cross-sectional inventory study that adopted the
portfolio analysis approach, Shelton et al. (2012) examined 1,593 projects and discovered
that over 66% of those projects focused on biological threats. The projects involved nonclassified national health security research that was mostly sponsored by the National
Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases. The authors contributed to the knowledge
about the national approach to bioterrorism preparedness which further justified the need
to explore bioterrorism hardening and preparedness among emergency workers. The
study also highlighted the need to involve the private sector in national security matters.
Non-hospital based EMTs are critical aspects of the private sector participation in
emergency medical response.
Smith and Hewison (2012) explored the existential threats of bioterrorism and the
roles and vulnerabilities of hospital nurses. The study found that despite the U.S.
bioterrorism preparedness policies, programs, and legislations hospital nurses were
inadequately trained and prepared. The study noted that the inadequate bioterrorism
preparedness had implications for bioterrorism mitigation and suggested that bioterrorism
training should be conducted along with infection control education. Besides the nurses’
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roles in the ER department, mobile intensive care nurses often work alongside EMTs in a
prehospital environment and administer advanced treatment to disaster patients. Although
Smith and Hewison (2012) focused on hospital nurses, it excluded mobile intensive care
nurses and EMTs who often are first medical responders to disaster situations. This
qualitative study addressed this gap in the literature.
Aghaei and Nesami (2013) similarly conducted research that focused on nurses
but on nurses’ education and its impact on their bioterrorism response and mitigation.
Aghaei and Nesami (2013) demonstrated that education was effective in making nurses
bioterrorism ready: Before bioterrorism education, 67.7% had low-knowledge, and after
education, 98.5% had good knowledge of bioterrorism. The study also found a similar
effect of education and training on physicians. Again, Aghaei and Nesami (2013) and
Smith and Hewison (2012) omitted critical chain in bioterrorism preparedness: EMTs,
who are the healthcare population most at risk when responding to bioterrorism. Barnett
et al. (2012) conducted a cross-sectional qualitative study of 8 urban and rural local
health departments (LHDs) and 2993 LHD workers’ (LHDWs) willingness to respond to
an all-hazard emergency scenario. Part of the emergency scenario involved bioterrorism.
The study found that all-hazard preparedness initiatives have different impacts on
willingness to respond among emergency local and urban HCWs. For instance, the
research finding suggested that an “effective scenario-based risk awareness assessment”
has a positive impact on increased knowledge and a higher level of willingness to
respond. First responders were part of the study, but like the tabletop scenario study by
Abraham et al. (2012), they were not a good representative of EMTs’ capability and
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willingness to respond to anthrax bioterrorism (a bioagent). The study very much
acknowledged this limitation. Barnett et al. (2012)’s study was, however, significant
because LHWs showed a higher rate of willingness to respond towards bioterrorism than
other categories including radiological hazards.
The significance of these studies (Aghaei & Nesami, 2013; Barnett et al., 2012;
Smith & Hewison, 2012) was their recommendations for further training of HCWs and
the inclusion of bioterrorism preparedness into their curriculum. But their respective
studies included a little or insignificant number of EMTs as study participants, and thus
making extrapolating their findings to EMTs emergency response practices difficult.
In another study, Kabir, Naik, Kumar, and Bhas (2016) noted that knowledge of
bioterrorism preparedness among HCWs is important if the effects of weaponized
pathogens are to be mitigated among the HCWs in the event of biological attacks. The
study focused on medical students’ knowledge and awareness of bioterrorism agents. The
result showed the need to include bioterrorism preparedness in the medical students’
curriculum. For example, the medical students had a higher knowledge of bioterrorism
than biosecurity. This study supports the other studies (Aghaei & Nesami, 2013;
Hoeppner, Olson & Larson, 2010; Kabir, Naik, Kumar & Bhas, 2016; Smith & Hewison,
2012) that demonstrated the importance of adding bioterrorism preparedness in the
curriculum and education of HCWs including nurses, emergency medical workers.
Hoeppner, Olson, and Larson (2010) created bioterrorism (BT) and emergency response
(ER) competencies program for HCWs. The longitudinal study found that after six
months of learning 64.1% had acquired bioterrorism competency and 63.5% were
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competent after twelve months of BT/ER learning program. Similarly, the quantitative
study conducted by Kabir et al. (2016) found the need to incorporate bioterrorism
preparedness in the medical curriculum.
On the other hand, the study by Wang, Luangkesorn, and Shuman (2012) was
significant to the current study because it focused on the relationship between
information received by emergency responders and their commanders and the decisions
they make when responding to disasters. Decisions made during disasters have critical
implication on EMTs response effectiveness, safety, and community-wide disaster
containment. Part of the decisions is determining how and where to transport patients
(such as acute healthcare facility) after stabilizing them.
The roles of evacuating and transporting patients are more problematic if it
involves mass casualty incidents (MCI). To address this scenario, Wang et al. (2012)
developed an agent-based simulation model to assess patients’ emergency needs before
taking appropriate actions. The quantitative study contributed to knowledge in modeling
emergency scenario but limited in its focus on all hazard scenario. However, the study’s
observation that specialized casualties be treated at so-dedicated hospitals, and its’
recommendation that hospitals reserve some beds in reserved units are appropriate for
bioterrorism attacks victims. Such specialized beds or hospitals for bioterrorism patients
appeared inadequate in the United States during the Ebola epidemic, and that
demonstrated unpreparedness for HIDs.
The varied responses from the states to the Ebola epidemic appeared to reveal
unclear and inadequate infectious disease response protocols and practices put in place
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after the 2001 anthrax incidents. For instance, Taylor (2015), noted the failure of the
disaster responses to anthrax, and the lost opportunity to have used the Ebola epidemic as
a ‘test run’ and “‘tabletop exercise’ to assess the existing protocols for responding to
covert bioweapons attacks.” A test run could have reviewed the rigorous decontamination
process especially with handling PPE and determining whether additional training was
needed (Taylor, 2015). This study again focused on the hospital environment and nurses
in the emergency department and excluded a critical part in the emergency response
chain: Disaster response in a pre-hospital environment by EMTs. Poor knowledge of the
decontamination process and PPE was evident during the Ebola epidemic and posed a
community-wide risk. Caro, Puro, Fusco, Capobianchi, and Ippolito (2015) and
Wiwanitkit (2014) aligned with the studies conducted by Taylor (2015) and Passi et al.
(2015). Both Caro et al. (2015) and Wiwanitkit (2014) underscored the gap in knowledge
whenever a new disease emerges or re-emerges and noted the need for continuous
preparedness measures.
In a different but related study, Caro et al. (2015) illustrated how the 2009 H1N1
epidemic was mislabeled the swine flu as instances of lack of preparedness and
knowledge gap among healthcare officials and workers. The gap in knowledge and
challenges persisted despite the over twenty years of bioterrorism preparedness policies
and funding (Caro et al., 2015). Wiwanitkit (2014) viewed the Ebola epidemic as a
potential global threat that was made more challenging due to the lack of biosafety level
4 in many developing countries, possible misdiagnosis, and inadequate funding for
diagnosis and treatment. In a related study, Caro, et al. (2015) noted that since the Ebola
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began, new standards for managing patients have been developed and updated including
donning PPE, handling of patients and dead patients, waste management, and medical
staff safety in accordance with the infection prevention and control (IPC) protocols. The
study was conducted in a hospital in Italy after a 50-year-old patient was infected, treated
and released. However, EMTs who are critical to the mitigation of epidemics or
biological agents were not part of the studies. How knowledgeable are EMTs in the
selected County to these enhanced level 4 biosafety protocols updated during and after
the 2014 Ebola epidemic?
The Ebola virus disease is a potential bioagent that poses a challenge to HCWs
and has national health implications (Lohmus, Janse, Goot, & Rotterdam, 2013). The
challenges manifested during the 2014 Ebola epidemic. Therefore, adequately preparing
HCWs should be a national priority. No matter the sources of bioagent infection (natural
or bioterrorism) EMTs should be well-prepared to mitigate the impact. Inadequately
prepared HCWs and EMTs have community-wide health implications because
contagious pathogens have incubation periods by which time the symptoms would have
become potentially deadly in the community (Passi et al., 2015).
Passi et al. (2015) observed that part of the challenge in containing Ebola
included acquiring knowledge of the virus, institutional failings of the health system, and
lack of experienced HCWs. Particularly, Passi et al. (2015) informed that delay in
identifying cases of virus or bioagent infection and transporting samples such as blood or
serum from Ebola patients to the laboratories posed challenges as well. The study, a
historical account of the disease, brought out another critical dimension to bioterrorism
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preparedness: The question of managing and transporting tissues or blood samples for
laboratory testing and analysis. Passi et al. (2015) further suggested the following
preparedness protocols for EVD: Knowledge of PPE, patients’ transportations or
handling in hospitals, equipment handling and processing, and environment sanitization
among others. Although the study focused on scenarios in a hospital setting, the study’s
preparedness protocols may be extrapolated outside of the hospital to EMTs disaster
response practices.
During the anthrax attacks, first responders were challenged by the inadequate
training and understanding of areas contaminated by the anthrax exposure (Galada et al.
2013). Galada et al. (2013) further noted that although some bioterrorism preparedness
programs have been developed since the 2001 anthrax attacks, those programs have not
been implemented uniformly across the levels of government. The quantitative study
focused on first responders with the majority drawn from the fire department (55) out of
70 study participants. EMTs were among the other first responders categorized as others
(7). The study has some limitations: First, it has a small number of EMTs that could make
the study not representative of the EMT population. Second, the study addressed only
inhalation anthrax while excluding dermal and ingestion exposures. Third, other
biological agents were not considered in the study. This study built upon the Galada et al.
study because it focused on a dermal exposure bioagent such as Ebola. Also, my study
was conducted in a post Ebola epidemic period. The findings may help address
bioterrorism preparedness in the event of biological attacks.
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In a study, Waldrop, Clemency, Maguin, and Lindstrom (2014) noted the critical
roles that Prehospital emergency providers such as EMTs perform and decisions they also
make when responding to emergency calls that include the end of life patients. These
critical roles and decisions involve transporting the patients to the hospital emergency
rooms or in the case of bioterrorism attacks to AHFs (Waldrop et al., 2014; CDC, 2015).
Although the study by Waldrop et al. focused on the end of life patients, the findings
demonstrated the importance of education, training, and established protocols and
practices to emergency responses.
To achieve the goal of bioterrorism preparedness, the CDC identified five areas
for strategic bioterrorism readiness: preparedness and prevention; detection and
surveillance; diagnosis and characterization of biological and chemical agents; response;
and communication. The start-up point was to categorize these pathogens. The CDC
classified potential infectious disease that can be weaponized into three categories
(Categories A, B, and C.) and, also because of ease of dissemination (Das & Kataria,
2010). The CDC classifications of the viruses illustrated their respective potentials as
bioagents capable of weaponization; the severity of the pathogens if used for bio-attacks
(Gunaratne, 2015). Category A virus represents the highest threat to humans, animals,
and plants both in mobility and mortality (Anderson & Boker, 2012; Gunaratne, 2015).
The categories and the pathogens in Category A include viral hemorrhagic fever (diseases
caused by viruses such as Ebola and Marbug), plague, smallpox, and anthrax. Category A
is so classified because the viruses in this category have the characteristics that give them
weaponization capabilities. These characteristics include infectiousness and symptoms;
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dissemination methods; pathogenesis and etiology; availability of prophylaxis, and
weaponization capability (Gunaratne, 2015). Category B include cholera, ricin, and
salmonella; Category C: are emerging pathogens including Nipah virus and Hanta virus
(Kenar & Baysallar, 2010; Patidar et al., 2013). Despite these initiatives by CDC, the
2001 anthrax attacks occurred with the resultant fatalities and injuries.
Gunaratne’s comparative qualitative study focused on the uniqueness of Ebola as
a bioagent in comparison to anthrax and smallpox that have previously been used in
biowarfare during the World War 1 by Germany (Gunaratne, 2015). However, the
potential pathogenesis of EVD appear not fully understood, and neither have HCWs
understood how to respond to potential bio-attacks with EVD.
Pathogens as potential Bioagents
Pathogens are disease-causing agents (Méthot, 2015). Ebola, anthrax, and
Smallpox are among the pathogens that the U.S. Working Group on Civilian Biodefense,
and other studies listed as most likely to be deployed for bioterrorism by terrorist groups
or state-sponsored biological attacks (Anderson & Boker, 2012; Cenciarelli et al., 2013;
Gunaratne, 2015). The reason advanced for this assumption was the possible ease of
acquiring and putting bioagents into use by terrorist groups and state sponsors of
terrorism, and the time frame before the disease is identified (Sinha, & Singh, 2016). By
the time a pathogen is identified, it would have spread to many more victims in the
community causing panic, socio-economic disruptions, and deaths (Anderson & Boker,
2012; Cenciarelli et al., 2013).
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Menrath, Tomuzia, Frentzel, Braeunig, and Appel (2014) provided yet another
way to measure the likelihood of an agent becoming weaponized. The study noted the
ranking system of identifying levels of risk measured by the probability of using an agent
and its impact on a population (probability + impact = risk). The study, however, warned
that the ranking is for management decisions for enacting policies and legislation and
enhancing preventive measures and for bioterrorism emergency responses. Menrath et al.
(2014)’s comparative ranking formula was important to this study because it helped
assess the pathogens most likely to be deployed especially with the ease of procurement
and dissemination (Cenciarelli et al., 2013). As Cenciarelli et al., (2013) further noted,
relative to other forms of terrorist attacks, biological weapons are least expensive to
procure per area size: Bioweapons – 1$/km, $600/km (chemical), $800/km (nuclear), and
$2,000/km (conventional armaments) based on a 1996 North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) assessment. In a related historical account of the history of
bioterrorism, Ózsvári, Kasza, and Lakner, (2015) emphasized that identifying pathogens
constitute a difficult problem and therefore, more challenging to control because of the
time involved in identifying the bioagents. Also, the effect of biological attacks from 100
kg anthrax-spore bomb can inflict casualty rate of about three million whereas, those
from megaton hydrogen bomb can cause about up to two million casualties (Ózsvári et
al., 2015).
In summary, Cenciarelli et al. (2013), Gunaratne (2015) as well as Menrath et al.
(2014) studies, were significant in helping our understanding of pathogenesis and
etiology and weaponization of HIDs. The studies also exposed the threats posed by
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bioagents and terrorist groups using the pathogens as did the study by Anderson and
Boker (2012). Biological agents are pathogens (smallpox, anthrax, Ebola, influenza, and
Botulism among others) that have potentials for conversion into biological weapons; are
often deployed covertly and, pose serious challenges to HCWs (Ananthula, et al., 2012;
Anderson & Boker, 2012; Gunaratne, 2015). Similarly, Also, the threat of biological
attacks and the difficulty of developing mechanisms for detecting bioagents and
protecting the community from harmful application of biological research especially in
this age of globalism is real (National Threat Initiative, 2015).
The 2011 Presidential Policy Directive-8 (PPD-8) was one approach used to
mitigate the effect of weaponized biological agents through HCWs knowledge of
bioagents’ attributes (Patidar et al., 2013). Other approaches included instituting
standardized training and uniformity in emergency responses among HCWs especially
after the 2001 anthrax attacks and the 2014 Ebola epidemic (Hunger, 2014; Taylor,
2015). Review of the literature showed the abundance of studies on bioterrorism threats,
policies on bioterrorism preparedness, evidence of failed policies and emergency medical
responses, and literature gap on Ebola and/or hybrid Ebola pox as potential bioagents
(Caro et al., 2015; Eva 2012; Passi et al., 2015; Taylor, 2015; Wiwanitkit, 2014).
All the studies significantly demonstrated the need for preparedness by national
agencies and HCWs for possible bioterrorist attacks and contributed to knowledge by
providing the need for studies on HCWs’ preparedness response and practices for
possible biological attacks. The need was more so for EMTs.
Anthrax
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Bacillus anthracis, popularly known as anthrax (cutaneous, inhalation and
gastrointestinal) is highly resistant to environmental changes and can be easily acquired
and used as bioagents (Cenciarelli et al., 2013). The study by Li et al. (2017) on the
anthrax incidences in China indicated a 98% prevalence rate of the cutaneous form of
anthrax within the Chinese farmers and herdsmen population. Anderson and Bokor
(2012) further noted that anthrax was classified as a Category A pathogen because its’
cutaneous form has a high mortality rate and requires unique preparedness response from
HCWs including EMTs. Li et al. (2017) and Anderson and Boker (2012) studies were
significant to my study because they agreed on the high rate of cutaneous forms of
anthrax (95% of all anthrax cases) acquired through direct contact with the spores or the
bacilli. These studies (Anderson & Bokor, 2012; Li et al., 2017)) also revealed the
potential human and economic implications of cutaneous anthrax if weaponized and
without a corresponding understanding of its characteristics and effective response from
HCWs including EMTs. The 2001 anthrax incidents occurred in five states including
New Jersey and caused five deaths and 17 injuries (Barras & Greub, 2014; Hayman,
2010).
Anthrax can naturally occur or be humanly inspired such as the 2001 attacks from
a biological laboratory (Adalja, 2012; Bush & Perez, 2012; Méthot, 2015; Schweitzer,
2016). Clinical cases of anthrax incidents or attacks can be cutaneous, inhalational, or
gastrointestinal (Weant, Bailey, Fleishaker, & Justice, 2014). Besides the 2001 incidents,
in 2011, a third inhalational anthrax incident was reported to a Minnesota community
laboratory, and the Minnesota Department of Health Public Health Laboratory (Sprenkle
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et al., 2014). The first inhalational anthrax incidents occurred in 1976 (Marston et al.,
2011; Sprenkle et al., 2014). However, the 2011 incident appeared to have occurred
naturally rather than a bio-attack, unlike the 2001 cutaneous anthrax incidents (Sprenkle
et al., 2014). Minnesota Department of Health Public Health Laboratory investigated the
incident by isolating the Bacillus species from the patient’s blood cultures, and the result
showed the presence of Bacillus anthracis (anthrax) in the blood specimen (Sprenkle et
al., 2014). The patient contracted the incident while traveling through the States of North
Dakota, South Dakota, Wyoming, and Montana, and further investigation by the CDC
revealed no further exposure to other humans (Griffith et al., 2014). The CDC finding
was an indication that anthrax can naturally occur or can be human inspired and
identifying the sources of incidents involving bioagents (zoonotic or enzootic) is also a
challenge to HCWs (Griffith et al., 2014).
The CDC identified zoonotic diseases as the infectious diseases caused by viruses
and bacteria and are usually passed between humans and animals (CDC, 2016c). The
CDC further informed that six out of ten cases of infectious diseases in humans come
from animals, and three out of every four new cases are from animals to humans.
Similarly, Leach and Scoones (2013) conducted a qualitative case study of two zoonotic
diseases (H1N1 and Ebola) and noted that 60% of the emerging HIDs (zoonotic) that
affect humans originated from animals. The humans once infected become vectors or
carriers of the disease. Leach and Scoones (2013) agreed with Grundmann (2014) that the
challenges among healthcare professionals are in understanding the nature of the
pathogen and how to respond to them to avoid further risks to the population. Leach and
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Scoones (2013) used the heuristic approach of modeling in exploring the two cases:
H1N1 and Ebola. These modelings were mathematical and process-based models that use
data to demonstrate HIDs’ epidemiological and ecological relationships; pattern-based
models drew inferences of these relations from empirical data, and participatory
modeling combined anthropological, ethnographic and participatory approaches. Leach
and Scoones (2013) study is important because it established an empirical connection of
how the environment plays critical roles in infectious diseases outbreak. During
outbreaks choosing a model may pose a challenge because of the urgent need to response
and the political pressure. However, Leach and Scoones (2013) recommended a multimodeling approach to understanding the complex and dynamic realities of zoonotic
diseases which included Ebola and Ebola-pox.
The 2001 anthrax attacks revealed a couple of things that were evident over the
years, and the deficiencies also manifested during the Ebola epidemic: Deficiencies in
government responses and inadequate preparedness and training for possible bioterrorism
(Khan, 2011; Taylor, 2015). These deficiencies led to the 2006 Pandemic and AllHazards Preparedness Act (PAHPA). PAHPA was created to develop national
pandemics, disasters, and terrorism response and preparedness plans by the Department
of Health and Human Services (DHHS). The result of the PAHPA initiative was The
National Health Security Strategy of the United States of America (NHSS). The
significance of the NHSS is measured through its main objectives of building community
resilience and strengthening and sustaining health and emergency responses practices
(Shelton et al., 2012). To address some of the deficiencies, Khan (2011) suggested
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bioterrorism preparedness in the future that includes the improvement of coordination
between the public health system and EMS and the private sector, and preparedness
programs that are verifiable. How has the public health program been able to enhance
bioterrorism preparedness among EMTs for cutaneous form of disease such as Ebola?
Smallpox
Smallpox, another deadly and highly cutaneous virus has the potential for use as a
biological weapon (Anderson & Bokor, 2012; Weant et al., 2014). Viruses also cause
smallpox as is the case with Ebola. The virus in an infected person exhibits the following
symptoms: high fevers, abdominal pain, vomiting, headaches, prostration, and myalgia
after which rashes begin to appear (Chopra et al., 2014; Petersen et al., 2015).
Transmitted from humans into the population, smallpox infection has a fatality rate of 30
percent; has 12 – 14 days of the incubation period and is a major source of bioagent
especially the variola major form that is more lethal than the variola minor. (Weant et al.,
2014). Weant et al. (2014) conducted a study that focused on smallpox, viral hemorrhagic
fevers, and botulism toxin as potential bioagents with high fatalities rates. Smallpox like
Ebola is transmitted from person to person and as such posed threats to EMTs and the
general population. Weant et al. informed that emergency workers need to be aware of
these threats, and have adequate knowledge of all Category A agents, emergency
protocols and practices to mitigate secondary infections.
Ebola
Ebola was first identified in 1976 in Sudan with a high mortality rate of 50
percent (Taylor, 2015). Although there have been about 29 outbreaks of the epidemic, the
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2014 outbreaks were more devastating and resulted in about 28,183 cases and 11,306
deaths by September 2015 and huge economic losses (Maras & Miranda, 2016; Coltart,
Johnson, & Whitty, 2015; WHO Ebola Response Team, 2014). As deadly as the virus is,
Ebola is rendered ineffective if certain measures are taken. Ebola is rendered ineffective
at a boiling point of 5 minutes or heating level of 60°C for 30 to 60 minutes but can be a
portent for a human to human transmittal in room temperature for many days (Taylor,
2015). The symptoms of Ebola include a severe headache, high fever, general body
weaknesses, muscle, stomach and joint pains, sore throat, and lack of appetite. The ability
of Ebola surviving for days is what makes the disease dangerous, and potential biological
agent.
The 2014 EVD created global concerns and apprehension that terrorist groups
may capitalize on the human to human transmission to weaponize the virus (Teckman,
2013; Gire et al., 2014). The concern was that terrorist groups might acquire the virus and
turn it into a biological agent. As a Category A pathogen, Ebola has the attributes and
capabilities of posing a high risk to national health security because of the ease of
transmitting the virus from person to person, causing social and economic disruption,
high mortality, and requiring special preparedness actions from public healthcare system
(Maras & Miranda, 2016).
Although the EVD epidemic has ended, the immediate concern was examining
and understanding the bioterrorism preparedness for EVD and other potential pathogens
vis-a-vis risk mitigation, rapid response initiatives, adequate facilities, equipment, and
trained HCWs (Kabir et al., 2016; Maras & Miranda, 2016). Global efforts that appeared
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to have prevented the virus from causing more deaths included the CDC initiatives of
collaborating with the World Health Organization (WHO) and sending about 1200
healthcare workers to the West African region (Frieden & Damon, 2015). Also, updated
Ebola management protocols were developed and used during the epidemic (Caro et al.,
2015). Although the spread of the virus has been controlled, little study has investigated
the extent to which terrorist groups may have shown interest in acquiring the virus for
terrorism purposes. Also, little research has been conducted on the post-Ebola
bioterrorism preparedness and response strategies among HCWs and EMTs. Maras and
Miranda (2016), noted the attempt by a group, Shoko Asahara, in the 1990s that went to
the Democratic Republic of Congo (former Zaire) to inquire about Ebola and possibly
procure a sample. Furthermore, there is no conclusive evidence that terrorists did or did
not acquire and preserve the virus for development and, future bio-attacks given their
previous attempts at acquiring it. What countries, public healthcare officials, and HCWs
can do is to harden themselves through training, and education of HCWs, creating
institutional support and adequate response strategies and developing vaccine and
therapeutics (Choi, Hong, Hong, & Lee, 2015; Smith & Hewison, 2012).
Additionally, a study by Kar, Pradhan, and Pattnaik (2012) pointed to an
emerging disease - Ebola pox (or black pox, a combination of Ebola and smallpox) as a
possible biological weapon. Kar et al. (2012) overview of Indian bioterrorism
preparedness was significant because it revealed the need to prepare for known HIDs and
emerging HIDs that are also resistant to the changes in the environment including
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humidity, cold and heat. The Ebola pox that manifested in Pakistan killed ten people, and
thus demonstrated its lethality as a potential new HID (Kar et al., 2012).
The study conducted by Taylor (2015) focused on the preparedness policies and
practices following the 2014 Ebola incidents in the United States. In noting the high
Ebola fatality rate of 90%, the study highlighted the factors that can help minimize the
fatality rate of Ebola. These factors included the state of the existing healthcare, the
general health of the population, the nutritional health of the population, the affected
patients’ immunology, and the response capabilities of the healthcare system (Taylor,
2015). The study is significant to my study in the assessment of the capabilities of the
healthcare system especially EMTs’ capabilities to respond to bioterrorism incidents.
Taylor (2015) specifically noted the varied and incoherent responses to the Ebola
incidents including the appointment of a non-medical and non-immunologist that handled
the epidemic in the United States. The study highlighted the possible weaponization of
the pathogen by terrorists and infect unsuspecting victims who are the focus of this study.
If terrorists become Ebola vectors, how prepared are EMTs to handle the situation and
transport patients to AHFs (and between hospitals) without risking themselves, and the
wider community? Taylor (2015), like a previous study (Abraham et al.,) on the anthrax
incidents noted the missed opportunities to use the Ebola epidemic as a ‘test run’ in
assessing the U.S. preparedness for bioterrorism.
The need to harden HCWs including EMTs against weaponized EVD and other
cutaneous diseases in the United States is because the U.S. cities appear high targets for
terrorism (including homegrown terrorism), often because of language diversity,

74
residential instability and urbanization (Brooks, 2011; LaFree & Bersani, 2014).
Bioterrorism hardening is also critical because of the many incidents of Ebola in the East
African region that is politically unstable and conducive for terrorism, and globalization
(Teckman, 2013). Many terrorist groups operate in the East African region (Maras &
Miranda, 2016; Teckman, 2013). There is, therefore, the concern that infected persons
may be used as human weapons or human vectors to infect unsuspecting population in
crowded areas such as the airport as terrorists have done and continue to do with body
explosives for terrorist attacks (Taylor, 2015; Teckman, 2013).
Importance of Bioterrorism Preparedness
Disaster preparedness is critical to mitigating the impact of disasters, minimizing
threats, and reducing vulnerabilities and risk to HCWs and the population when faced
with hazardous situations (Pandey, 2019; Spain, Clements, DeRanieri, & Holt, 2012).
September 11, 2001, terrorism brought about the Homeland Security Presidential
Directive (HSPD-5) which in 2004 initiated the National Response Plan and the National
Incident Management System (Barakey, 2013). The National Incident Management
System outlined the need for collaboration and cooperation among all levels of
government to prepare, prevent and respond to bioterrorism and public health
emergencies (Barakey, 2013; Nemane, 2012; Spain et al., 2012). Examples of federal
agencies and state governments collaboration in disaster response included Hurricane
Katrina (New Orleans) and Hurricane Sandy (New Jersey) with clear failures and lessons
learned for future emergency preparedness response (Dittmar, 2013; Powell, Hanfling, &
Gostin, 2012). The failures of the responses to the Hurricane Katrina led to the change in
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the implementation of the National Response Plan to include the community and later
renamed National Response Framework (Department of Homeland Security (DHS),
2016). The 2002 Bioterrorism Act through the National Response Framework initiated
incident management strategies that included the all levels of government, the private
sectors, and the non-government organizations (NGOs), and the community for incidents
and emergency preparedness and response (DHS, 2016; Nemane, 2012). The legislation
and policies were indications of the importance the federal government attached to
disaster preparedness and responses.
In many states, such as New Jersey, of the about 465 private and public
emergency operators, most are privately run EMSOs (New Jersey Department of Health,
2017). Furthermore, disasters and the response to disasters require some level of
resources: human, material and financial depending on the nature of the disaster as the
United States government did over the years (Monroe, 2014; United States Congress,
2004). The functions of many HCWs and EMTs are closely related and equipping them
with adequate and effective training is critical to disaster mitigation and preparedness
(Williams, Nocera & Casteel, 2008; Passi et al., 2015).
A quantitative study conducted by Williams et al. (2008) found that the
effectiveness of disaster response training for out-of-hospital HCWs was mixed and
called for future studies that are more rigorous. However, other studies concluded that
training of healthcare providers and increased disaster management knowledge and skills
especially emergency responders increased their willingness to respond, and attitudinal
and behavioral intention rates (Arbon et al. 2013; Clancy, 2008; Kar, Pradhan, &
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Pattnaik, 2012; Rokach et al., 2010). The study conducted by Rokach et al. (2010)
focused on Physicians and nurses’ willingness to respond to bioterrorism attacks. The
study found that physicians and nurses’ knowledge of the anthrax disease had a positive
relationship with their willingness to respond to anthrax attacks. The study, unlike my
study, was not on contagious disease such as Ebola. The study (Rokach et al., 2010)
admitted the limitation of non-applicability on contagious disease and recommended
future studies.
In 1999, the CDC initiated a Public Health Preparedness and Response for
Bioterrorism program (Duncan, Ginter, Rucks, Wingate, & McCormick, 2007). The
program funded local and public health preparedness and responses for bioterrorism,
infectious diseases and other emergencies responses (Duncan et al., 2007). In 2004, after
five years of the program, the CDC reviewed the program’s effectiveness in bioterrorism
and disaster management and response and requested further funding (Duncan et al.,
2007). The review also led to the development of strategic areas for disaster
preparedness: prevention, detection and reporting, investigation, control, recovery and
improvement (Duncan et al., 2007). The CDC’s five areas of preparedness mirror those
of the World Health Organization (WHO): surveillance, healthcare response, public
health intervention, communication, and command (Craig, Kasai, Li, Otsu, & Khut,
2010). The attention of the WHO to bioterrorism demonstrates the worldwide
apprehension of weaponized bioagents and the need to have response strategies. The
apprehension is heightened by the expected increase for ambulatory healthcare in the case
of large-scale infectious disease depending on the nature of the disease (Craig et al.,
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2010). Craig et al. (2010) observed that early and adequate response by healthcare
workers would not only save lives but prevent a community-wide spread of the disease.
The review of the literature on bioterrorism preparedness demonstrated that although
training, education, and uniformity in emergency response practices are critical for
effective bioterrorism response and practices, they are rarities among EMTs.
EMTs’ Training, Readiness, and Hardening
The question of how EMTs prepare for biological attacks is of great importance to
mitigating HCWs’ risk, and critical for community-wide bioterrorism response and
disaster mitigation. The answer can be found in EMTs’ understanding and identification
of the factors that are critical to bioterrorism hardenings such as knowledge of emergency
response protocols, and knowledge of characteristics of different potential bioagents
(Eddy & Sase, 2015). Response strategies will require emergency responders’ knowledge
of what to do to adequately confront bioterrorism situations. Such knowledge will
involve knowledge of existing preparedness and response protocols acquired through
training and regular exercise (Edwards, Price, Gordon, & Gadgil, 2005; Crane, 2010;
Abrol, 2016).
In a 2010 study, Olson, Scheller, Larson, Lindeke, and Edwardson, (2010)
demonstrated that bioterrorism and emergency readiness (BT/ER) training increased
emergency response performance. In a follow-up study Olson, Scheller, and Wey, (2014),
did a stimulated quantitative survey of 17993 (out of 20151 potential participants) to
determine the relationship between the duration of BT/ER training to bioterrorism
response performance. The research found that those with forty-five or more hours
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training performed better compared to those with less than forty-five hours of training.
The study was important because it established the need to not only train HCWs and
EMTs on bioterrorism but to note the duration of the BT/ER training especially after the
2014 Ebola epidemic and to examine their knowledge of bioagents.
The study conducted by Abrol (2016) was significant to my study because of its
finding that an estimated 17 countries have active bioweapons programs and are also
sponsors of terrorism. The study used India which experienced H1N1 influenza epidemic
in 2015 as a case study. Lessons learned from the study on India bioterrorism
preparedness could be utilized by other countries including the United States. As Abrol
(2016) noted, the effects of biological attacks depended on the preparedness strategies in
place to mitigate the attacks. The study recommended training and development of
communication infrastructure for first responders at the community level for effectively
combating bioterrorism attacks. Abrol (2016) also suggested integrated international
cooperation for sharing knowledge, information exchange, and possible bioterrorists
extraditions.
However, Malet and Korbitz (2015) informed that emergency responders have
often not adhered to the regulations and best practices recommended by regulatory
agencies such as the CDC or the Homeland Security Department (DHS). The study also
noted the inadequate knowledge of agents, symptoms of biological agents, and sources of
contaminations despite exercises among public health officials including public
emergency responders. Malet and Korbitz (2015) further observed that information
received by public health officials are not always shared with other emergency
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responders that operate outside the domain of public health daily regulation. The study
recommended changing this attitude for effective bioterrorism preparedness. The findings
and suggestions are particularly important because EMTs’ bioterrorism preparedness
should align with the DHS and CDC-recommended protocols and best practices.
EMTs knowledge of PPE
The 2014 incidents of EVD in the United States elicited varied responses from
some of the states where the virus manifested: New Jersey, Texas, and Georgia. Olliaro,
Horby, and Torreele (2015) questioned why the United States lacked adequate health
tools for protecting against EVD and other emerging infectious diseases. However, the
study focused on developing an affordable and efficient reach to diagnostics, medicines,
and vaccines for biological agents that would enhance collective public health security
rather than on HCWs preparedness for bioterrorism response (Olliaro et al., 2015). This
study was significant because evaluating HCWs emergency healthcare preparedness
helps address the question of secondary infection through the first responders and HCWs
especially EMTs.
Critical aspects of bioterrorism preparedness are the identification of factors that
would help avoid secondary infection through HCWs. The Pandemic and all-Hazards
Preparedness Reauthorization Act (PAHPRA) of 2013 was enacted to address the issue of
secondary infection through HCWs (Eddy & Sase, 2015). PAHPRA also mandated
hospitals to continually review the workplace hazards and to minimize risks through a
hazard vulnerability analysis assessment process (Eddy & Sase, 2015). The objective of
the PAHPRA was to improve hospitals emergency preparedness practices and their
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capabilities to meet challenges posed by infectious diseases such as Ebola. For the
hospital workers, vulnerability analysis assessment is a required process for bioterrorism
hardening against infectious diseases. Also important is the knowledge of PPE, the ability
to accurately diagnosis infectious diseases, and knowledge of the zoonotic nature and
sources of the disease (Eddy & Sase, 2015). However, Decker, Sevransky, Barrett,
Davey, and Chertow (2014) noted the challenge of caring for Ebola patients while
donning the PPE because they are likely to affect job performance. Hence, the need for
EMTs to have a clear understanding of how to don PPE and work with them. But Decker
et al. (2014) informed that with carefully planned protocols and training, patients could
receive needed care without the secondary infection of HCWs and EMTs.
Eddy and Sase (2015), further noted that bioterrorism preparedness policies and
programs should protect hospitals against all viral hemorrhagic fever (VHFs) such as
Ebola. However, the study found that hospitals did not adhere to preparedness programs
by performing the vulnerability analysis assessment. The finding by Eddy and Sase
(2015) supports the need to examine the current protocols in the operations of other
healthcare population outside of the hospital environment, such as the EMTs. If the
protocols exist, how knowledgeable are EMTs of the processes and how have the
protocols helped in their emergency response and practices?
Threat Assessment
The threats of biological attacks are evident in the proliferation of terrorist groups,
state-sponsored terrorist activities including their active bioagent programs, and increased
use of biological agents (Abrol, 2016; Grundmann, 2014; Kadlec, 2013). This qualitative
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case study focused on the threats, vulnerabilities, and existing capabilities to withstand
the threats if they occur. Major emergency response capability strategies are the
willingness of EMTs to respond to terrorist and biological attacks and their knowledge of
response strategies acquired through training (Clancy, 2008; Rokach et al., 2010; Taylor
2015).
Tambunan, Parikesit, and Saputro (2014) informed that there are two critical
issues in a biological threat assessment: the expected impact of the attack on the target
(create fear and disrupt socio-economic activities), and the potentials of the attacks
occurring and being successful. Both criteria depended on the capabilities of the
attackers, and values and vulnerabilities of the targets respectively (Tambunan et al.,
2014). Historically, past biological incidents and military activities met these criteria. The
past incidents and military activities included Japan’s Unit 731 during the World Wars 1
and 2, Rajneeshee Religious Cult incident of 1984, Aum Shinrikyo Cult in 1995, 2001
letters with Anthrax, Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) in Saudi Arabia in
2012 (Tambunan et al., 2014).
The issue of bioterrorism continues to pose a global concern. The concerns were
borne out of the progress in the development of life science and the intention of terrorists
to exploit infectious diseases for biological attacks (Maras & Miranda, 2016; Suk et al.,
2011). Suk et al. (2011) categorized research on viruses or infectious diseases into dual
uses (dual-use research of concern – DURC): Positive and negative uses. Maras and
Miranda (2016) observed that terrorists could turn themselves into “human Ebola
munition.” However, the focus of the U.S. National Science Advisory Board for
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Biosecurity (NSAABB), is on the simultaneous uses of research on infectious diseases.
Infectious diseases have potentials to help increase knowledge as well as for misuse by
other groups such as terrorists. Although Suk et al. (2011) found that the biological
agents that require high technologies are less likely to be deployed, it noted the
importance of preparing for their eventual use for biological attacks. So, while there is the
need for freedom of research on infectious diseases, there was also the threat or question
of the research process been deployed for terrorism as the 2001 anthrax attacks showed
(MacIntyre, 2015).
The United States government understood the threats of not only terrorist attacks
but also of potential bioterrorist attacks. Consequently, it allocated a huge amount of fund
into the bioterrorism programs (Monroe, 2014). Following the 2001 anthrax incidents, the
United States government in the 2002 and 2003 fiscal years provided a total of $2.5
billion towards the initiatives to get local, state, federal governments, hospitals, and
EMSOs prepared for bioterrorism (United States House of Representatives Committee on
Science Report, 2004). Furthermore, in 2004 the U.S. HR Committee on Science
conducted a hearing to discuss the threats posed by bioterrorism, the vulnerabilities, and
the preparedness of the various levels of governments and emergency medical services
providers (United States House of Representatives Committee on Science Report, 2004).
The result of the 2004 Congressional Hearing was the Project Bioshield Act of 2004
(Monroe, 2014; Gottron, 2014). Other events related to biological incidents in addition to
the 2001 U.S. anthrax attacks prompted the Committee meeting. The other events
included the severe acute respiratory syndrome in China and globally in 2003.
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Before the 2001 bioterrorism-related attacks, inhalational anthrax occurred in the
United States in 1976 (Jernigan et al., 2001). Anthrax has been used by countries since
the early 20th Century during and after the First and Second World Wars by countries
including Japan, United States, United Kingdom, and Russia (Schmid & Kaufmann,
2001). So, the technological knowledge is there, and terrorist groups are believed to be
developing biological agents for the purposes of deploying them for terrorist activities
(Abrol, 2016; Maras & Miranda, 2016).
The 2001 anthrax incidents affected 22 people (five deaths and 17 sicknesses)
who tested positive to Bacillus anthracis powder (Schweitzer, 2016; Thompson, 2016).
The fatality of the anthrax attacks demonstrated the nature and range of anthrax as a
potential covert bioterrorism agent. Other bioagents including smallpox and Ebola have
similarly devastating effects as the thousands of deaths following the 2014 Ebola
epidemic illustrated (Maras & Miranda, 2016). The pathogens often spread through
physical contacts, cause not only high fatality but also cause panic in the population and
economic dislocation in the society (Anderson & Boker, 2012; Barrow et al., 2015;
Gunaratne, 2015; Pinto, 2013; Zhang et al., 2014).
Smallpox, although eliminated since the 1980s, the virus is still stockpiled in
many laboratories for scientific purposes in the United States and Russia, and additional
concerns of more stockpiles in sophisticated laboratories elsewhere, insider threats and
easy access to information online (Henderson, 2014).Given these concerns, there is no
guarantee that smallpox, SARS coronavirus and transmissible influenza virus AH5N1
currently under study in laboratories cannot be released by someone or group of persons
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with access to them for biological attacks (Lipsitch & Bloom, 2012). The 2001 anthrax
attacks in the United States are examples of an intentional release of a biological weapon
for terrorist purposes from a laboratory. The public concerns over potential bioterrorist
attacks are not far-fetched given the growth of home-grown terrorists and lone wolf
terrorists inspired by foreign terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State
(Navarro & Villaverde, 2014; Ramakrishna, 2014). Previous studies (Weant et al. 2014)
have noted that the challenges of bioterrorism preparedness for HCWs include
recognizing covert biological agents, learning and adapting to preparedness plans,
response, and practices.
Ebola and the new emerging hybrid – Ebola pox are among the deadliest
cutaneous infectious diseases (Kar et al., 2012; Khan, 2011; Taylor, 2015). Ebola, one of
the deadliest forms of the Viral hemorrhagic fevers is caused by ribonucleic acid (RNA)
viruses namely, Arenaviridae, Bunyaviridae, Flaviviridae, Filoviridae, and
Rhabdoviridae; with a fatality rate of between 50% to 90% (Passi et al. 2015). Of the five
species of Ebola, the Zaire Ebola virus has the highest fatality rate of 90%; tends to
reoccur and fall into the Category A as the CDC and the WHO classified the pathogens
(Passi et al. 2015).
Vulnerability Assessment
Terrorists are likely to deploy biological weapons because they are cheap and
easy to procure; ease to disseminate; have the potential to cause panic, maximize fatality
in the population, and dislocate the targets’ economy (Cenciarelli et al. 2013). The United
States is a potential target for terrorist attacks, whether chemical, biological, radiological,
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nuclear or explosives (CBRNE) at sources of water supply and pharmaceuticals
distribution (Cinturati, 2014). The U.S. vulnerability was also demonstrated in the
weaknesses identified in the handling of the Ebola outbreak in 2014 (Olliaro, Horby, &
Torreele, 2015). Also, HCWs are most vulnerable to a secondary infection of HIDs due
to lack of or non-adherence to protocols and inadequate protective equipment (Maras &
Miranda, 2016).
The United States is also a good target for bioterrorism because of the many
infrastructures and other targets that have the potential to cause substantial huge
economic cost and human losses, and iconic targets such as the Statue of Liberty and
Pentagon (Gruenewald, Allison-Gruenewald, & Klein, 2015). The 2001 terrorist attacks
resulted in a significant loss of lives and destroyed the aura of invincibility or security in
the United States (Toomey & Singleton, 2014). Gruenewald et al. (2015) in a study
discussed how Clarke and Newman (2006) applied eight basic principles namely,
exposed, vital, iconic, legitimate, destructible, occupied, near, and easy” (acronym:
E.V.I.L D.O.N. E) to assess the vulnerability and attractiveness of targets to terrorist
attacks. The United States has many targets that meet these targets using the theory of
situational crime prevention (SCP) as Clarke and Newman (2006) applied them
(Gruenewald et al., 2015). Though, a quantitative study on eco-terrorism, the study was
significant to my study because it demonstrated how terrorists are most likely to identify
targets using the principles of E.V.I.L D.O.N. E, and SCP. The eight principles were
useful to my study in helping identify possible vulnerable targets such as areas with a

86
high concentration of human beings for maximum casualties, and ease targets to avoid
detection.
Similarly, Becker (2014) analyzed 84 lone wolf terrorist attacks on the civilian,
government, and the military targets and found that 61 percent of such cases were
targeted at the civilians because of the inadequate hardening of the civilian targets.
Civilian or soft targets such as transit stations, bus terminals, and shopping malls were
also targeted because of their potentials for causing maximum casualties and inflicting
fear in the population (Morris, 2015). In the article on maritime security in the wake of
the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Johnson (2013) pointed to the vulnerability of the United States
because of globalization and its perception by terrorists as a wealthy country with
potential for enormous economic losses if attacked. Johnson (2013) further noted in the
survey study of security at the ports, the relationship between international free trade and
maritime terrorism and noted the vulnerability of the United States because only five
percent of over 500 million cargos are inspected at the United States ports yearly.
The 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon
exemplified the vulnerabilities the United States face and the goals of the terrorists to
cause maximum fatalities and create fear (Gruenewald & Allison-Gruenewald, 2015;
Johnson, 2013; White, Porter, & Mazerolle, 2013). In 2014, Ebola reached the United
States soil, and the manner the epidemic was handled by the various authorities raised
concerns of unpreparedness among the HCWs and governments (Ganguli et al., 2016;
Harris, Dadwal, Wu, & Syed, 2015). For instance, Ganguli et al. (2016) discovered in
their cross-sectional web-based study of 202 respondents out of 462 targeted participants
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that 75% of the cases referred to CDC were wrongly referenced. Similarly, the varied
responses from the various governments to the epidemic revealed the unpreparedness of
HCWs, acute healthcare facilities, including the lack of uniformity heightened the
vulnerabilities of the United States to bioterrorist attacks (Rickles & Catarious, 2015).
The inadequate responses occurred despite the Bio-watch Program developed to improve
the capability of responding agencies to interpret data collected for necessary actions
(Koenig, 2013). The study further pointed out that bioterrorism preparedness should
involve an effective surveillance system that can interpret and put into action the outcome
of the interpretation. The capability of data interpretation is critical for HCWs readiness
for bioterrorism response and capability to detect and analyze bioagents while responding
to disasters (Department of Homeland Security, 2014).
Bioterrorism Preparedness in New Jersey and the County.
Bioterrorism is the emerging public health threat locally, nationally and globally
(CDC, 2000; Maras and Miranda, 2016). Predicting next terrorist or bioterrorist attacks
are hard to decipher, although (Bakker, 2012; Navarro & Villaverde, 2014) documented
that terrorism will continue to exist, the modus operandi may change. Hence, the
possibility of bioterrorist attacks remains a concern to HCWs (Olsen, 2013). To allay
these concerns, HCWs should be prepared for biological attacks because they are more
vulnerable than the population as their emergency response roles require them to attend
to infected persons (Walker & Whitty, 2015). The Ebola epidemic and the responses to
the epidemic provided an opportunity to reassess the bioterrorism preparedness of the
HCWs because as the epidemic demonstrated, HCWs are at a higher risk of infection

88
(Maras & Miranda, 2016) The 2001 anthrax attacks were followed by major bioterrorism
preparedness programs, legislation and increased bioterrorism preparedness funding
(Nemane, 2012). The bioterrorism preparedness programs and funding benefited local
public health authorities in the areas of public health awareness, the collaboration
between the levels of government, public health infrastructure improvements, and
improved disaster response readiness and assessment (Staiti, Katz, & Hoadley, 2003).
Incidentally, both anthrax and Ebola incidents affected New Jersey.
The 2001 terrorist and anthrax attacks revealed flaws in our emergency response,
and to correct the flaws the Bush Administration in 2002 released $1.1 billion to states,
territories, and some cities for the development of bioterrorism preparedness plans
(Markowitz & Rosner, 2004). The cities mentioned were Chicago, New York, and Los
Angeles. Interestingly, Newark, the largest city in New Jersey with proximity and shared
critical infrastructures with New York was not mentioned. Also, the City of Camden that
was actively involved in the 2001 anthrax attacks was equally not part of the fund
recipients. The fund was also designated to support and enhance bioterrorism
preparedness readiness against infectious diseases and to create regional acute healthcare
facilities capable of responding to bioterrorism attacks.
In New Jersey, the New Jersey Office of Emergency Management coordinates
emergency preparedness and response including natural and human-made such as the
intentional acts of terrorism or bioterrorism in collaboration with the federal, state and
local partners (NJOEM, n.d). In the counties, there are also regional emergency
management offices. For instance, in the selected county, the County Regional Health
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Commission (ERHC) is the point agency with the Department of Human and Health
Services (DHHS) and New Jersey Department of Environment Protection (NJDEP). The
role of the county regional health commission was to coordinate the county emergency
preparedness initiatives. However, the operational implementation of emergency
responses is handled by the County Office of Emergency Management located in the
County Sherriff’s office. A review of the county emergency mission statement showed
that preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery were part of the strategy to harden
HCWs and emergency responders. The goal of the county EOM is to prevent the
occurrence of natural and human-made disasters and reduce the impact of any such
disaster.
In 2015, sequel to the 2008 Plan, the county OEM updated its all-Hazard
Mitigation Plan (HMP) and reaffirmed its mission statement. The mission statement
reaffirmed the need for strategic planning, partnership, collaboration to help identify and
mitigate the vulnerability of HCWs and the community to hazards caused by humans or
nature in the county.. Bioterrorism preparedness is part of the HMP, but the mission
statement lacked a clear policy statement towards bioterrorism readiness and response.
Incidentally, Newark, the largest city in New Jersey is not part of the
Commission (ERHC). Also, there is also the New Jersey Medical Reserve Corps (MRCs)
who assist during emergencies. MRCs are volunteers who assist during medical and nonmedical emergencies, and natural and non-natural disasters including bioterrorism,
pandemic flu, floods, and blizzards (New Jersey Medical Reserve Corps. (NJMRC),
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2004). MRCs work under the county and local health systems as part of emergency and
disaster preparedness programs (NJMRC, 2004).
The study by Abatemarto et al. (2007) informed that the anthrax attacks showed a
lack of preparedness for biological attacks especially the knowledge of PPE for
respiratory protection in New Jersey. The study focused on providing training and
education on the use and importance of N-100 respiratory-protective face masks against
biological and chemical attacks. The study was timely given that anthrax and terrorist
attacks just occurred a few years earlier, and there were few studies that analyzed the first
responders’ bioterrorism preparedness. The study recommended future studies on the
state of preparedness of first responders for bioterrorism and knowledge of infectious
diseases. My study built upon the study by Abatemarto et al. (2007), by examining and
understanding what has changed since then. My study furthered the knowledge by
examining the infectious disease and bioterrorism preparedness following the 2014 Ebola
epidemics in the United States and used EMTs in New Jersey for the study.
The New Jersey Department of Health, Office of Emergency Medical Services
(NJDH-OEMS) certifies EMTs and conducts training needs and continuous education in
New Jersey (New Jersey Office of Emergency Management Services, 2017). The first
responders that OEMS train included EMT-basic and EMT-paramedics. OEMS also
licenses the following: ambulances mobile intensive units, mobility assistance vehicles
and specialty care transport units both hospital-based and non-hospital based (New Jersey
Office of Emergency Management Services, 2016). Created in 1967, OEMS has over
27,000 EMT-Bs and EMT-Ps and over 4500 emergency vehicles (NJOEMS, 2016).
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Summary and Conclusions
This chapter highlighted the problems and challenges HCWs, especially EMTs
faced in disaster situations and exposed the lapses in bioterrorism preparedness plans
since the 2001 anthrax attacks. The literature review also revealed the missed opportunity
of using the 2014 Ebola epidemic as a tabletop scenario to gauge the bioterrorism
preparedness programs in place (Taylor, 2015). This missed opportunity was despite the
challenge of biological threats to health security in the United States (Shelton et al. 2012).
The chapter began with a presentation of the literature search strategy and the theoretical
framework for the study: MST. The review of the literature showed the prevalence of
inadequacy of bioterrorism preparedness practices, increased threats, heightened
vulnerability of HCWs, the vulnerability of soft targets, and, that the willingness to
respond to all-hazard emergencies was tied to increased knowledge of bioagents. Other
studies found that the lack of preparedness increased the risk of secondary infection and
identified the need for regular training.
Bioterrorism is of both national and global concerns and threats because of the
minimal cost involvements and the challenges it poses (Abrol, 2016; Cenciarelli et al.
2013; Wiwanitkit, 2014). Therefore, preparing national, states and local healthcare
agencies, and HCWs for possible bioterrorism threats is very important. Preparedness and
early detection require increased biological and chemical terrorism awareness among
front-line health-care providers because they are in the best position to report suspicious
illnesses and injuries (CDC, 2000). Most research on HCWs’ bioterrorism preparedness
had focused on hospital nurses’ and other first responders’ preparedness, leaving critical
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gaps in understanding the EMTs’ pre-hospital bioterrorism readiness and knowledge of
bioagents which are emerging health and terrorism threats. Furthermore, although, there
are extensive policies and studies on managing patients with infectious diseases (Aghaei
& Nesami, 2013; Smith & Hewison, 2012; Whetzel, Walker-Cillo, Chan, & Trivett,
2013), there is little research on specialized transportation of patients with HIDs such as
Ebola to avoid secondary infection, and on EMTs’ understanding of emergency response
protocols and in handling HIDs.
In this chapter, the study identified the need for future studies in the areas of
EMTs preparedness for cutaneous diseases such as Ebola, smallpox and Ebola pox.
Before the 2014 Ebola incidents, there was little literature on cutaneous forms of
bioagents as weapons for terrorism. The Ebola epidemic and the lack of response
uniformity demonstrated the need to study EMTs and indeed, HCWs’ bioterrorism
preparedness and practices.
Also, as the review of the literature showed, much of the literature that existed
were on bioterrorism preparedness in the pre-Ebola era and after the anthrax attacks of
2001. Little literature had focused on the possibility of weaponization of pathogens such
as smallpox and EVD, and the emerging disease: Ebola pox. A study by Kar et al. (2012)
pointed to this emerging disease - Ebola pox (black pox) as a new biological weapon. Kar
et al. (2012) noted that the disease, a combination of Ebola and smallpox is considered
more lethal than Ebola and is resistant to the changes in the environment including
humidity, cold and heat. This study addressed the gap in EMTs’ post-Ebola bioterrorism
preparedness, response protocols, and practices. The study also filled the gap in the
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literature by examining the problems and challenges confronting EMTs and identified
the factors for bioterrorism hardening and policy formulation using the theoretical
framework of MST. The study’s findings would increase knowledge by facilitating an
increased understanding of the growing field of bioterrorism preparedness and hardening.
In Chapter 3, the qualitative case study design helped fill the gap in the literature
by examining the current bioterrorism preparedness among EMTs. The research study
involved the processes of selecting the 18 EMTs who have theoretical and practical
experiences and understanding of emergency medical response practices before and after
the 2014 Ebola epidemic. The interview format was significant in examining and
understanding factors EMTs perceived as relevant to bioterrorism hardening.
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Chapter 3: Research Design
This qualitative case study was intended to examine and understand how
knowledgeable and prepared EMTs in New Jersey were for cutaneous forms of biological
agents, and the policy and political implications of a lack of knowledge or inadequate
knowledge of and preparedness for bioagents. EMTs were the focus of this study, and the
study was conducted a few years after the Ebola epidemic that exposed HCWs
unpreparedness for bioterrorism and bioterrorism policy lapses. This study was embarked
upon to understand the bioterrorism, and emergency response (BT/ER) preparedness of
EMTs. This study is important because terrorist groups are exploring and developing
bioactive programs (Abrol, 2016; Kadlec, 2013). Some studies demonstrated that
training, education, and uniformity in bioterrorism responses and protocols were
important for emergency workers’ readiness for biological attacks (Khan, 2011; Waldrop
et al., 2014).
The problem of unpreparedness for biological agents or lack of knowledge of
bioagents’ characteristics was worth examining because such unpreparedness not only
puts emergency workers at greater risk but also has community-wide health implications
(Passi et al., 2015). This study, therefore, would be beneficial to HCWs, EMTs, first
responders, and to local communities’ emergency response practices and bioterrorism
hardening (BH). The study added to knowledge by highlighting the problems EMTs face
during emergency response situations and proffered ways to increase EMTs knowledge
of bioagents and how the knowledge could increase community-wide bioterrorism
preparedness.
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This research method chapter also detailed the rationale for the study, the research
design, and, the role I played as the researcher. Particularly, I stated how I avoided
potential researcher biases. The method for the data collection section addressed possible
replicability, noted the key research protocols and the method of research participants’
selection. Other issues this chapter addressed included ethical concerns and the analytical
data method that enhanced the study’s credibility and trustworthiness.
Research Design and Rationale
Research Tradition
The study provided suggestions for enhanced bioterrorism preparedness as it
addressed the research questions: Are EMSOs and EMTs in New Jersey prepared for a
cutaneous form of biological attack such as EVD? What are the policy and political
implications of lack of preparedness? To answer these research questions, the study used
the qualitative research design (QRD) to examine the issue of bioterrorism hardening
(BH) among HCWs with a focus on EMTs. BH is the preemptive preparation for
protecting HCWs who are deployed to disaster areas; bioterrorism preparedness (BP)
includes exercises to mitigate the impact of biological attacks (Kabir et al., 2016; Rickles
& Catarious, 2015). The study also examined the knowledge of cutaneous diseases such
as Ebola among EMTs, and the emergency response practices if bioagents were
weaponized for biological attacks (MacIntyre, 2015). This qualitative case research
examined the bioterrorism (BT) preparedness and emergency response practices (ERPs)
in New Jersey from the perspective of the county EMTs. Examining and understanding
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the BT preparedness and ERPs in New Jersey will educate EMTs on the areas that
require improvements and training for enhanced ERPs.
A qualitative case study is ideal for the interview of participants in their natural
settings and provides the researcher the opportunity for an in-depth questioning to
understand the phenomena: bioterrorism hardening, bioterrorism preparedness,
emergency response practices, and Ebola. I chose the approach because it is amenable to
multiple sources of data, which enhanced the study’s internal validity and reliability.
Finally, case study approaches are flexible and are constructed to suit the cases and the
research questions (Hyett, Kenny, & Dickson-Swift, 2014). Qualitative research studies
ask probing questions for in-depth information to understand the meaning of the central
issue(s) from the participants’ diverse ideas, experiences, perspective, and the meaning
they attach to the problem (Creswell, 2014; Kozleski, 2017). The research questions in
qualitative research establish the foci of the interview procedures and the questions are
open-ended for the participants to provide detailed information (Creswell, 2014). The
research questions for this study focused on the nature of potential biological agents and
EMTs’ knowledge of bioagents.
QRD was also chosen because of its flexibility, provided a holistic account of the
phenomenon. It is also a useful method for collecting, analyzing, and interpreting data
from multiple sources to examine and gain an insight of EMTs BT/ER readiness for and
willingness to respond to cutaneous bioagents (Fusch, & Ness, 2015). Critical elements in
qualitative research are consistency and dependability that bring about validity which led
to the studies’ credibility and trustworthiness (Venkatesh, Brown, & Bala, 2013). The
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elements for assessing the trustworthiness of a QRD case study suggested by Lincoln and
Guba (1985) are credibility, dependability, confirmability, and transferability (Houghton,
Casey, Shaw, & Murphy, 2013). Credibility means the data mining process is believable;
dependability involves trustworthiness of the process and data collected; confirmability
can be achieved using qualitative data analysis software such as in vivo, and
transferability entails the ability of the study being interpreted and transferred to other
contexts (Houghton et al., 2013). Unlike a quantitative research design which key
elements are the validity and reliability of the measuring tools, in qualitative research, the
trustworthiness of the researcher as a critical research tool is most significant (Tavakol &
Sandars, 2014).
A qualitative case study was also chosen over other approaches such as
quantitative and mixed methods because case studies are constructed to suit the cases and
for probing research questions (Hyett et al., 2014). The qualitative design uses fewer
participants; gives an interpretation to the issue and uses an inductive approach to explore
and attach meaning without predetermined typology, while quantitative approaches use
larger sample population and provide formal or predetermined attributes for the study
(Brown, Strickland-Munro, Kobryn, & Moore, 2017).
Among the qualitative research approaches, I chose the case study approach. The
qualitative case study approach explores a single case in-depth based on contextdependent facts and holistically and it aligns with the study’s goal of examining in-depth
EMTs’ bioterrorism preparedness and emergency response readiness (Collins & Cooper,
2014). On the other hand, the other approaches deal with the study of individuals
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(narrative), explores the meaning of experiences towards a phenomenon
(phenomenology), generates a theory (Grounded theory) and describes and interprets a
culture-sharing group under study (Creswell, 2013). These other qualitative research
approaches were not suitable for my study because none of the other methods were bound
by time and activity (Creswell, 2013). This study was undertaken after the 2014 Ebola
epidemic that exposed the unpreparedness of HCWs for a cutaneous disease and provided
the single case inquiry which examined (and to understand) EMTs’ level of bioterrorism
preparedness.
Role of the Researcher
My role as the researcher was important in determining the credibility and
trustworthiness of the study (Tavakol & Sandars, 2014). I made use of my data collection
experiences in past academic research including my masters’ degree program and my
current job as a probation officer without appearing judgmental. Part of the strategies I
used in getting rich information from the participants was using my sense of humor and
showing an appreciation for the work EMTs perform (Barratt, 2012). Both strategies
helped the participants to be at ease and answer the research questions in detail. I
conducted the interviews using both strategies professionally and objectively without
showing biases. I ensured that there was no personal bias introduced into the data
collection process and assured the participants of their privacy and confidentiality. I
protected the participants’ privacy and confidentiality by not including their names in the
research findings. I checked any personal bias by adhering to the requirements of the
institution review board (IRB) of Walden University and the Belmont Report. Although
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bias exists at every stage of the research and is difficult to eliminate, the goal, however,
was to minimize the bias (Smith & Noble, 2014). The need to minimize potential biases
was the reason I conducted the research in another county rather than the County where I
reside. I also made no assumptions of what the participants said. Rather, I sort
clarifications when I was not sure of what any participant was saying or meant. Finally, I
avoided potential personal bias by reviewing government policies and resources from the
NJOEMS, NJDOH, and NJMRC to familiarize myself with their BT/ER practices and
policies.
I acquainted myself with the study participants and the nature of their work to
build a trusting relationship which helped increase the participants’ willingness to
provide accurate and rich information (Caretta, 2015). Although the close relationship I
established with the study participants was important, it posed some challenges for me as
the researcher both cognitively and emotionally (Postholm & Skrovset, 2013). The
challenge helped in navigating between my role as the researcher and the familiarity with
the participants and still maintain neutrality. To overcome these challenges, I exhibited
emotional maturity and exceptional interpersonal attributes that helped effectively gather
data and use the data to describe the phenomenon (Collins & Cooper, 2014). Part of the
interpersonal attributes included maintaining eye contacts and not showing or making
gestures but skillfully and attentively listening to the participants throughout the
interview (Collins & Cooper, 2014).
I took issues of ethical concerns and conflicts seriously and avoided them
throughout every stage of the study. Ethical concerns vary. Ethical concerns are assessed
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on the goals of the study, the data collection techniques, and the setting of the study
(Roberts, 2015). One of the ethical issues was obtaining signed informed consent form
from the participants. The informed consent form clarified areas of potential conflicts of
interest, the purpose of the research, the funding of the research (if any), the data
collection procedure, and the manner of reporting and protecting participants’
information and data collected.
Ethical issues also included avoiding harming the participants (Ahern, 2012).
According to the Belmont Report, not harming the participants means protecting
vulnerable research participants. However, I do not foresee my study posing any harm to
the participants. I informed the participants of their fundamental rights to withdraw or not
answer any question at any time throughout every stage of the interview.
Methodology
This qualitative case study was embarked upon to examine and understand the
bioterrorism preparedness practices of EMTs especially after the Ebola epidemic of 2014
that exposed HCWs bioagent unpreparedness and policy lapses (Shultz, Baingana, &
Neria, 2015). To help the understanding of EMTs’ BT/ER readiness, I used Kingdon’s
multiple stream theory (MST). The theoretical framework views a window of opportunity
as critical to initiating new policies and practices, and it is pivotal to the examination of
the EMTs’ bioterrorism preparedness (Ackrill, Kay, & Zahariadis, 2013). The theoretical
framework helped the study understand the problems, the policy options and the politics
inherent in formulating new bioterrorism preparedness practices and policies.
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Participants that I selected were those who have at least five years of emergency
response experience. The major sources of data were interviews (semi-structured),
observation, and review of emergency response documents. The use of many sources of
data (data triangulation) helped the trustworthiness of the study. In addition, stating in
detail the research procedures including participants’ selection, data gathering,
instrumentation, data analysis techniques, and ethical concerns further enhanced the
content validity, trustworthiness, and replicability of the study.
Participant Selection Logic
I used purposeful, snowball sampling technique in identifying and selecting the
initial 24 emergency medical technicians (EMTs) from EMSOs in a particular county in
New Jersey who met the criteria for participation. The technique helped the study get the
best information from EMTs who are representative of the sample population and had
adequate theoretical and practical knowledge of the phenomenon studied and facilitated
the understanding of the problem and the research questions (Creswell, 2014; FrankfortNachmias, 2008; Robinson, 2014). The researcher deciding whom to select and the site
for the study are critical aspects of the qualitative research (Maxwell, 2013). I was
introduced to the organizations’ supervisors and managers by a county deputy
coordinator of Office of Emergency Management Services (OEMS). The participants’
demographic survey forms (Appendix B) were used to identify the participants who met
the study requirements. First, the organizations’ supervisors used the Form to identify
potential participants that met the requirements. The identified participants then
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completed the forms. From the list of the returned completed demographic forms, I
selected the study 18 participants and two pilot study participants.
Each organization was limited to four participants but not more than five
participants. After the participants were identified by the supervisors, I emailed to the
potential research participants an invitation to participate in the study and attached the
cover letter (Appendix A) and the participant demographic forms (Appendix B). In the
email, I thanked them for agreeing to participate in the study. I used the cover letter to
introduce myself, state the reason for the study, benefits, and summary of the research,
and assure the participants of their confidentiality which helped maximize data
generation (Rowley, 2012). The cover letter also indicated that their participation was
voluntary. I called each participant to explain further the content of the cover letter and
agree with each participant the date, time and place for the interview. Later, I emailed the
consent forms to the selected participants and explained the selection criteria to them.
Before the start of each interview, the participant completed and signed the consent form
which I collected and gave them copies.
Although I selected 24 participants, I interviewed 18 research participants. The 18
participants enriched the study with adequate information until thematic saturation
occurred. The number was apt, and it ensured that adequate and diverse emergency
response experiences were gathered from many organizations rather than from one
organization. However, some studies have recommended a different number of
participants until thematic saturation occurs. For instance, Creswell (2014) recommended
between four and five participants while Gentles, Charles, Ploeg, and McKibbon (2015)
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recommended between 20 and 25 interviewees. For my study, there were an extra six
participants. Two of the participants were used for the pretest or pilot study. The
remaining four alternate research participants from the pool of six participants were
extras for additional recruitment of participants. For instance, the extra participants were
potential sources of replacement if any participant dropped out of the study. The criteria
for inclusion in the study included at least 5 years of emergency response experience.
Other criteria included active emergency medical technician during the 2014 Ebola
epidemic, at least 25 years old at the time of the interview and involvement in
transporting patients to HCFs.
Determining the number of research participants for data saturation was
important. However, there is no definite number of research participants for a study to
attain data saturation (Fusch & Ness, 2015; Hennink, Kaiser, & Marconi, 2017). Data
saturation is attained when no new information or further coding are possible or needed
(Fusch & Ness, 2015). Burmeister and Aitken (2012) observed that saturation is not
about sample size rather what constitutes the sample size guides the study in reaching
data saturation point. Therefore, knowledgeable and experienced study participants with
rich and thick information selected through purposeful, snowball sampling technique
aided the study to attain data saturation (Creswell, 2014). Another method I employed to
attain data saturation was data triangulation. Data triangulation, the process of gathering
data from multiple sources, also helped the reliability of the study and finding (Fusch &
Ness, 2015). Therefore, the information from the 18 participants, the field notes, and
documents reviewed ensured the study attained data saturation and reliability.

104
Pilot Study
In qualitative research, there is no one way of conducting interviews or
developing an interview protocol. But because the data collection instruments were
researcher-developed, there was the need to pretest the instruments to ensure that they
measured what they intended to measure. The pilot test provided me the opportunity to
review the interview questions, modify the interview protocols and, provide the data that
could help improve the conduct of the main interview procedure (Mok, Lau, Lai, &
Ching, 2012). When conducting a pilot test, whether for a qualitative or quantitative
study, the goal is to help improve the validity and reliability of the research instruments,
and, therefore, the study findings (Cope, 2015; Dikko, 2016).
I selected two participants for the pilot study from the first selected EMSO. The
two pilot study participants were identified by their respective supervisors using a
purposeful sampling technique. Participants completed the participants’ demographic
survey form to ensure that they met the requirements for participation in the study. I
emailed the cover letter and the informed consent forms to them. My initial contacts with
the pre-test participants were via emails. I conducted a face-to-face interview for the
pretest at their workplaces at a time most convenient for them to participate in the
interview process. I recorded the session with an ICD recorder. The pilot test session also
helped me assess the functionality of the recording equipment. The data collection
procedure I used for the pilot study guided me in determining the effectiveness of the
interview procedure and its efficacy for the main study (Cope, 2015). However, I did not
include the data collected during this pilot test into the main study data analysis.
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Procedures for Recruitment, Participation, and Data Collection
The research instruments I developed for data collection included participants’
demographic information form (Appendix B), cover letter (Appendix A), informed
consent form, and the interview questions (Appendix C). The 18 EMTs that I selected
formed the primary source of data gathered through a face-to-face interview. After the
interview, field notes gathered from my observations during the interview were reviewed
and included in the research data for analysis. Finally, I analyzed the data collected and
identified themes using thematic analysis procedure.
The core of this section centered around data collection methods. Data collection
was part of the research process that described the research plan, answered the research
questions that resulted in the research findings for potential practical applications
(Gelling, 2015). To ensure fair representation of the EMTs and EMSOs in the selected
county, I selected one EMSO each from six towns. However, only four EMSOs formed
the core of the unit of analysis while the remaining two EMSOs were alternates if any of
the initial four EMSOs declined to participate in the study. For the organizations’ privacy
and confidentiality, I assigned identifiers: Emergency Organization 1; Emergency
Organization 2; Emergency Organization 3; and Emergency Organization 4. The
alternate emergency organizations were not be assigned any identifiers. But if any
participating emergency organization declines, one of the alternate emergency
organizations would assume that identifying number.
I met the assisting supervisors in each organization in their offices and gave them
the permission forms: Gatekeepers Information Form (Appendix D) and Consent and
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Authorization Form (Appendix E). As the connecting link between the researcher and the
potential research participants, the supervisors recommended participants who met the
qualification criteria and, therefore, had a significant influence on who participated or did
not participate in the study (Eslamian, Moeini, & Soleimani, 2015; Oye, Sorensen, &
Glasdam, 2016). Although in some cases, supervisors could assist the participants in
completing the informed consent form and, therefore, protect the interest of the
organizations they represent, that was not the case about my study (Gallo et al., 2012).
The study participants completed the consent forms themselves. The supervisors
identified in my study included operations supervisors or managers.
The EMSOs chosen for the study had been in operation during the Ebola
epidemic. The EMSOs were also purposely selected from those who operated in a prehospital environment. My researcher position role allowed me to examine the
participants’ understanding of reality from their points of view (Edwards, 2017). For the
actual data collection, I allocated each week to each organization. So, for the EMSO
organizations I selected and visited for the interview, I allocated between four to six
weeks for the interview. The additional two weeks was to make room for spillovers. I
notified each organization and their respective employees ahead of the day, time and
place for the face-to-face interviews. The study questions were open-ended. I used a
semi-structured interview technique, and each interview lasted for an average of 30
minutes. The 30 minutes was enough for the data gathering until no new information
emerged and data became repetitive (Musheke, Merten, & Bond, 2016). Rudestam and
Newton (2015) noted that open-ended interviews could yield high fidelity and little
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structure when properly recorded. Both the recording and note-taking techniques ensured
the accuracy of information obtained, enhanced feedbacks, improved survey instrument
and increased the quality of data collection processes (Thissen, 2014).
Data Collection
Interview
I collected data through the interview of the participants, observation of the
participants’ mannerism and review of related documents (Creswell, 2013). The multiple
sources of data helped achieve data saturation because of its rich and thick provision of
information, reduction of potential bias, allowance for better assessment and applicability
of the findings; and avoidance of systematic measurement error (Leuffen, Shikano, &
Walter, 2013). The study interviewed the participants (EMTs) individually rather than as
a focused group (Rudestam & Newton, 2015). Before starting the data collection process,
I reviewed the relevant documents on emergency preparedness, responses, and policies
and that gave me an understanding of what EMTs do.
I collected the data from participants using a face-to-face interview technique, and
the process was recorded with two ICD recorders at their workplaces. I took notes as I
interviewed the participants and was guided by the interview protocol I developed
(Creswell, 2013). I used the two ICD recorders to ensure that no part of the interview
session was missed and in the event one recording device malfunctioned, I will have a
backup. I interviewed the participants at their respective workplaces. The interview
protocols included preinterview and postinterview activities including completing
participants’ demographic information sheet; participants signing the informed consent
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form; and member checking (Jacob & Furgerson, 2012). Member-checking measured the
credibility of the study because it gave the participants the opportunity to review the
accuracy of the recording and information transcribed (Houghton, Casey, Shaw, &
Murphy, 2013).
The interview questions were designed to probe and to yield maximum data from
the participants (Maxwell, 2013). The research questions drew inferences to the
background of the study, participants’ opinions, feelings, experiences and knowledge of
the phenomenon under study (Greene & Yu, 2014). For instance, the central research
questions guided me in formulating the interview questions. I used the interview
questions in Appendix C to examine and understand EMTs knowledge of cutaneous
diseases, bioterrorism preparedness and practices, and policies; the participants’
experiences, knowledge and training in bioagents; understanding of existing preparedness
policies and protocols; and the participants’ willingness to respond to biological attacks
in the aftermath of the 2014 Ebola epidemic. The questions were open-ended, and the
interview was conducted in a conversational setting. Also, the selected county’s allhazard mitigation plan (HMP) of 2015 was useful in understanding EMTs’ levels of
preparedness for all disasters, and the emergency response protocols were also included
in the interview questions.
The flexibility of the research reflected in the choice of the participants’ work
sites as the venues for the interview which made the participants willing study
participants; made the interview convenient for them, and easier for me as the researcher
to reach them (Woith, Jenkins, Astroth, & Kennedy, 2014). I conducted a pilot test that
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measured the validity of the interview protocol in the field and thus improve the content
validity of the interview instruments such as the research questions and the coding system
for the final study (Dikko, 2016). I used the research interview questions for the pilot
study as well.
I scheduled and conducted the interviews between Mondays and Fridays during
office hours between 10.30 am and 9.30 pm. The flexibility of the days and hours
allowed the participants to choose the most convenient day and time for the interview.
The flexibility of both the interview days and hours ensured that the interview did not
interfere with the participants’ work schedule and negatively impacted on the
organizations’ emergency response functions.
After each interview, I thanked the participants for their participation and
conducted a debriefing session with them. I used the debriefing sessions to clarify any
issue or issues of concern with the participants: concerns that may have arisen in their
minds after the interview began especially about the aim of the study although this was
stated earlier (Roche & Hefferon, 2013). I asked them if they have questions about the
study and the interview. I also used the debriefing to ask if any participant needed
counseling. I informed them that there would be a follow-up meeting with them in-person
for a review of the interview transcript to ensure the data reflected their views in the form
of member-checking.
The process of member-checking allowed the participants to review the
transcription of the interview; verify and confirm the accuracy of the transcribed
interview; and enhance the credibility of the research (Birt, Scott, Cavers, Campbell, &
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Walter, 2016; Houghton et al., 2013). I did the member-checking by meeting with the
participants with a copy of the transcribed interview and have them go through it.
Observation
An observation was another data collection technique I used in gathering data
from the participants, and it involved taking field notes on the behavior and body
expressions of the research participants (Creswell, 2014). I used observation sheet to
document my observations of the research participants’ mannerism before, during and
soon after the interview such as the participants’ body language and facial expressions
(Antin, Constantine, & Hunt, 2015) to avoid missing critical details. The observation
sheet was a log that I used to document observations that were relevant to the study but
not captured in the audio recording devices such as body expressions and for further
inquiries (Edwards, 2017). The triangulation of data from these data collection
techniques: interview protocols, observations, audio-recording, and observation log
assisted in giving the study its trustworthiness and credibility (Edwards, 2017).
The issue of validity in any qualitative research depended on “the ontological and
epistemological views of the researcher” and the nature of the study (Green, 2015, p. 68).
Therefore, my role as the researcher involved self-reflexivity that helped me check any
held personal and potential bias that would have affected the validity of the data
collection (Berger, 2015; Green, 2015). Another critical issue about validity is
transformational validity which refers to the outcome of the qualitative research through
the participation of the respondents and collaboration throughout the research (Thomas,
2017). Validity is the extent to which the research processes including the data collection
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tools and data interpretation are presented, devoid of distortion and biases (Leung, 2015;
Teusner, 2016).
The researchers’ held views (human cognition) arises from bias, and these views
have the potentials to distort the findings in any study. As Suter and Suter (2014)
observed, researcher bias affects the validity of any study because human cognition based
on bias emanates from faulty reasoning or assumptions. For instance, I held the view that
EMTs only transport patients to HCFs. When conducting the interview, I was openminded and avoided rushing to conclusions as the participants provided answers to the
interview questions and this mindset help avoid compromising the data and finding.
Data Analysis Plan
This qualitative case study approach was used to collect and analyze data and
examine the issue of bioterrorism preparedness and ensure that the participants’
experiences and perception of the phenomenon were accurately captured (Kornbluh,
2015). Data analysis involves data collection, coding, emerging themes, interpreting the
findings and determining the validity of the findings (Gaglio, Glasgow, & Bull, 2012). To
achieve this, I used open-ended interview processes to get answers (data) to the research
questions from the participants; and I transcribed all the answers to the research questions
verbatim (Gaglio et al., 2012; Chan, Fung, & Chien, 2013). I also compared the audio
recording with the notes I took during the interview.
I began the data analysis with the collection of the data from the various sources:
recorded interviews, field notes, and documents gathered from NJOEM and a county
emergency management office. The interviews were tape-recorded using ICD recorder,
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later transcribed verbatim and finally conducted a qualitative thematic content analysis
through the coding of the data (Mehraban, Hassanpour, Jamdani, & Ajami, 2013). The

process of data transcription involves text search, coding queries, and matrix queries
((Houghton et al., 2013). I listened to the recorded interview many times before
beginning the process of transcribing the recorded interview, word for word (Zeighami,
Oskouie, & Joolaee, 2014). I then segmented the collected data question by question for
each participant using the text search method, reviewed the recorded interview and the
notes I took and identified the key terms or ideas that formed the primary codes (Vaughn
& Turner, 2016; Zeighami et al., 2014). The segmentation of the data question by
question was necessary because of the expected volume of data involved in the process of
data analysis and for a clearer understanding of the data and the transcription (Vaughn &
Turner, 2016). Next, I used coding queries to reduce the large segments and labeled them
into codes which I stored in the nodes for references (Houghton et al., 2013). Later, the
related codes were reduced into sub-themes, and the sub-themes further categorized into
themes (Zeighami et al., 2014). Finally, the matrix coding was used to identify and
compare numerous nodes or themes and confirm findings to ensure the participants’
information was accurately reflected (Houghton et al., 2013). Data coding is an important
procedure in a qualitative study because, in an open-ended interview procedure, coding
helps show emerging patterns and themes (matrix queries) from the participants’
response to the research questions (Rapport, Clement, Doel, & Hutchings, 2015).
Data analysis requires an understanding of the entire process of data mining,
organizing data, and developing reflective memos to increase data interpretation
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(Finfgeld-Connett, 2014a). Memoing was important to this study because I used it to
encapsulate concisely, clearly, and transparently my understanding of the generated data
as to arrive at findings that also reflected the participants’ views of the phenomenon
(Finfgeld-Connett, 2014b). To develop the themes, the software in vivo coding technique
was utilized. The usefulness of in vivo as a computer-assisted qualitative data analysis
software is to assist the researcher in data coding, retrieval and recording, editing, and
filing of data (Roberts, Breen, & Symes, 2013). Essentially, the software program
assisted me in data coding and analysis while I remained the major instrument throughout
the data collection and analysis stages (Habib, Etesam, Ghoddusifar, & Mohajeri, 2012).
Another critical element in data analysis that I included while reviewing the data
was the discrepant cases and non-conforming data. These were cases and data that though
did not fit into the data categorization or emerging theme but were nonetheless
considered for better thematic data analysis (Waite, 2011). I reflected the discrepant data
in the study’s finding because they were equally relevant for a clearer understanding of
the data I collected and the findings of the study.
Issues of Trustworthiness
Trustworthiness in qualitative research involves the verifiability of the data,
researcher accounting for or acknowledgment of bias, data triangulation, clear description
of the data gathering and analysis processes (Noble & Smith, 2015). Trustworthiness was
measured with the four yardsticks or criteria of dependability, confirmability,
transferability, and credibility rather than the quantitative measuring tools of reliability
and validity and generalization (Morse, 2015). White, Oelke, and Friesen (2012) noted
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that trustworthiness and careful management of data are critical elements in inductive
qualitative research such as my study. The four criteria for assessing the trustworthiness
of a qualitative study were developed by Guba and Lincoln in the 1980s replacing such
terms as generalizability, reliability, and validity (Morse, 2015).
To ensure the trustworthiness of the study, I adopted an open-ended and iterative
line of questioning along with data triangulation, participants selection process and
context of the study clearly stated, and data accurately reflected participants’ actual
views (Cope, 2014; Mabuza, Govender, Ogunganjo, & Mash., 2014).
Credibility (Internal Validity)
An inductive research such as my study draws its credibility from the
trustworthiness of the entire gamut of the data analysis process namely, data
triangulation, participant selection technique, member-checking, peer-review of the
process (Connelly, 2016; Whyte, Burke, White, & Moran, 2015). Credibility is the
equivalent of internal validity for quantitative research. Credibility measures how the
researchers’ interpretation of the data collected meshes with participants’ information
given during the interview (Munn, Porritt, Lockwood, Aromataris, & Pearson, 2014). In
assessing the credibility of my study, I made painstaking efforts to ensure that I
accurately interpreted the data and arrived at findings that reflected the actual data
collected from the EMTs interviewed. I employed the following techniques: exhaustive
interview of the participants, keen observation, and note-taking of body language, review
of journals, member checking, purposeful selection of knowledgeable EMTs for the
study’s credibility (Connelly, 2016).
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The study adopted a semi-structured method to conduct the interview. Also, to
select knowledgeable participants, the snowball purposeful sampling technique was
utilized to increase the credibility of the finding (Ahern, 2012; Smith, & Herber, 2015).
The snowball purposeful sampling technique gave the study credibility through the
sampling of information-rich participants who had deep knowledge, experience, and
understanding of the phenomenon under study (Palinkas et al., 2015). In applying this
selection technique, both the gatekeeper (supervisor) and the other research participants
assisted in identifying individuals who were both knowledgeable and willing to
participate in the research. The research participants were drawn from EMTs rather than
from other emergency medical responders such as mobile intensive care nurses,
paramedics and Advanced EMTs.
Transferability (External Validity)
Transferability refers to the application of the findings of a study to another
setting or other contest (Moon, Brewer, Januchowski-Hartley, Adams, & Blackman,
2016). I provided a detailed description of the phenomena under study; the participants’
recruitment procedure and the inclusion criteria, the data collection processes, data
triangulation, duration of the interview session, and where and when the interview took
place. Triangulation of data helped the study achieve transferability. The extent to which
examining and understanding EMTs bioterrorism preparedness, from a small study
population in a particular county, could be replicated and extrapolated to other Counties
was what made the study trustworthy from a positivist perspective (Moon et al., 2016).
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The transferability of a study to another situation is, however, complex because
the sample size is measured not only by the number of study participants but also the
adequacy and usefulness of the data (O’Reilly & Parker, 2013). The transferability of my
study to another setting might be limited by the sample size and heterogeneity of the
participants. The transferability (external validity) could, however, be enhanced if the
nature and process of research inquiry are well defined. Hence I provided detailed
information about the research method to help future research on the phenomena or
similar phenomena.
Dependability (Reliability)
Dependability in inductive research is the measure of the consistency of the
research design process throughout data collection, analysis, interpretation, and reporting
of the findings (Connelly, 2016; Houghton et al., 2013). Dependability also involves a
detailed audit trail of process log about the research activities including the research
participants’ selection process and conduct of the interview (Connelly, 2016). I ensured
the dependability of the study by creating an audit trail for tracking and keeping detailed
records, approaches and activities involved in the research process (Connelly, 2016;
White, Oelke, & Friesen, 2012). The audit trail I developed during the interview helped
me keep track of the relevant activities that happened throughout the study for reference
purposes.
Member checking is another technique I used to improve the study’s
dependability. I utilized member checking to check back with the research participants
with the transcribed interview to ensure it reflected their views (Houghton et al., 2013;
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Kornbluh, 2015). I also used member-checking, a validation technique to establish the
dependability and credibility of the result of my study (Birt, Scott, Cavers, Campbell, &
Walter, 2016). I did this by returning to the participants several weeks after the interview
for them to check the accuracy and consistency of the data and information they
provided.
Confirmability (Objectivity)
Confirmability as a measure of the trustworthiness of the study is to find out if
another researcher who is not privy to the original study can arrive at the same finding
with the same data rather than the researcher’s assumptions (Rapport et al., 2015). The
independent replication of the study helps the researcher check for any bias that may have
been unwittingly introduced into the study. Confirmability should measure the objectivity
of the study based on the actual data collected from the participants rather than the
researcher’s preconceived ideas and opinions. Although, as the researcher, I stated my
beliefs, assumptions, and predispositions towards the phenomenon under study, it may
not have necessarily eliminated the potential introduction of bias (Moon et al., 2016).
However, I reduced the possibility bias of prejudgment of EMTs knowledge by
maintaining unbiased disposition and not make any assumptions of the research findings.
I also achieved the confirmability criterion of the study by using data triangulation and
member checking to ensure the accuracy of the data gathered from the participants and
the credibility of the findings.
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Ethical Procedures
I conducted this study with IRB Approval No. 02-26-18-0441760. Ethical
considerations ensure that personal bias is minimized through member-checking because
the researcher is ethically required to reflect participants’ views and lived experiences
accurately (Kornbluh, 2015). In every research, the researcher is also required to protect
the participants’ confidentiality, privacy, and rights throughout the research process
(Petrova, Dewing, & Camilleri, 2016). Qualitative research involves the interaction
between the researcher and the research participants. So, I abided by the Belmont Report.
The Belmont Report emphasized that researchers adhere to three principles: respect for
persons (informed consent); beneficence (not harm); and justice (protect vulnerable
subjects) (University of Iowa: Human Subject Office, n.d). Throughout the participants’
selection process and interview, I also abided by the Walden University review board
(IRB) requirements including obtaining signed informed consent form, the protection of
the participants’ rights, identity and privacy, and confidential and personal information
(Smith & Herber, 2015). The informed consent form contained the interview procedure,
the purpose of the study, and the language made clear, comprehensive and readable to
ensure the participants understood the nature of the study (Foe & Larson, 2016).
The ethical procedure also requires that I state how the interview will be
conducted which also included the duration of the interview, audio recording procedure,
and the participants’ right to terminate the interview or withdraw if feeling uncomfortable
or unable to continue (Green, Darbyshire, Adams, & Jackson, 2016). In line with the
Belmont Report, IRB’s requirement, and ethical requirement, the subjects were not be
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harmed by the study (Ahern, 2012). I made provisions for professional assistance in the
event the questions and interview process caused some harms or distress to the
participants as they relieve their emergency response experiences (Hegney & Chan
2010). I also provided the participants with the toll-free number 800-233-4357 for any
crisis and 800-999-9999 for depression cases.
Another aspect of the ethical procedure was research materials protection.
Interview materials including the recording devices and field notes were stored in a safe
box, and the information in the computer encrypted and password accessible only by me.
The data and information protection mechanisms were to avoid a third-party accessing
them and to protect the participants’ information, maintain their privacy and
confidentiality. I informed the participants that the research data and materials obtained
from them would be retained in confidentiality for five years after the study and then
destroyed. After five years, the recording devices will be destroyed, the data deleted from
the computer, and the documents shredded.
Summary
In this chapter, I discussed the rationale for research design: inductive qualitative
case study approach. The critical element in a qualitative study is the open-ended
questions conducted via a semi-structured technique for which my role as the researcher
was pivotal. My role was the principal instrument for data collection and, therefore,
critical for the trustworthiness of the study. I discussed the other pertinent issues in
research method including the pilot test, the recruitment of participants for the study, data
collection methods, data analysis, and ethical issues. Important in this qualitative study
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was establishing the study’s validity and credibility through trustworthiness and data
management (White et al., 2012).
In the next chapter, the focus is on conducting the actual study beginning with the
pilot study and data collection including the setting for the interview protocol, and data
analysis procedures. The chapter addresses how the pivotal issues of trustworthiness:
credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability relevant to a qualitative
study were met. Finally, the study addressed the issues of discrepant data because they
were equally important in data analysis.
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Chapter 4: Findings
Introduction
The 2014 Ebola epidemic that started in the West African subregion reached the
United States and created hysteria. The response from the medical community and the
various levels of government revealed apparent disjointed policy towards potential
biological attacks. The uncoordinated approach towards the epidemic and the fear that
pathogens such as smallpox, anthrax, and Ebola could be weaponized demonstrated the
need to examine the preparedness and response readiness of EMTs, who are the first
medical responders when disasters strike. There was also the need to determine the best
strategies for bioterrorism hardening. The study sought to examine and understand the
nature and level of bioterrorism preparedness among EMTs in New Jersey, for cutaneous
forms of biological agents such as EVD, and the attendant policy and political
implications of inadequate preparedness or a lack of preparedness.
The research questions used for data collection were as follows: Are EMSOs and
EMTs in the counties prepared for a cutaneous form of biological attack such as EVD?
What are the policy and political implications of lack of preparedness? They were
designed to examine the preparedness and emergency response practices of EMTs in a
particular county and to identify factors New Jersey’s policymakers, and EMSOs would
consider for bioterrorism preparedness within EMTs operations for community-wide
bioterrorism hardening. The study examined the bioagent knowledge and preparedness of
EMTs. I interviewed participants who were active EMTs during the 2014 Ebola epidemic
to understand their knowledge of bioagents, bioterrorism preparedness, and practices in
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their respective organizations. Furthermore, the research focused on the obstacles that
affected EMTs’ readiness and what they believe should be the emergency response
protocols for effective bioterrorism response practices.
In this chapter, the participants’ information was transcribed and stored in a
computer and the following areas were addressed: the pilot study, the participants’
recruitment process, data collection process, the participants’ interview response from
which the themes emerged, data safeguards, data analysis, and the issues of
trustworthiness. Following the data analysis, these eight themes emerged: adequate
planning and preparedness, lack of resources, inadequate knowledge and information,
continuous education, mandatory bioterrorism training, collaboration among agencies and
safety and job security.
Description of the Pilot Study
I conducted a pilot study. I used two EMTs for the pilot study. The EMTs used for
the pilot study were not included in the subsequent interviews for the actual research. The
purpose of the pilot study was to help fine-tune the research instruments and determine if
changes were needed. The two pilot study participants were interviewed in the evening
between 6.00pm and 9.00pm. After administering the demographic survey information
sheet, I determined that they met the requirements to participate in the study. I conducted
face-to-face interviews with the pilot study participants. The pilot study had an impact on
the substantive interview because it helped me to acquaint myself with how to use the
data collection instruments: the tape recorder, the information sheet, and the delivery of
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the interview questions. It turned out that no research instruments changes were needed,
and the questions were adequate for the study.
The Setting
The venue for the interview of the participants was the respective meeting or
conference rooms of the organizations that participated in the study. None of the research
participants agreed to participate in the study outside of their respective organizations
because they wanted the interviews conducted during their work shift hours. The
organizations’ supervisors also agreed to that arrangement. The interviews were
conducted in the evening between 4.00pm and 9.00pm. The reason for this was because
most of the participants were either volunteers or had other daytime jobs and, therefore,
reported to their respective emergency services assignments in the evening.
The Demographics
I used the organizations’ supervisors and managers to gain access to the research
participants in their organizations. The participants were selected using purposeful,
snowball sampling technique. The organization supervisors acted as the point persons in
each organization and were approved by the Walden University Institution Research
Board (IRB). The data used in this study emanated from a total of 18 EMTs. I received
the IRB authorization to use these organizations for the study. Six organizations were
identified and approved by the IRB. Although six organizations were identified and
selected for the study, only four EMSOs were used for the study. The additional two
extra organizations were placed as buffers. In the event any selected organization
dropped out of the study, one of the two additional organizations would be used as a
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substitute. A total of 24 participants were also identified through emails but, 20 EMTs
were accepted for the study. Two of the 20 participants were only used for the pilot study.
The remaining four participants were not used for the study.
The 18 participants for the study from the EMSO were selected because of their
varied experiences in emergency responses, knowledge, and involvement in emergency
response during the 2014 Ebola epidemic and after the epidemic. The number of
participants in the youngest age group (25 to 29) was two while the participants in the
oldest age bracket (42 years and above) were 12. The remainder of the 4 participants’ age
brackets were in between. The huge number of participants above 42 years was an
indication that most of the participants were very experienced in emergency medical
services and they provided useful data for the study. The average age of emergency
response experience of EMTs who participated in the study was 14.63 years (See Table 1
below).
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Table 1
Demographic Distribution of Research Participants
EMS
Number of Gender
Organizations Participants

Educational
Level

Organization
1

5

Females 2
Males 3

1certificate,
3 BA & 1
above BA

Organization
2
Organization
3
Organization
4

4

Males 4

4

Female1
Males 3
Female 1
Males 4

2 GED and 2
BA
3 certificates
and 1 GED
1 certificate,
1 GED, 3
BA
Certificate 5,
GED 4, BA
8, above BA
1

Cumulative
& Average
#s:

5

18

Females 4
Males 14

Participant Average years
s’ average of experience
age
38.6 years 14 years

39 years

17.5 years

37.5 years

15 years

38.6 years

12 years

38.43
years

14.63 years

Data Collection and Organization
I conducted a face to face interviews of the participants. Four participants each
were selected from two organizations while five participants each were from the other
two organizations for a total of 18 participants. The participating organizations were
located in New Jersey and the interviews were conducted between April 23, 2018, and
June 25, 2018. I designed the interview questions (see Appendix C) to assist in answering
the research questions. Data transcription was simultaneously done as the data mining
was going on. Soon after the data collection and transcription ended, the data analysis
started.
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The process of data collection began with the internet search for EMSOs. I
identified about a dozen EMSOs. Next, I identified the community partners who were the
EMSOs’ supervisors and managers by using the referral technique. I reached out to the
county emergency medical preparedness coordinator who helped narrow down the
potential organizations and gave me their respective addresses. He also provided the
addresses, emails and phone numbers of the contact persons in the organizations. To
reach to the contacts, I visited the organizations’ supervisors and discussed with them
how they would assist the study. I later gave them the gatekeeper information form
(Appendix D), and the Consent and Authorization Form (Appendix E) to review. Some
of them required multiple visits. However, after reviewing the consent and authorization
forms, they gave their consent by signing the Authorization Forms. The organizations’
conference rooms were the venues of the interviews.
Some days, couple of interviews sessions were conducted in an organization the
same day. In some other days, just one interview was conducted. It was practically
impossible getting all participants at the same time or day. But the interviews were
scheduled at a time most convenient for the participants and the organizations to avoid
interrupting their workflow. Although the interview was scheduled to last about one hour,
the average duration of the interview was about 30 minutes. The table 1 above shows the
age distribution and average years of experience of the research participants drawn from
the four research organizations.
I used a semistructured interview technique for the data collection process. Each
selected participant was emailed the cover letter (Appendix A) and the participants’
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demographic information survey sheet (Appendix B). After a review of the Appendix B,
the qualified participants were emailed the consent form. However, the informed consent
form was signed by the study participants before the start of the interview. I welcomed
the participants and thanked them for agreeing to participate in the study. I also recapped
in person the nature of the interview, the reason for the study, the benefit of the study, the
security of the data, and protection of their privacy in accordance by the Belmont Report.
I audio-taped the interview after obtaining their consent both verbally and in writing as
contained in the consent form. These issues were covered in both the cover letter and the
informed consent form. The study participants retained copies of the informed consent
forms for their records while I took the original copies.
The participants showed an eagerness to participate in the study. Some of them
volunteered that the study was useful because it was a way of expressing their views to
bring about changes in emergency medical preparedness and responses. One participant,
in particular, stated that he is conducting a near similar study but with emphasis on
explosives and response readiness of paramedics.
After the interview, I reviewed and transcribed the information the participant
provided. After the transcription, I reviewed the transcript with the participants, and they
acknowledged that the data transcript accurately reflected the information they provided
during the interview. The interview questions (See Appendix C) addressed the focus of
the study and the research questions. The research participants were asked the same
questions, and in some instances, follow-up questions were asked to ensure that the issues
were properly addressed.

128
To ensure research material protection, interview materials including the
recording devices and field notes were stored in a safe box and the information in the
private computer encrypted and made password accessible only to me. This method of
interview material protection ensured the participants’ privacy and confidentiality. After
the validation of the interview transcripts with the participants, each participant data
transcript was saved in word document individually and was later uploaded into the in
vivo software for qualitative analysis.
Data Analysis
The primary data were drawn from the information provided by the EMTs, who
were EMTs during the 2014 Ebola epidemic. The in vivo software coding process was
used to organize the uploaded external documents (interview transcript) and subsequent
data analysis. Coding in this qualitative study was used primarily for the retrieval and
categorization of similar data chunks (Matthew, Huberman, & Saldana, 2014). In the
analysis, I used the participants’ words or phrases to identify codes. The codes
representing the participants’ words were clustered together to create categories, and the
categories, in turn, helped show their interconnectivity. Initially, I created five nodes:
planning and preparedness, lack of resources, continuous education, inadequate
knowledge and mandatory bioterrorism hardening which were placed in categories. I
placed matching transcripts into the corresponding nodes.
Further review established precise patterns that resulted in more concise themes
and the emergent of two additional themes: collaboration among agencies and safety and
job security. All the seven themes were later placed in condensed categories. The
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software in Vivo helped in organizing the unstructured data into a manageable format and
identifying the themes that resonated with the study participants (Creswell, 2013;
Creswell, 2015).
Examples of the responses from the participants in response to the interview
question (Appendix C) are illustrated here. From the interview question 1 the following
codes were identified: training, prepared and adequate and standard response leading to
the theme, planning, and preparedness under the category, understanding emergency
practices. Some quotes from the participants illustrated the codes. (P4, O2) stated that
“they are standard” and from (P2, O2) “overall, I will rate them adequate to slightly
above adequate.” From the interview questions 2, 3, 4 and 9, the following codes were
pronounced: funding/money, training, information sharing, insufficient knowledge,
identifying pathogens and universal precautions and the themes, lack of resources,
inadequate knowledge and information, and continuous education emerged under the
category: impediments to bioterrorism preparedness. Some of the participants’ responses
were significant. (P3, P3) responded “it comes down to two things: Money and the will.
Everything costs money. The political will to do it. The last bioterrorism attack was about
16 – 17 years ago. I do not know how many EMTs know what it is.” (P4, O2) states “the
biggest obstacle is numbers. I think we do not have enough people adequately trained and
prepared versus potentially the number of victims we can be faced with.” and (P1, O2)
added “I do not see the bioterrorism preparedness resolve or training that l saw about ten
years ago after the anthrax attacks. I think its declining. Public health, we are preparing
but not like a decade ago.”
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From the Interview Questions, 5 and 6 these codes were identified: training,
awareness of diseases, Universal precautions, and safety leading to the theme, mandatory
bioterrorism hardening under the category, understanding bioterrorism preparedness.
Some of the participants’ responses to these questions included those by (P4, 01) “It does
not prepare us at all. We only rely on what the state and the county tell us to do. If we get
to a scene and have some sort of biological agent, we will kick it back to the state health
department” and (P1, 02) added “The main thing is to maintain good universal
precautions. We in EMS often are in a disadvantage. In my other life, I work in the
hospital. In the hospital, if you walk to the door, there is a warning of the level of
precaution you should take.”
Finally, in response to Questions 7, 8, and 10, the study identified the following
codes, regular drills, education, interagency coordination, training, funding, PPE, and
information sharing. The emergent themes were collaboration among agencies and safety
and job security under the category, enhancing bioterrorism preparedness and practices.
Participants responses included the following: For Question. 8, (P1, O2) stated “There are
not a lot of bioterrorism classes anymore. So, bioterrorism classes should be in included
in the basic courses even if it is 30 minutes training. I know you are focused on
bioterrorism, why not include chemical and other for forms WMD in the refresher
courses so that people can maintain a high level of efficiency.” For Question 10, (P3, 02)
responded “I think EMS, paramedics, fire, and police should be required to have WMD
policy and procedures that are reviewed by everyone. Maintain their training and
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maintain their efficiency. More training and maybe more access to more protective
equipment specific to biological agents type of threats.”
Discrepant data
Most of the responses from the participants focused extensively on the questions
asked, and that helped yield a large amount of relevant data that produced the themes
discussed. In the few instances where the participants provided information that did not
fully address the question, their responses, however, helped provide background
information and knowledge. For instance, while answering the questions, very few
deviated slightly in the middle of the response. As an illustration, in response to Question
4: What knowledge do you have about cutaneous forms of pathogens such as Ebola?, (P4,
03) gave answers that described his student life rather than his knowledge of pathogens.
He talked a bit about his studies in emergency management at Jackson State University in
Alabama. Although his studies in emergency management may help him in managing
emergency responders when he graduates, he did not fully address his knowledge of
pathogens such as Ebola. The participant’s answer had no relevance to understanding his
knowledge of cutaneous forms of pathogens.
The issues of Trustworthiness
The trustworthiness of the study was reviewed and measured using the yardsticks
of credibility, dependability, confirmability, and transferability.
Credibility
One major element of ensuring the credibility of a study is accurately reflecting
the views of the participants. To achieve this, this study recorded the interview session,
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transcribed the data verbatim, reviewed it with the participants for accurate representation
of their information and diversity of the participants. Munn, Porritt, Lockwood,
Aromataris, and Pearson (2014) noted that for a study to be deemed credible, the
researcher must interpret the data in such a way that the interpretation aligns with the
information the participants’ provided during the interview. Also, the participants met the
requirements for participation and were active EMTs during the 2014 Ebola epidemic.
The participants were also knowledgeable about the issue of emergency medical response
and provided useful information.
Transferability
Although the study was conducted in one county, to ensure the transferability of
the study, I provided a detailed description of the phenomena studied, participants’
recruitment process, and data collection process to ensure the study’s replicability in
other settings or county. Part of the process of ensuring the transferability of the study
was in clearly documenting the research process such as how the participants were
selected to ensure that they were qualified, and the nature of their participation including
not being paid. Criteria for participation were documented and reviewed with the
participants before the interview.
Dependability
The processes involved in the study: research participants’ selection, data
collection techniques, data transcription, data analysis, interpretation, and the reporting of
the findings were documented as a way of measuring the consistency of the research
design. The participants’ selection process was carefully done to ensure that the
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participants were both knowledgeable and met the requirement for participation. A
detailed audit trail was used to ensure that the study’s findings were dependable
(Connelly, 2016). Audit trail involved accurate documentation of the process of the
research process. Also, for the dependability of the findings, I ensured that the research
questions, the purpose of the study, the research design and the study’s theoretical
framework meshed. I also adopted the member-checking approach by returning to the
participants with the transcribed data for data consistency. Only two of the study
participants requested corrections to certain areas of the data transcript.
Confirmability
Confirmability as a measure of the objectivity of the study was ensured by
accurately reflecting the information provided by the participants devoid of the views and
biases of the researcher (Rapport et al., 2015). I collected the data and carefully
documented the research process for independent replicability of the study and conducted
member-checking with the participants for the accuracy of the data. Data triangulation
was also used for the confirmability of the study.
Results
After the interview, I transcribed, member-checked the transcript and analyzed the
data. The participants’ information during the interview established the relation between
the central question and the theoretical framework (MST) from which several codes were
identified, and the seven themes emerged. For instance, from the perspectives of the
participants, the codes: training, awareness, personal protection equipment, universal
precaution, and preparedness were identified as instrumental to understanding
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bioterrorism preparedness leading to the emergent of the theme: mandatory bioterrorism
hardening. The interview questions in conjunction with the theoretical framework and the
literature review also helped in developing the four broad categories: understanding
emergency responses and practices, barriers to bioterrorism preparedness, understanding
bioterrorism preparedness and enhancing bioterrorism hardening. Then I aligned the
codes, themes and, categories with the research questions and the theoretical framework.
Table 2 below shows the relationship between the codes (14), the themes (7), the
categories (4). MST and the research questions.
Table 2
The relationship between codes, themes, categories and research questions.
Categories
Understanding
emergency practices

Theme
Planning and
preparedness

Impediments to
bioterrorism
preparedness

Lack of resources;

Understanding
bioterrorism
Preparedness
Enhancing
bioterrorism
preparedness and
practices

Inadequate
knowledge &
information;
Continuous
education
Mandatory
bioterrorism
hardening
Collaboration
among agencies
Safety & job
security

Codes
Training, prepared &
adequate, standard
response
Funding/money;
training; information
sharing; insufficient
knowledge,
identifying
pathogens, universal
precautions
Training; awareness
of WMD; universal
precautions; safety of
the responders
Regular drills;
education;
interagency
coordination;
training; funding;
PPE; information
sharing

Research Questions
Question 1
Politics stream
Questions 2, 3, 4 &
9

Problem stream
Questions 5 & 6

Politics stream
Questions 7, 8, &
10

Policy stream
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To buttress the codes and themes, some of the participants’ exact information was
reproduced along with the emergent themes during the explanation of the findings. Table
3 showed the codes and their frequency of occurrences and Table 4 depicted study
participants’ identifiers.
Table 3
Graphic Representation of the Themed Responses to the Interview Questions.
S/No Codes

Frequency

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

102
35
34
32
29
27
23

% of
occurrences
25.44
8.73
8.48
7.98
7.23
6.73
5.74

23
18
18
17
16
15
12
401

5.74
4.49
4.49
4.24
3.99
3.74
2.99
100%

8
9
10
11
12
13
14

Training
Prepared and adequate
Insufficient Knowledge
Information sharing
Awareness of diseases
Education
Personal protection equipment (PPE)
maintenance
Money/Fund/Resources
Regular drills
Safety
Identifying pathogens
Universal precautions
Standard response
Inter-agency coordination
Total

The responses to the questions were varied, but they pointed to clear directions
with constant phrases or words that led to the emergent of training,
preparedness/prepared, knowledge and information as the dominant coded data. Almost
all the participants were of the view that these codes training, knowledge and information
sharing were needed for bioterrorism preparedness and hardening. Although the safety
concern was not as dominant as some other codes, the participants believed that safety
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issues such as adopting universal precautions were crucial to effective emergency
response. For instance, on Question 5, Participant 1, Organization 3 (P5, 03) stated:
“Again, it goes back to our basic training. That our safety is first and foremost in our
response. So, to know what we are going into is always very important.” P5, O5 shared a
similar thought when he stated “once you get there, you have to make sure the scene is
safe. Most importantly, the safety of your crew is most important.” Similarly, despite the
overall lack of adequate knowledge of bioagents among the participants, four participants
(P1,O2; P3,O4; P1,O4, and P4, O3) expressed adequate or partial knowledge of bioagents
because of their other full-time jobs in the hospitals unlike their volunteer or paid
colleagues who lacked such knowledge.
Table 4
The participants identification markers
S/N

Organization 1 (O1)

Organization 2 (O2

Organization 3 (O3)

Organization 4 (O4)

1

Participant 1 (P1)

Participant 1 (P1)

Participant 1 (P1)

Participant 1 (P1)

2

Participant 2 (P2)

Participant 2 (P2)

Participant 2 (P2)

Participant 2 (P2)

3

Participant 3 (P3)

Participant 3 (P3)

Participant 3 (P3)

Participant 3 (P3)

4

Participant 4 (P4)

Participant 4 (P4)

Participant 4 (P4)

Participant 4 (P4)

5

Participant 5 (P5)

Participant 5 (P5)
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Illustration of table 4. The organizations and the research participants were not
identified by name. They were assigned identifiers as Table 4 shows. For instance, the
first organization was identified as organization 1 and the first participant interviewed in
organization 1 was identified as participant 1 and abbreviated thus P1, O1. The
identification followed that trend until the last organization (O4) and the last participant
of the organization (P5) abbreviated thus (P5, O4).
Summary of the findings:
The following are the initial summary of the findings based on the codes,
emergent themes, the research questions, and the critical aspects of MST: problem
stream, politics stream, and policy stream.
1. Despite the 2001 anthrax incidents and the 2014 Ebola epidemic, there was an
apparent lack of sustained bioterrorism preparedness although the emergency
organizations were prepared for other emergencies (Problem stream).
2.

Although the problems existed, there was a heightened level of caution and
emphasis on universal precaution and safety which are critical to any
emergency response (Politics stream).

3. The participants believed that increased funding, inter-agency collaboration,
drills (training) and continuous bioterrorism awareness and preparedness were
needed for a new approach towards bioterrorism hardening (Policy stream).
The presentation of the themes and the responses from a cross-section of the
participants helped paint a picture of the current emergency medical responses and
practices and proffer what needs to be done to protect both the EMTs and the community.
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Problem Stream
I found that the impediments to bioterrorism preparedness included lack of
resources, inadequate knowledge, and insufficient information sharing and continuous
education. In other to address these problems, the finding supported the need for adequate
funding, increased training and information among emergency medical responders.
Theme 1: Lack of resources
Question 2: How would you describe the preparedness practices in your organization for
biological attacks especially after the 2014 Ebola epidemic?
Lack of resources emerged from the participants’ references to money/funding,
and training in the context of lack or inadequate training were mention multiple times
while responding to the interview Questions 2. Almost all the participants mentioned
training in some way while responding to most of the questions. Hence, training was
mentioned most: 102 times representing 25.44 percent of the codes. Lack of funding was
mentioned 23 times representing 5.74 percent of the entire codes as illustrated in Table 3.
Lack of or inadequate funding was the seventh most mentioned code. This suggests that it
was a critical issue among the participants for effective emergency response and their
safety. On Question 2, P1, O3 stated that “Again, I will say we are above average. Like
most other agencies of our size, some of it is hampered for monetary reasons. But for the
most part, I will say that we are above average if not over an average for agencies of our
size.” I followed up the response with this question: “You said hampered by monetary
reason, how can you explain that?” He responded, “Just that it is an expensive continual
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process to make sure we are staffed with particularly up to date PPE that we can find.
Unfortunately, that stuff expires. So, the need to replace it comes into play.”
Two participants particularly mentioned “poor” in describing their organizations’
bioterrorism preparedness. Pushed further for explanation, P4, O1, stated that lack of
education was responsible for the inadequate preparedness which was traceable to poor
funding. Lack of education presupposed poor knowledge of bioagents and bioterrorism
mitigation protocols. P4, O3 stated “We have fit-tested with N-95 mask. Certain
members of my organization have been fit-tested for a full CBRNE mask. We were fittested once. We never received training on the equipment. Majority of the people never
received training on the equipment. There is no annual training to do that. And, I know
that it is crucial. A lot of that is due to funding and manpower.” Similarly, O4, P3,
informed that “not every person is trained to the same level for biological response (or)
has the same level knowledge of the appropriate PPE necessary to respond to a biological
attack.” Others noted that they neither conducted drills nor trained for bioterrorism or
bioagents They trained rather for improvised explosive devices (IEDs).
Similarly, information from the participants noted that the heightened awareness
and precautionary measures of biological agents during and immediate years after the
Ebola epidemic but as the threat went down the awareness level dropped. These
observations were linked to insufficient knowledge of bioagents and inadequate training
and preparedness for bioterrorism.
Theme 2: Continuous education
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Question 3: How will the knowledge of bioagents help you in emergency responses that
involve cutaneous diseases?
Question 4: What knowledge do you have about cutaneous forms of pathogens such as
Ebola?
Both questions were interrelated, and the responses from the 18 participants led to
the theme: continuous education. The responses of the participants point to the lack of
adequate knowledge of pathogens. Although, they recognized the importance of such
knowledge for their safety and their families. The participants recognized the importance
of training and regular education to identify and separate pathogens when responding to
disaster scenes. On Question 3, P4, O1 responded that “I mean, it is not something you
will suspect immediately you walk to the scene. Ok, this person is exposed to anthrax. I
mean, effectively identifying it. Obviously, you will need a lot of training in that. Or
somebody else exposed outside to something that could be airborne, you will know
immediately, ok, this is what I want to do to effectively treat this patient and then contact
medical control.”
P5, O1 stated knowing “how to identify certain biological agents, anthrax versus
Ebola versus smallpox to normal things that are still contagious. Small things like lice
that are more common and treatable than biological agents. So, it starts with the simple
things to the more severe things. So, knowing biological agents and the training will
enable us to respond, treat and continue treating, and (know) how to prepare, if the
knowledge is there.” P2, O3 responded, “Well, that was one of the things we learned after
Ebola outbreak. We were educated on certain things like Ebola, scarlet fever, a lot of
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highly contagious diseases that we may have passed over were made aware of. We
focused on re-educating the people. Like it became more apparent that ok, back in the
day, you get a little vomit, you clean it up. But training and education are not done.” One
particular participant (P2, O2), alluded to acquiring his knowledge of pathogens from
fictional books in response to question 4. He stated, “Minimum knowledge. Just what I
have read in magazines, periodicals. I read about a Tom Clancy novel called Executives
Orders (A fictional novel). The way they described the disease was interesting and
similar to what I have read about germs.” Responses to these questions reveal the
concerns of the participants because as the years pass their acquired knowledge declined,
and their safety and performance become compromised.
There was also the concern that effective performance of their job will have a lot
to do with the public having education and information on what they are reporting. In
particular, one participant (P1, O3), expressed the need for public education because of
its pivotal role in information dissemination to responders which will help in effective
emergency response and the protection of EMTs: “I think better educating the public.
There are many times that we will only have the information that is giving to our
dispatchers. I think the more people have a better understanding and education of
incidents like this; they will be better able to convey that information to our dispatchers
who will then give us better information. So, the public help end of it is a major
problem.” So, in this instance, it is not only about educating the emergency responders,
but it also about educating the public so that EMTs can be better prepared to protect
themselves and the community.
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Theme 3: Inadequate knowledge and information
Question 9: What would you say are the major obstacles for an effective emergency
response involving infectious diseases?
This theme emerged out of the general feeling among the participants that in spite
of the amount of preparedness for bioterrorism immediately after the 2014 Ebola
epidemic, no concerted effort was made to sustain the level. Now and then the
participants went back to the issues of inadequate funding, lack of knowledge and
insufficient information sharing either with the public or among the other emergency
responders. The major codes that contributed to this theme were knowledge (34) and
information (32) representing 16.46 percent of the total occurrences. They were among
the top five occurrences. These occurrences illustrated their importance regarding getting
the emergency responders prepared. Excerpts from the participants will further support
this assertion. P3, O2, in response to Question 9 said, “The major obstacle is poor
communication between departments. Sometimes, the information they relay to the police
department is not always passed down to emergency medical services because when
people call 911, the first person they speak to is the police. And as the information gets
transferred, sometimes you lose some of the information along the way.” P2, O3
expressed the same sentiment: “I will say the first line is the dispatch. This is very vague.
You do not know what you are walking into. The first problem starts with the dispatch.
When the information is not clear, the responders are in the dark about what to expect,
and that has a great impact on EMTs’ safety and preparedness.” And she added “people
who are calling in 911, they do not answer all the questions and are not paying attention.
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They hang up. Also, with the Pro QUA, you cannot rely on. It is like a kind of catch 22
because you cannot rely on the people at the end of the phone because they are too
confused to answer.”
But one common theme by the participants is the lack or at best, minimum
knowledge of biological agents. P1, O1 stated that “The biggest thing is knowing what
the disease is” when asked about the obstacles in responding to potential emergencies
involving infectious disease. The lack of knowledge was pervasive in most of the
responses from the other participants. P3, 04, in response to Question 9 stated, “Lack of
support for training. Lack of knowledge.” I then asked a follow-up question: When you
say lack of knowledge, what do you mean? He offered this clarification: “Lack of
knowledge on how to protect yourself to that level. And the fear of saying that your
organization is not prepared to respond to that kind of incident, you do not want to make
that public.” Other participants, while acknowledging the improved preparedness in many
areas of emergency responses are concerned that there is laxity in preparedness for
biological attacks because it is seen as a rarity. However, one participant noted the
potential weaponization of not just the pathogens, but the wastes derived from patients
infected with Ebola if they are not properly disposed to avoid secondary infectious. Some
participants expressed the notion that the issue of bioterrorism is alien to them but noted
the need to prepare for it. P5, O4 said “I think one of the obstacles is the state not having
enough classes or courses to keep members sufficiently educated on things that pop-up
that is new. I think there is enough knowledge about Ebola from the last outbreak. But,
like you said, if they are inventing Ebola-pox biological agent. I think the state has to
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look at that and how do we protect EMTs and first responders who will be the first on the
scene to treat these people. So, I think we really need to push the state for more courses,
more awareness for EMTs, or classes.”
Having more classes at regular intervals had a lot to do with funding. And the
funds appear not there. For example, P1, O4, in response to question 9 echoed the
sentiment of many participants: “I will say money. It will be the top obstacle there.
Personnel dedicated to learning how to train people and implementing such training in
organizations.” One participant (P2, O1) particularly mentioned that the lack of resources
was responsible for the many emergency organizations making extensive use of
volunteers. The use of volunteers, he noted has its drawbacks because the volunteers do
not have as much time as regular paid EMTs to train and acquire more knowledge.
Of the 18 participants, only four expressed a fair working knowledge of
pathogens and how to handle them if they have to respond to bioterrorism. These
assertations were in spite of the county’s all Hazard Mitigation Plan of 2008 and the
reviewed and revised version in 2015.
Politics Stream:
One thing was clear: EMTs were adequately knowledgeable and trained for most
emergencies besides emergency responses that involve biological agents. But developing
effective emergency response practices would build bioterrorism hardening among first
responders.
Theme 4: Adequate planning and preparedness
Question 1: How would you describe the existing emergency response practices in your
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organization?
Concerning Question 1, almost, every participant expressed better preparedness
before and after the Ebola epidemic for general emergency responses. The contributing
sources were training, prepared and standard response. Prepared and adequate were
mentioned 35 times (the second highest occurrence: 8.73 percent), and standard response
represented 3.74 percent (15 occurrences). They noted the increased preparedness for
infectious diseases responses during and the immediate years after the 2014 epidemic.
But the bioagent preparedness and awareness level have steadily declined because Ebola
threat no longer existed. P2, O3 stated “We have learned a lot, especially after the Ebola
outbreak. They have gotten us more prepared. Before we were dropping the ball. We are
a lot prepared.”
P2, O1 expressed a similar sentiment: “everyone had training and awareness was
heightened at that time.” This concern was a general trend among many participants. It is
instructive that most of the participants expressed above average or adequate
preparedness for emergency responses. But the responses changed when the question is
on preparedness for biological attacks (Question 2), especially after the Ebola epidemic.
P2, O2, informed that “…since they epidemic disappeared. There has been no refresher
training. It has not been in the media. It has fallen by the wayside.” P3, O1 spoke in the
same vein for Q1: “We are adequate. I am a volunteer. We are pretty educated. We have
to recertify every two years. We take classes. We have to have 24 hours of continuing
education.”
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Further, P5, O1 echoed the sentiment of P3, O1 when he responded to Q1 this
way: “Our current emergency response is in accordance with standard operating
procedure (SOP). We are only trained at awareness level to know how to identify and
stay safe until the appropriate personal gets there.” P1, O3, when asked to describe their
preparation for an emergency response said, “it is above average.”
Theme 5: Mandatory bioterrorism training
Question 5: How do your emergency response protocols prepare you for potential
bioagent or biological attacks?
Question 6: What kind of preparedness and training do you need for disaster response?
The participants, in general, called for more training in bioterrorism preparedness.
Their suggestions allied with their responses in Questions 1 and 2 that while EMTs’
emergency response, practices, and knowledge were above average in most areas of
emergency response, they were below average when it came to bioterrorism
preparedness. The contributing sources for this theme were training, awareness of WMD
(29 occurrences:7.23 percent), the safety of the responders (18 occurrences: 4.49 percent)
and universal precaution (16 occurrences: 3.99 percent). The codes operating within the
politics stream contributed to the theme, mandatory bioterrorism hardening and were
useful in understanding bioterrorism preparedness.
Excerpts from the participant: On bioterrorism preparedness P4, O1 emphatically
stated: “It does not prepare us at all.” In response to Question 5, P4, O2 unequivocally
stated “Again, it all comes down to training and awareness preparedness.” Similarly, on
Question 5, P2, O2 provided this response “And, we do need more Hazmat awareness
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training. It is good to have Hazmat knowledge and the steps you can take to protect
yourself and not just knowing that it is bad.” Another participant added, “again, it goes
back to our basic training. That our safety is first and foremost in our response.” On
Question 6, the participant responded, “again, a lot of it is mostly awareness recognition
and reaction.” P1, O2 spoke in the same vein when he stated, “You should have WMD
awareness which I believe is now part of the basic EMT curriculum.” And further added,
“The main thing is to maintain good universal precautions.” Another participant’s
response to Question 6 included this response, “we need a mandatory requirement of
being trained at least, in the minimum, the CBRNE awareness, and operations every two
years along with Hazmat awareness and operations.”
Another participant, P2, O3, stated the urgency for “the standard training
throughout the different agencies in the area. If we have one standardized training, police,
fire EMS, they all go for the same training.” P4, O3 when asked Question 6 stated “try to
make people aware of what they may be going into, what kind of pathogens they may
come upon, what steps they can take to prevent exposures as much as possible. Again,
paramount is their safety first.” Finally, P4, O1 concluded that “I think we do more
preparation for mass casualty than we do for anything else per injury-wise.” And that
‘anything else’ includes, lack of bioterrorism preparedness.
Policy Stream:
Participants noted that in addition to other emergency response practices, there is
a need for increased interagency collaborations and enhanced safety measures when
responding to emergencies. These measures would increase EMTs’ willingness to
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respond to emergencies including bioterrorism. However, achieving these measures
would require political will among policymakers.
Theme 6: Collaboration Among Agencies
Question 7: What areas of training or tools do you think you will need for effective
bioterrorism and emergency response?
Question 8: What other suggestion would you proffer for adequate bioterrorism and
infectious disease response by emergency medical responders?
Some factors that participants suggested will help improve emergency responses
are intra-and interagency collaboration and training. These are training among emergency
organizations and training between EMSOs and other first responders such as the Police
and the fire fighters. Other contributing sources for this theme include drills, PPE and
information sharing among the agencies. Specifically, drills, PPE, and collaboration had a
total of 53 sources which amounted to 15.22% of the occurrences. Excerpts from the
participants illustrated this point. Participant 2, Organization 3 (P2, O3) noted that “we
will need mass drills, with everybody involved, your police, your fire, your EMS, your
port authority and mass transit police. Mass training (and) drills spread throughout,
classroom education you know, throughout the different agencies the same throughout
the state. So that everybody is on the same page.” Similarly, P3, O4 responded to
Question 7, “You need hazmat awareness which is required by the state, is also required
to be refreshed every year. You also need training for a biological response; you
definitely need PPE training on donning and duffing techniques and need to conduct
drills to practice doing it.” P2, O3 responded to Question 7 thus in part: “I guess training
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and drills. If there are new things out there, it should be put together, even if it is a power
point, whatever. It should be done throughout the multi-agency. Like it got to be the same
throughout.” P2, O1 gave almost similar responses to Questions 7 and 8. She stated
“Clearly, training on bioterrorism. Emergency response, you have to practice. Practicing
(that is drilling) is a big part of emergency response at least yearly to keep up with the
certification” (Question 7) and to Question 8 added: “The suggestion I will proffer to
handle bioterrorism disease responses would be basically training. And not just training
once. But practicing and keeping everyone up to date with what to do and how to do it.”
To Question 8, P1, O3 responded “there should be easy access to protective gear,
to training, education that does not hamper the overall response of the agency because we
cannot afford it. Definitely, more money to every aspect of the response will be helpful.”
P4, O3 was even more blunt, “for everybody to be on the same page and have one standard
throughout the state. Whether you are a volunteer or paid, everybody meets the same
requirement from one agency to the next. We all have to have the same standard. I know
some agencies do not even fit-test for N-95 Mask for tuberculosis patients. Other agencies
bluntly say if it is this kind of patient, we will call another squad.” The responses from the
participants demonstrated the importance of drills, PPE, training, and collaboration to
enhance bioterrorism preparedness and practices.
Theme 7: Safety and Job Security
Question 10: What policy changes do you think can make your emergency response
safer?
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Safety was a common decimal among most responders either regarding
preparedness to help a victim or a patient and in responding to disaster situations. The
main contributing sources for this theme are training, education and information sharing.
For instance, Participant 5, Organization 4 (P5, O4) in response to Question 10, was
particular about the manner many EMTs respond to a disaster situation, often with
minimal regards to safety on the road. He expressed concern that EMTs when responding
to calls, drive to the areas without obeying traffic lights, “I think there could be policy
changes. Based on something as simple as responding to a scene. There has been a lot of
talk about ambulances speeding, running through red lights, not obeying stop signs.” P1,
03, was also of the view that information is central to better emergency response and
suggested policy changes in that area: “The big part is information. We respond to what
information we are given. So, the better our information, the better it all works out.” P2,
O2 said the issue of job security could impact on both the response effectiveness and
retention of experienced staff. He stated: “mandate policy changes that almost place
EMTs at the same level as the National Guard for public safety. Training times should be
used without any repercussion.”
Almost all the participants suggested the need for policy changes in the area of
continuing training and education for the safety of the EMTs and their families in the event
of a biological attack. The training will help them to recognize pathogens. P4, O3 stated
that “not all of them have the same level of equipment. Not all of them meet the same
mandate. Everybody needs to have the same type of training.” He noted the danger of
EMTs’ not recognizing pathogens and not being cautious and end up taking the disease to
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their families. He added “But it should recognize that this a very contagious disease. Let
me start by contacting the hospital. I have already been home with my family twice. That
is horrible. We should be able to recognize them.” P5, O1, response to question 10: “there
needs to be a mandatory level of training in this area as well as many. But this area is
specific. We do online classes for chemical or what we call CBRNE training. But, I think
it needs to go another step further on it and have just more scenario-based training in
person.” P4, O1 similarly responded to the same question this way, “It goes back to training
and communication between the various health departments as far as, the trickle-down
effect of getting out information down to the people faster.” He added: “in fact, not just us.
It has to involve the fire department, police department, health departments. Everybody
has to be coordinated. That is, dissemination of information.” And P2, O2 in response
stated, “Grants for training to obtain classes perhaps policies particularly for volunteers;
policies that allow employees to allow EMTs especially for volunteers to attend 2 week or
2 years degree program classes and still keep their jobs. Mandate policy changes that
almost place EMTs at the same level as the National Guard for public safety. Training
times should be used without any repercussion. It should be a policy.”
Summary
One thing most of the participants stated was that before the 2001 anthrax attacks,
there was next to zero knowledge of pathogens as potential weapons for biological
attacks. That changed after the anthrax attacks. But they also added that few years
following the anthrax attacks, training, and preparedness for biological attacks were
regularly done. But the training declined years later until the 2014 Ebola epidemic. The
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trend regarding gradual decline for bioterrorism preparedness also manifested and the
trend continued in the immediate years after the 2014 Ebola epidemic.
This chapter discussed the emergency response preparedness and practices among
EMTs, the factors that affected effective bioterrorism readiness and response. It also
described the implications for inadequate preparedness for biological agents if
weaponized. The research questions were designed to understand the current
preparedness practices and discover ways to improve their emergency response,
especially for bioterrorism. Consequently, seven themes emerged based on the outcome
of the information gathered from the research participants. Two constant themes garnered
from the data were the inadequate knowledge of biological agents and lack of resources
(funds and human resources). The implications of lack knowledge and inadequate
funding for bioterrorism preparedness would be increased vulnerability of EMTs, first
responders and the public.
The other five themes were: Continuous education, Adequate planning and
preparedness, Mandatory bioterrorism training, Collaboration among agencies, and
Safety and job security. The participants’ responses to the interview questions revealed
insights into their emergency response practices and the dangers they confront when they
respond to emergency calls. Also, the participants indicated the need to explore ways to
improve and enhance EMTs’ safety practices and preparedness policies, especially for
bioterrorism.
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In the next chapter, I discuss the research findings, identify the limitations of the
study, make potential policy recommendations and conclude with the study’s social
change implications.
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION
Introduction:
The threat of bioterrorism was an issue that captured the attention of policymakers
and the general public in the United States following the 2014 Ebola epidemic in West
Africa and its manifestation in the United States. The apparent unpreparedness for such
infectious diseases in the United States was seen in the uncoordinated responses from the
healthcare community and the various levels of government which further created
hysteria in the population (Olliaro et al., 2015). This study sought to understand the
bioterrorism preparedness and practices among EMTs who are among the front-line
health-care providers in the event of emergencies and biological attacks (CDC, 2000).
The study focused on EMTs within a particular county in New Jersey and their
bioterrorism preparedness and practices to discover areas of improvement. Data were
collected via audio recorder in a face-to-face interview and recorded. The research
participants were asked open-ended questions. The study participants met the
participation requirement that included a minimum age of 25 and active EMT status
during the Ebola epidemic. The EMTs were selected from the EMSOs using the
purposeful sampling technique.
The data collected were transcribed and coded. Accurate transcription of the data
and member-checking of the transcribed data ensured the trustworthiness of the findings.
Two of the study participants identified areas of corrections which were rectified. The
process of member-checking helped the study in ensuring that the transcript accurately
reflected the information participants provided during the interview (Houghton et al.,
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2013). After the member-checking process, the data were analyzed and coded. The coded
and analyzed data showed that the major issues militating against adequate bioterrorism
preparedness included inadequate funding, lack of adequate knowledge of biological
agents, and lack of continuous education and training among EMTs. Data analysis
identified the following themes: planning and preparedness, lack of resources; inadequate
knowledge & information; continuous education, mandatory bioterrorism hardening,
collaboration among agencies and safety and job security. The themes aligned with the
study’s theoretical framework of multiple stream theory (MST) and helped answer the
research questions. Next, I discuss the purpose and nature of the study, a summary of the
findings, limitations of the study, interpretation of the study findings, study
recommendations and the recommendations’ implications for social change.
Purpose and Nature of the Study
The study examined bioterrorism preparedness among EMTs in a New Jersey
county to understand the nature and level of their preparedness for cutaneous forms of
biological agents such as Ebola and to understand the policy and political implications for
lack of or inadequate bioterrorism preparedness. The study also sought to identify
strategies for improving bioterrorism hardening among EMTs and community-wide
bioterrorism readiness that is different from the current preparedness plans, policies or
programs.
Summary of the Findings
Part of the goal of this study was to understand EMTs’ knowledge and awareness
level of biological agents. Despite the preparedness strategies in place before and after
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the 2001 anthrax attacks, including the HMP of 2015, the study found inadequate
bioterrorism preparedness practices among EMTs interviewed for the study. This
unpreparedness was evident in the participants’ insufficient knowledge and awareness of
most infectious diseases, including Ebola. On the other hand, the study found that EMTs
were more prepared for other emergency medical situations than for bioterrorism or
infectious disease epidemic. Despite the above findings, the study demonstrated that the
2014 Ebola epidemic created the awareness and urgency for bioterrorism preparedness
practices especially in the immediate years after 2014. However, as the study also
revealed, the heightened awareness of the potential use of bioagents for terrorism and the
increased bioterrorism preparedness level were not sustained in the subsequent years after
the Ebola epidemic. Conversely, the study found that despite the inadequate knowledge
of bioagents and lack of continuous education for bioterrorism preparedness among
EMTs, there was heightened safety precaution among the EMTs. As a result, EMTs, as a
rule, applied more stringently the universal precautions, which emphasized personal
protection to avoid contact with blood, bodily fluid or other potentially infectious
materials when responding to emergencies (USDOL-OSHA, n.d.).
Finally, the study showed that interagency collaborations, constant drills
(training), and biological agents’ knowledge were critical to bioterrorism hardening but
were hampered by inadequate funding. And, some of the emergency agencies were
funded by private donations which often were not adequate and regular. Of the 18 study
participants, 12 participants in response to Questions 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, and 10 mentioned
interagency collaboration in the areas of joint drills, information sharing and interagency
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coordination as critical to bioterrorism hardening. All the 18 participants mentioned
regular training in all the interview questions as the most critical element in bioterrorism
hardening. The four codes (regular training, interagency collaborations, constant drills,
and insufficient knowledge) out of the 14 codes represented 41.39% of the occurrences
(198) of the codes. These aligned with the problem and policy streams of the MST that
affirms the emergence of policies from problematic situations with the influence of the
politics stream.
Some of the findings were consistent with some suggestions and scenarios found
in the literature whether for emergencies or bioterrorism: that regular training and
continuous knowledge acquisition of bioagents were critical to HCWs’ readiness,
effectiveness, confidence to work, and avoidance of secondary infections (Aghaei and
Nesami, 2013; Kabir et al., 2016; MacIntyre, 2015; Taschner et al. 2016).
Interpretation of the Findings
In this section, I interpreted the study findings based on the themes that emerged
and their relationship to the research questions and the theoretical framework of MST.
The common denominators among the EMTs were the need for continuous education to
acquire and update knowledge and hands-on training (drills) similar to tabletop scenarios
that mimic real-life situations for bioterrorism hardening (Aghaei & Nesami, 2013). The
findings confirmed the influence of clear actions towards bioterrorism preparedness
necessary for bioterrorism hardening. The study findings affirmed the main tenet of MST
that windows of opportunity are necessary for the emergence of new solutions to a
problem. The findings also confirmed previous studies that preparedness is critical to
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mitigating the effecting of bioterrorism and avoiding secondary infections among
emergency workers (Eddy & Sase, 2015). But these studies were not specific to
cutaneous pathogens and did not focus on EMTs. Bioterrorism preparedness actions
included continuous education, training and drills (Kabir et al., 2016; Olson et al., 2014;
Waldrop et al., 2014). This study added to knowledge because it was a post-Ebola study
that recognized the missed opportunity of using the Ebola epidemic to assess EMTs and
HCWs’ preparedness for HIDs and bioagents (Taylor, 2015).
The research questions used for data collection were: Are EMSOs and EMTs in
New Jersey prepared for a cutaneous form of biological attack such as EVD? What are
the policy and political implications of lack of preparedness? The overwhelming
revelations that emerged from the research interviews were that a majority of the EMTs
were not prepared for bioterrorism attacks. The unpreparedness for bioterrorism was
evident despite the all-Hazard Mitigation Plan (HMP) and the vulnerability of New
Jersey to HIDs due to its geographic and demographic characteristics (ECOEM, 2018).
The study also found that although regular drills and bioagents knowledge were needed
the county and communities lacked the funds to execute them. For instance, of the 18
study participants, only two demonstrated adequate knowledge of biological agents
which they attributed to training. Another two participants demonstrated fair knowledge
of biological agents. The two participants with adequate knowledge of biological agents
stated that they took courses and training in bioagents identification and response
following the 2001 anthrax attacks.
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The data and revelations from the study aligned with the two broad aspects of the
research question and the theoretical framework of MST as demonstrated by the four
broad categories identified in chapter 4. The categories identified were understanding
emergency practices, impediments to bioterrorism preparedness, understanding
bioterrorism Preparedness, and enhancing bioterrorism preparedness and practices. The
themes that emerged also aligned with what the research questions set out to find: To
understand the bioterrorism readiness of EMTs in New Jersey and the policy implications
of lack of preparedness. The themes that emerged were discussed below in their order of
occurrences and categorizations.
Category 1: Understanding Emergency Practices
Theme 4: Planning and Preparedness
The study intended to examine and understand the bioterrorism readiness of
EMTs. However, the first interview question was about EMTs preparedness for general
emergencies not necessarily specific to bioterrorism. A majority of the EMTs interviewed
(16) indicated adequate preparedness for emergencies but not for bioterrorism in response
to interview Question 1: How would you describe the existing emergency response
practices in your organization? The remaining two participants stated that they were
adequately prepared for both bioterrorism and general emergencies responses. The theme
emerged following the EMTs’ responses to the question, their respective years of
experience responding to emergencies and the steps taking by their respective
management teams to equip them as a result of the all-Hazard Mitigation Plans (HMP).
Part of the goal of the HMP was to create “a more sustainable-resistant community.”
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(ECOEM, 2015) They used words such as trained, prepared, an adequate and standard
response to describe their preparedness for medical emergencies but not for bioterrorism
preparedness. The collateral consequence of preparedness for a medical emergency is the
willingness to respond to all-hazard emergencies as the study by Barnett et al. (2012)
found with little or no hesitation. This finding also supported an earlier study that
established the relationship between preparedness (training, education, and practices) and
emergency responses (Waldrop et al., 2014).
This finding is equally significant because it partially agreed with the current
literature including Cinturati, 2014; Gursky & Bice, 2013; Lall et al., 2017 and Stratton,
2014) about preparedness among some HCWs for all forms of terrorism preparedness
including bioterrorism but not within the EMTs population of HCWs. In the literature,
preparedness or public health emergency preparedness and response (PHEPR)
presupposed getting ready for the unknown happening, preventing the occurrence of
emergency situations, and planning to respond appropriately to mitigate the effect of the
emergency (Hedman, Knutsson, Ansell, Radstrom, & Rasmusson, 2013; Washington
State Department of Health, 2016). All the study participants expressed their emergencies
response readiness as NIMS outlined: mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery.
This preparedness readiness was lacking when it came to bioterrorism among EMTs
principally because of their lack of adequate knowledge of biological agents. And, the
lack of knowledge was a consequence of inadequate training occasioned by insufficient
funding of EMSOs.
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All the 18 participants stated adequate preparedness for their everyday
emergency responses. But when asked about bioterrorism preparedness, 14 study
participants expressed inadequacy, two participants stated little knowledge and two
expressed adequate knowledge of biological agents. However, most study participants
(16 out of the 18 participants) agreed that during and immediately after the Ebola
epidemic there was a heightened awareness of the disease and readiness for potential
epidemics as recommended by the CDC. But that awareness and readiness level declined
as the years passed by. The decline in readiness and knowledge was due to the
unavailability of funds to organize regular training, drills and continuous classroombased education of EMTs. The collateral consequences of this decline in readiness have
increased the vulnerability of EMTs, heightened the risk of secondary infections, and
increased community-wide vulnerability bioterrorism and HIDs.
Preparedness for an emergency was linked to the frequency of responses to such
emergencies unlike the rare responses to biological attacks or epidemics from bioagents
such as the 2014 Ebola epidemic. Overall, from the perspective of the study participants,
they were ready for emergencies such as medical, fire, natural disasters and accidents and
that was affirmed by choice of words such as “prepared” and “adequately prepared” to
describe their comfort level. Both codes were repeated 35 times representing 8.73% of
the occurrences of the entire codes. Why did the awareness level and preparedness for
bioterrorism decline in the years following the 2014 Ebola epidemic? The answer is
found in the findings of the study. EMTs and EMOSs removed from the major cities
believed that the threat no longer existed after the 2014 Ebola epidemic and that they
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were remote targets for biological attacks. Although, on the face value, some of the cities
where these EMSOs and EMTs operated may be unlikely targets, but their proximity to
major cities such as the City of Newark made them vulnerable to potential biological
attacks. There is, therefore, the need to adequately prepare against bioterrorism whether
the EMTs are located in the major cities or the suburbs.
The problem of inadequate bioterrorism preparedness can be addressed by
incorporating bioterrorism preparedness as part of regular emergency response readiness
and recertification programs, and these suggestions correlate with kingdon’s MS theory.
The theory posits that in certain situations, to solve a problem, policymakers may
advance urgent decisions from competing proposals to deal with a problem (Kingdon,
1984). In this instance, the 2014 Ebola epidemic revealed inadequate knowledge of
bioagents by EMTs and inadequate preparedness for bioterrorism (problem stream). The
data from the interview showed these problems could be addressed through any or a
combination of the competing solutions or proposals including regular drills, adequate
funding, continuous education and regular inter-agency training and collaboration (policy
stream).
In the literature, it was clear that the lack of knowledge of bioagents was a
problem that needed to be addressed for bioterrorism hardening among EMTs. It was also
part of the problem that the 2008 and 2015 County HMPs intended to solve. The 2015
HMP is a hazard mitigation program that aligns with the politics stream as well. How
EMTs understand and incorporate the strategies contained in the HMP will be critical to
enhancing bioterrorism hardening. The convergence of these two streams (problem and
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policy streams) opened up the window of opportunity for policymakers and
administrators to advance proposals as political decisions (politics stream) to harden
EMTs. The finding furthered knowledge because it demonstrated that the emergency
response readiness could be replicated in bioterrorism situations if policymakers showed
willingness and courage to make needed policy changes as the three streams converge
through the window of opportunity.
Category 2: Impediments to Bioterrorism Preparedness
Passi et al. (2015) observed that part of the challenge in containing Ebola included
lack of knowledge of the virus, institutional failings of the health system, and lack of
experienced HCWs. These challenges were impediments to bioterrorism preparedness
which the study findings largely collaborated. In addition, the findings showed that the
impediments to bioterrorism preparedness also included the lack of adequate resources in
the areas of funding and manpower development and inadequate information sharing. But
participants were particularly concerned that there was poor funding for emergency
responses as a whole and worse for bioterrorism preparedness which in some cases were
non-existent. Poor funding leads to inadequate preparedness and increases the risk of
secondary infections through the EMTs and first responders.
The challenge was also about allocating the available resources. And because
some of the EMSOs see their organizations as remote targets, more resources were
channeled to the more common emergency response issues such as medical emergency
calls and fire hazards. The themes used by the participants to express their level of
preparedness (inadequate funding, insufficient knowledge, and inadequate information
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sharing) aligned with Kingdon’s MST’s problem stream. Kingdon’s problem stream
triggers the need for solutions which are consistent with the policy stream, and
policymakers’ decisions to advance urgent policies within the political stream to overturn
the impediments because of pressures from interest groups and political expediency.
Theme 1: Lack of Resources
An underlying pattern that was clear across the EMSOs and EMTs was the idea
that there should be regular training and adequate funding for bioterrorism preparedness
not just for EMTs but for all first responders. I sensed the urgency among the participants
for increased bioagent knowledge which would result in an increased willingness to
respond to bioterrorism (Barnett et al., 2012). Increased willingness to response
presupposes the ability to mitigate the impact of biological attacks and prevent or reduce
the possibility of secondary infections (Ahmad et al., 2016). A major goal of this study
was to understand the emergency response practices that involve biological agents. All
the participants identified poor funding as a critical factor for the unpreparedness for all
emergencies especially bioterrorism preparedness. The findings showed that whereas
there were apparent lapses in bioterrorism preparedness, it was not for the reluctance of
the EMTs to participate but due to inadequate funding for bioterrorism preparedness
practices such as continuous education, periodic drills, and hands-on training. Inadequate
funding as a major barrier for emergency response readiness was responsible for some of
the cities’ utilization of volunteers for emergency medical services. The volunteers work
part-time, and in the evenings on the days they are available. Essentially, they provided
skeletal emergency medical services.
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And, the use of volunteers for emergence medical services has its peculiar
problems that would require further study. For instance, using volunteers also had its
shortcomings which included inadequate volunteers. Some cities lacked enough
volunteers to cover the various shifts. The shortage of volunteer EMTs in some cities put
enormous pressure on the neighboring towns with full-time EMTs as they tended to cover
the neighboring cities with volunteer EMTs. Also, in some towns with volunteer EMTs,
emergency offices are closed until evening when volunteer EMTs become available.
Second, critical interagency cooperation is higher between agencies with full-time EMTs
than between full-time agencies and volunteer agencies. This second problem is traceable
to the partial availability of volunteer EMTs as noted earlier. Hence, the erosion of trust,
confidence and effective collaboration. The above problems led to the third problem
namely, non-retention of experienced EMTs. The higher than normal volunteer EMTs’
turnovers as they relocate to other places in search of employment opportunities does not
encourage the retention of experienced EMTs. As a result, the meager available resources
are utilized in training new volunteers.
The importance of adequate funding for the execution of needed activities for
bioterrorism preparedness such as continuous education, regular drills and the
procurement of PPE has been documented (Maras & Miranda, 2016 & Waldrop et al.,
2014). The lack of adequate funding was identified as responsible for the nonprocurement of essential equipment such as the PPE for some agencies, and maintenance
of existing equipment when due. The data from the interview showed that PPE was
procured by emergency organizations following the Ebola epidemic, but no plans were
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made for their maintenance or replacement. As the years went by, some of the equipment
expired and needed replacement and others needed refurbishment, but there were
inadequate funds to refurbish or replace them - inability to replace aging PPE because of
inadequate funding was a critical issue in bioterrorism unpreparedness. Even if the funds
were available, there was the added challenge of acquiring knowledge of bioagents and
identifying their characteristics in emergencies. This is because each biological agent
presents different symptoms and characteristics.
This problem of funding correlates with the problem stream of Kingdon’s
multiple stream theory. The inadequate funding showed the existence of a problem which
in the MST’s problem stream can appear after a disaster as was evident during and after
the Ebola epidemic (Hayle, 2015). To overcome the funding problems, policymakers and
emergency managers may pool resources and consolidate emergency services for
efficiency and effectiveness especially among smaller towns whose meager resources
were stretched thin during the Ebola epidemic. According to the Kingdon’s model, policy
makers and organizational managers can pursue a careful review of proposals that would
address the problem issues which for the study are bioterrorism response plans.
Theme 2: Continuous Education
The EMTs in the towns where the interviews were conducted did not have regular
and continuous education on bioterrorism preparedness despite the HMP of 2015. A
major aim of the HMP 2015 was to ensure that HCWs in the county are adequately and
continuously trained to effectively and efficiently respond to emergencies. Regularly
updating EMTs’ knowledge of biological agents is critical for effective emergency
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responses to bioterrorism (Plough et al., 2013). The manner and urgency of emergency
responses would not allow for laboratory testing of the disease before helping victims.
The need for continuous education cannot be overstated. The importance of continuous
education is encapsulated in continuous training to acquire and update knowledge and
identify pathogens, and these ideas agree with the study by Aghaei and Nesami (2013).
However, the problems of inadequate funding and lack of uniformity in staffing in some
of the organizations were impediments to achieving the goal of increasing the knowledge
base of HCWs including EMTs.
Although the problem of inadequate training was partly a result of inadequate
funding, there is also the added problem of scheduling training especially in the
organizations with volunteer EMTs. Volunteer EMTs have other jobs with different
schedules and demands. As a result, the volunteer EMTs operated at different times based
on their respective regular jobs, and that made it difficult to schedule training that
required most of the EMTs at the same time. And, joint drills, training, and education in
collaboration with other emergency organizations are needed to build interagency
cooperation, collaboration, and coordination, for the synergy of ideas and comradery. To
achieve policy changes regarding increased knowledge of HIDs through continuous
education, policymakers must be ready to make the hard decisions as the politics stream
of Kingdon’s MST recommends.
Theme 3: Inadequate Knowledge and Information
As the data from the participants indicated, information sharing and knowledge of
pathogen are critical elements in bioterrorism preparedness, and this finding supports the
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existing literature (Passi et al., 2015). When asked about their knowledge of pathogens,
only two of the 18 study participants expressed adequate knowledge of most HIDs. Lack
of knowledge was identified as a major barrier to an effective emergency response
involving infectious diseases. This finding was not surprising given that EMTs do not
deal with pathogens on their daily emergency response activities. For example, except for
four EMTs who were around during the 2001 anthrax attacks, the other EMTs
interviewed would hardly recognize anthrax attacks if they occur now.
Information sharing and communication with both the public and other
emergency agents are also critical to the effectiveness of EMTS. Information sharing
with 911 callers who most often do not give adequate information to emergency
dispatchers posed safety concerns to EMTs because they have inadequate information of
what they are responding to. Despite the 2014 Ebola epidemic, the training and drills that
followed and the policy recommendations contained in the 2015 HMP, there was still
apparent inadequate knowledge of biological agents. This is because there has been no
refresher training on bioterrorism preparedness for most EMTs even as new EMTs were
either employed or have volunteered and that further increases the risk of secondary
infections
When the question was asked about bioterrorism preparedness, 16 of the study
participants expressed a poor level of preparedness because they lacked adequate
knowledge of biological agents. For instance, insufficient knowledge of biological agents
had 34 frequencies representing 8.48% of the occurrences of the codes. These responses
aligned with a similar study in Nigeria by Oladimeji et al., 2015. Oladimeji et al., (2015)
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found that most HCWs lacked adequate knowledge of biological agents and that
demonstrated an existential problem in line with the problem stream of MST. When you
add the lack of information (32 frequencies), the cumulative percentage of the
frequencies for both codes represented almost one-sixth (16.46%) of the total
occurrences.
The findings revealed that the impediments to bioterrorism preparedness practices
were lack of funds, lack of continuous education and insufficient knowledge of biological
agents and inadequate information sharing. These impediments to bioterrorism
preparedness aligned with Kingdon’s multiple stream theory that required the existence
of certain conditions which policymakers and citizens must address for the desired policy
and political changes to occur (Sabatier & Weible, 2014). The problems having been
identified, it is then for policymakers to identify the most appropriate proposals or policy
options to solve the problems. The 2014 Ebola epidemic and the attendant poor responses
provided the windows of opportunity for bioterrorism hardening among EMTs. Interview
questions that addressed this category and from which the themes emerged were
Questions 2, 3, 4 and 9. The responses and findings aligned with earlier studies that
utilized the MST and demonstrated that the existence of the window of opportunity was a
prerequisite for the three streams to achieve desired goals (Brunner, 2008; Walhart,
2013). To overcome these barriers, improvements in funding, inter-governmental and
inter-agency collaboration and better information sharing between the public and the
EMTs through the emergency dispatchers are required. The window of opportunity is
there for bioterrorism hardening among EMTs.
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Category 3: Understanding Bioterrorism Preparedness
Critical to bioterrorism hardening is understanding what is required for
bioterrorism readiness. This category formed the core of the study given the research
question. Regardless of where one is located, any city, town, structure or school can be
targeted. The study finding showed the lack of adequate knowledge of biological agents
among EMTs has implications for their safety, the safety of their families and the
community they serve. The overwhelming theme identified in this category was
mandatory bioterrorism hardening when the study participants were asked about how best
to achieve bioterrorism preparedness. Instituting preparedness practices that would bring
about mandatory bioterrorism hardening will require political will from policymakers that
Kingdon’s multiple stream stresses.
Theme 5: Mandatory Bioterrorism Hardening
Over eighty percent of the study participants acknowledged the efforts of the
various governments in the aftermath of the 2014 Ebola that increased the awareness
level of infectious diseases such as Ebola among EMTs and the readiness strategies
initiated to handle infected persons. Fifteen of the participants acknowledged the
satisfactory initiatives to educate HCWs including EMTs about Ebola in the immediate
years after the Ebola epidemic. The politics stream of MST helped explain this theme and
the participant’s data. The codes: training; awareness of WMD; universal precautions;
and safety were derived from Interview Questions 5 and 6. The politics stream of
Kingdon’s MST and the findings were consistent with the literature which affirmed that
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bioterrorism preparedness practices reduce the casualty rate among HCWs by about 75
percent in the event of bioterrorism (Jansen et al., 2014).
In line with the main elements of the MST, the 2014 Ebola epidemic provided the
window of opportunity to address the issues of bioterrorism preparedness and hardening
through the creation of awareness of WMD, strict application of the universal
precautions, regular training, and safety of the responders (Abrol, 2016). The safety and
protection of EMTs were assessed by how responders approach disaster situations with
caution, don of PPE when attending to patients, and ask critical questions such as travel
history (Decker et al., 2014). As a result of the Ebola epidemic and the lessons learned,
EMTs became more stringent in asking leading questions such as: Did you travel outside
the United States? Do you have a fever? Are you vomiting? This theme demonstrated that
EMTs should, as a matter of urgency, be prepared to handle any disaster through more
training, regular drills, continuous education, and inter-agency collaboration and
information sharing for their safety and those of their communities. These are
bioterrorism hardening practices. Unfortunately, these suggestions were in some agencies
non-existent, and where existent, they were either not implemented, or their
implementations were not sustained.
From this finding and the current literature, it was evident that the 2002
Bioterrorism Act, the 2004 NRF, 2006 Pandemic and all-Hazards Preparedness Act
(PAHPA), the National Health Security Strategy of the United States of America
(NHSS), PAHPRA of 2013 and the 2008 and 2015 all Hazard Mitigation Plans (HMPs)
did not achieve the common objective of building community-wide resilience emergency
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responses practices (DHS, 2016; Eddy & Sase, 2015; Shelton et al., 2012;). The problems
in the past gave rise to proposals from which policies were created including the
Bioterrorism Act of 2002 following the 2001 anthrax attacks. In 2014, the Ebola
epidemic and the responses to it revealed new problems that required policy changes
from many competing proposals. Incidentally, the 2015 HMP was in a review when the
Ebola epidemic occurred. According to the MST, policymakers must advance decisions
to address them. Part of the policies made was the designation of some facilities as acute
healthcare facilities for medical treatments without putting EMTs, their families, and
their immediate communities at further risks. This policy should be followed with regular
education and drills across emergency response organizations for efficiency and
effectiveness when responding to disaster areas especially if biological agents are
involved.
Category 4: Enhancing Bioterrorism Preparedness and Practices
Theme 6: Collaboration Among Agencies
An integral goal of the all-Hazard Mitigation Plan (HMP) was to have a mutually
beneficial document that would be used throughout the county and reduce duplication of
emergency response or mitigation initiatives. This goal presupposes strategic joint
training and sharing of knowledge. The HMP mission statement also included the goals
of partnership and collaboration to reduce vulnerability. Other bioterrorism preparedness
programs and policies also aimed to achieve similar objectives. However, these goals of
partnership, joint drills, HazMat Awareness and Operation and interagency collaboration
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among first responders within the county have not been fully achieved as the data from
the study indicated.
Following the 2001 anthrax attacks, there was an increased need for intergovernmental collaborations (Gamboa-Maldonado et al., 2012). What also appeared to be
lacking as the study data showed was effective interagency collaboration during the 2014
Ebola epidemic response. There was overwhelming concern about the insufficient
interagency collaborations and sharing of knowledge and information among EMTs.
Interagency collaboration is critical given that EMTs and other emergency responders are
mostly at risk of secondary infections in the course of performing their duties. Therefore,
the HMP needs to be revamped and implemented for effective interagency collaboration
and joint drills in emergency responses. This process could start with creating uniformity
in the staffing of EMSOs.
The study found that the differences in the staffing of the emergency
organizations across the county were considered a problem in interagency collaboration.
Some EMSOs were staffed by full-time EMTs while some others were staffed by
volunteers or part-time EMTs. Some other agencies’ staff was a combination of both fulltime and volunteers. The lack of uniformity in the staffing of EMTs in the county was a
hindrance in interagency collaboration and information sharing. One study participant
told me that some full-time EMTs do not feel comfortable sharing information or
collaborating with the agencies staffed by volunteers. Some emergency medical agencies
staffed by volunteers were not available at certain times of the day. Of the agencies in
which I conducted the study, two of the agencies were staffed by full-time EMTs; one
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agency was staffed by volunteer EMTs, and the other agency was a mixture of both fulltime and volunteer EMTs. Some of the volunteer EMTs themselves acknowledged that it
was a problem especially in attending training, continuous education programs, and drills
because the EMS activities often conflict with their regular jobs.
In spite of the problem of the low level of collaboration among EMSOs and
EMTs, there is the urgent need to engage with other emergency response agencies, share
information with first responders, train together and conduct joint drills. These
collaborative initiatives are prerequisites for effective real-time joint responses to actual
disaster situations by EMTs. Also, inter-agency coordination, cooperation, and
collaboration reduce the cost of running EMSOs and increase the effectiveness and
efficiency of emergency response practices. The need for effective inter-agency
collaboration programs or policies as prerequisites for bioterrorism preparedness aligns
with Kingdon’s MST politics stream. Such a program would facilitate a careful review of
the preparedness policies by policymakers to address the problems of lack of uniformity
and effective collaboration. The policymakers in this instance will include the
management of EMSOs who handle the day to day affairs of emergency response
practices and policymakers. The study contributes to the existing body of knowledge on
bioterrorism preparedness by highlighting the urgency for all-hazard inter-agency
collaboration, cooperation, and coordination.
Theme 7: Safety and Job Security
Other issues that EMTs considered critical to an effective emergency response
were safety and job security. These issues were of concern to ten of the EMTs
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interviewed. The issues of safety and job security align with Kingdon’s MST’s politics
stream. Politics stream of MST stresses the roles policymakers must play to address the
issues within the problem stream from the competing solutions or proposals (Kingdon,
1984). Participants’ answers to interview Questions 7, 8, and 10 provided policy choices
that may be considered for the overall safety of both the emergency medical responders
and the general population. The vulnerability of EMTs can be far-reaching and are not
restricted by age or gender as the study findings showed with the distribution of the
participants’ age, gender, and educational status. The vulnerability of EMTs was
recognized in the revised all-Hazard Mitigation Plan of 2015, given the geographic and
demographic characteristics of the county in which the study was conducted.
If EMTs are well trained, have uniformity in staffing, and have adequate
knowledge of bioagents they will have a multiplier effect of protecting EMTs and their
families and ensuring a safe and protected community (Hunger, 2014; Taylor, 2015). For
instance, one participant said that it is a huge problem if EMTs will have to wait for about
48 hours before knowing what diseases they may have been exposed to when “we would
have been with our families the past 24 hours.” Data revealed that although the study
participants made use of the triage system when approaching a disaster scene, the
inadequate and, sometimes the lack of knowledge of bioagents still made EMTs
vulnerable to bioagents infection. As a precaution, there is a need for stricter application
of the triage system and by extension ask certain routine but important questions when
responding to disaster or emergencies. At the minimum, the benefit of this finding is that
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EMTs will look for and identify physical signs of diseases such as chicken pox, smallpox,
Ebola and anthrax when responding to disaster scenes.
Experience of the EMTs was an issue that revealed itself during data collection.
As the study data showed, the average years of experience of the study participants were
14.63 years. The implication of this average age of the study participants is that many of
the EMTs became EMTs after the 2001 anthrax attacks. So, the 2014 Ebola epidemic was
to some of the study participants and other EMTs, their real-time experience with
emergency medical preparedness and responses that involved biological agents.
Another issue that participants raised was emergency agencies proximity or
distance from what they perceived as high threat cities. For instance, big cities like
Newark, Jersey City and Elizabeth (all in New Jersey) are considered more vulnerable
than the participating emergency organizations’ cities. The high threat is particularly
more so for Newark City. And not much attention was devoted to bioterrorism prevention
and mitigation in the HMP despite the high-profile targets including Newark Liberty
International Airport, Newark Penn Station and the New Jersey Port Authority located in
Newark and Elizabeth.
All four organizations involved in the study participated in the 2015 HMP review.
And, the HMP also sort to make frontline-responders including EMTs safe by updating
the strategies to mitigate risks and vulnerabilities including “natural and human-caused
hazards in order to protect the health, safety, …, and all communities” in the county.
Yet, EMTs are vulnerable to and ill-prepared for biological attacks.
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In spite of the participating cities’ less vulnerability to biological attacks,
bioterrorism preparedness practices should be considered critical because any group of
EMTs could be called upon to assist in disaster-hit cities or when biological agents are
weaponized. This is because of their proximity to the high threat cities. The participating
four organizations are within 10 miles of Newark City. And the City of Newark is
considered the most vulnerable city in New Jersey, and these organizations may be called
upon to help out if Newark is attacked with biological agents. The City of Elizabeth is
about 15 miles from the cities involved in this study and about 21 miles from the City of
Jersey City. It was, therefore, imperative that EMTs in as many cities as possible have
bioterrorism hardening strategies namely, training, education and regular drills for the
safety of the participants.
Another concern to EMTs was jobs security. A great number of EMTs are not
career positions. Data showed that standardized training and uniformity in emergency
response is critical to emergency response (Taylor, 2015). Data gathered during the study
showed that various EMTs had different levels of education. There is a need to mandate
uniformity in hiring and a standardized higher-level of educational qualification.
Responses from five of the participants pointed to at least an associate (two-year) degree
as the minimum educational level for EMTs. This policy should bring about a stronger
professional bond among EMTs across cities. The themes of safety and job security
emanated from the Interview Questions of 7, 8 and 10 and they coincide with the politics
stream of Kingdon’s MST which emphasizes policy formulation from the many
competing solutions to deal with a problem (Kingdon, 1984). The formulation of job

178
security and safety policies are within the control of EMSOs, emergency response
managers and government officials who make laws and policies. They constitute the
policy-making body within the Kingdon’s multiple streams, and they must incorporate
policies or proposals that will guarantee the safety of EMTs and increase the retention of
EMTs and, therefore, enhance bioterrorism hardening.
Limitations of the Study
The first limitation of the study was that none of the EMSOs and EMTs involved
in the study was located in any of the three largest cities in New Jersey namely, Newark,
Jersey City, and Camden. Efforts to involve some of them in Newark failed due to time
constraint despite repeated requests. This limitation implies that the data from the study
participants did not emanate from the EMTs whose cities are most likely to be attacked.
The second limitation is the unwillingness of the participants to share certain
information that would have helped the study gain a better understanding of the critical
elements involved in their current response strategies and how they may contribute to
future bioterrorism preparedness and hardening. Aside from the prepared interview
questions, I asked for existing bioterrorism preparedness strategies in each of the
emergency organizations, if any. Most of the organizations refused to divulge such
information. They stated they were not allowed to share such information with the public
as precautionary measures. Also, they would not reveal the nature of their funding. Only
one agency volunteered the information that all of its funding comes from donations from
members of the community. That agency is made up of volunteer EMTs, and the
community funds the agency’s activities.
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The third limitation was the underrepresentation of female EMTs and other racial
groups such as the African Americans and Hispanic EMTs. This limitation had to do with
the organizations that agreed to participate in the study. Efforts were made to ensure
broader representation from EMTs in areas with a higher mixture of races, but the
emergency agencies in those areas did not show interest to participate in the study.
However, the under-representation of female EMTs in the agencies interviewed was
because of the low number of female EMTs relative to their male counterparts and a
reflection of the nature of the diversity of the EMTs in the participating organizations.
Recommendations for Future Study
This qualitative case study aimed to understand the nature of bioterrorism
preparedness among EMTs in New Jersey. The study, therefore, focused on weaponized
biological agents to the exclusion of other forms of terrorism: explosives, radiological,
chemical and nuclear. While the study focused on biological agents, it was not clear how
prepared EMTs are for these other potential forms of terrorism. The study recommends
future studies is conducted on the readiness of EMTs for weaponized WMD: chemical,
radiological and nuclear. In this age of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD), any of them can be weaponized and first responders and HCWs should be
prepared to respond to them.
Furthermore, I recommend that future study is conducted on the readiness of
EMTs in the larger cities for a clearer understanding of their bioterrorism response
readiness given that terrorists appear to target densely populated areas and cities.
Previous studies showed that terrorists target areas with a high population for cause
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societal disruption, panic and maximum human casualties (Jensen et. al., 2014; Green,
LeDuc, Cohen, & Franz, 2019). The current study’s inability to involve EMTs and
EMSOs in the large cities was a limitation.
Some of the study participants during the interview noted the educational
disparity among the EMTs. There was concern about the low educational requirements
for becoming EMTs. Further study is recommended on the impact of higher education on
the effectiveness of EMTs and how widespread this concern is among EMTs.
As the data from the interview revealed, collaborations should not only be among
EMTs across cities but also among all first responders: EMTs, AEMTs, the firefighters,
the police, MICNs, and the paramedics. The first responders have often jointly responded
in disaster situations. Joint responses by first responders have the potentials to increase
the risk of secondary infections if there are no joint preparedness programs. Therefore,
there should be periodic collaborative training and joint drills so that everyone knows
what do at any given time and stage of the response without increasing the risk of
secondary infections. The themes that resulted from the data analysis will help in the
bioterrorism hardening of all first responders and other healthcare practitioners.
Therefore, I recommend for future studies on the readiness and preparedness of the other
first responders for bioterrorism and weaponized WMD.
Implications for Change
The positive social change inherent in this study is in bringing about attitudinal
change. The findings will create awareness among EMTs to always take precautionary
steps when responding to emergencies especially in this age of the proliferation of
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biological agents and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD). As the interview
progressed, EMTs became more aware that recognizing the symptoms of biological
agents was a prerequisite for bioterrorism hardening. The knowledge will galvanize
EMTs and healthcare workers to agitate for more training, drills and regular education
which are necessary for building community resilience to biological agents (Plough et al.,
2013).
Second, the study findings will create awareness and urgency for collaborative
initiatives, coordination, and cooperation among EMTs and between emergency agencies,
and public awareness of bioagents. The threat posed by terrorists for potential
weaponization of biological agents necessitated the need to share information,
knowledge, and ideas, maximize scarce funds, and engage in joint training and drills for
bioterrorism hardening.
Third, the study will bring about and encourage the mass education of citizens on
the symptoms and effects of bioagents and how to control the spread. When citizens
become knowledgeable of bioagents and the several symptoms, they will be able to
communicate with 911 dispatchers and relay effectively what is happening and what
symptoms they are experiencing. The collateral consequence and benefits are that EMTs
will be better prepared to respond to such emergencies because of better knowledge of
the emergency or disaster. The increased knowledge of bioagents among EMTs and the
public will also make for community-wide safety and security and prevent or reduce
secondary infections, contamination, and risk. This recommendation aligns with the
recommendations of the HMP to prepare citizens and agencies for effective disaster

182
responses. But in this regards, greater efforts should be placed on preparing citizens and
emergency responders for an effective and efficient bioterrorism response preparedness.
Throughout data collection, it was apparent that the EMTs interviewed lacked
clear bioterrorism preparedness training and drills because the participants operated in
smaller cities. Some EMTs alluded to that and remarked that they were less likely to be
attacked. The study revealed the need to make EMTs in the smaller cities as prepared for
bioterrorism as EMTs in the larger cities. EMTs in smaller cities have often been called
upon to help neighboring larger cities during severe emergency situations. Therefore,
they also need to acquaint themselves of bioagents that could be weaponized. The
increased knowledge would equip EMTs with the knowledge base to make critical
decisions within the limited time they have to attend to patients and avoid secondary
infection of themselves and their colleagues (Ahmad et al., 2016).
Though the participants did not allude to it, it may be necessary for smaller cities
to pull resources and merge their emergency response services to maximize resources and
emergency response practices and readiness. Small cities do not have adequate resources
to fund full-time emergency organizations. This study recommends that towns merge
services to help maximize resources. The merging of emergency responses between or
among cities can also be done between bigger towns and smaller cities.
Finally, improvements in the bioterrorism preparedness and practices have
practical implications for positive social change through policy formulation and policy
changes. Policy changes in the area of increased funding would help enhance
community-level bioterrorism preparedness programs that cater to unique local needs and
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increase interagency collaboration in the county. The collateral benefit of a communitywide bioterrorism preparedness program or policy is the hardening of not only EMTs but
the entire first responders which include: EMTs, AEMTs, Fire Fighters, the Police,
mobile intensive care nurses (MICNs) and the paramedics. As a result, all New Jersey
regional emergency management plans such as the selected county’s HMP need to be
reviewed given the lessons learned from the responses to the 2014 Ebola epidemic and
the data from the study.
Conclusion
I embarked on this qualitative research study to understand the bioterrorism
readiness of EMTs in New Jersey. These non-hospital-based EMS organizations were
purposefully chosen because of their proximity to the general population. Non-hospitalbased EMS organizations are more likely to respond quicker than hospital-based EMTs
because of their closeness to the general population. The study was also conducted to
understand the policy implications for lack of bioterrorism hardening which can be
measured in terms of bioterrorism preparedness programs and knowledge of biological
agents. The study’s 18 participants discussed their knowledge of biological agents that
was less than adequate before the 2014 Ebola epidemic and in some cases non-existent.
Preparedness and disease management should not only be for HCWs and those exposed
to the disease but should also include those who fear that they have been exposed to the
bioagent or the “worried well” and not just the exposed (Evans & Lawrence, 2006). A
large number of the worried well put enormous pressure on the EMTs and the entire
HCWs and affect their effectiveness.
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The study participants’ responses addressed the research questions that led to the
emergence of seven major themes from 14 codes based on 401 total occurrences of the
codes. The study found that the participants’ bioagent knowledge and awareness
increased during the Ebola epidemic and the immediate years after the epidemic.
However, the increased knowledge and awareness level were not sustained because of the
lack of continuous training as the years went by. Nevertheless, the participants
recognized that preparedness programs and practices such as training, regular joint drills,
continuous education, and interagency collaboration were essential to bioterrorism
hardening. Conversely, the study identified the lack of adequate funding as the major
barrier to the building of intra and interagency bioterrorism hardening among EMTs and
implementing bioterrorism preparedness programs.
The threat of bioterrorism is real because terrorist groups are exploring ways to
inflict maximum casualty, which is one of their main objectives (Green et al., 2019)
There are various biological agents that terrorists and terrorist organizations can use to
cause maximum damage and harm. These bioagents include Ebola, anthrax, and smallpox
among others that the CDC identified and categorized based on their degrees of potency.
The need to develop bioterrorism hardening strategies and programs has been urgent
before and following the 2001 anthrax attacks. As a result, it was believed that the United
States governments and the healthcare community were prepared for biological attacks.
But the uncoordinated responses to the 2014 Ebola epidemic revealed inadequate
preparedness and practices within the healthcare community for biological attacks despite
the programs and policies put in place after the 2001 anthrax attacks and, therefore, a
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policy failure on bioterrorism preparedness. And policy failure occurs when it fails to
achieve the desired goals in certain aspects of the policy objectives (McConnell, 2016).
There is, therefore, the urgent need to consider other approaches to bioterrorism
preparedness and hardening.
However, the Ebola epidemic helped in creating awareness both within the
medical community and among the general population. With the epidemic came the
public knowledge of such terminologies as personal protection equipment (PPE),
gasmasks, hazmat suits and donning and duffing. As the interview showed, there were
deliberate attempts by the members of the medical community to maintain a high level of
preparedness for infectious diseases and biological agents in the immediate years
following the Ebola epidemic. However, as the years went by, many medical
organizations and medical professionals including EMTs let down their guards. Thus,
making them less prepared and more vulnerable should bioterrorism occur. The major
factors responsible for this was the lack of funding and the feeling of less vulnerability
among the EMTs in the organizations I conducted the study. The EMTs I interviewed
attributed their feeling of less vulnerability to their “remote” locations. Other factors
responsible for this lack of preparedness among EMTs include lack of training and lack
of interagency collaborations. The study participants were either full-time, part-time or
volunteers and the lack of uniformity in the constitution of EMTs were identified as one
factor among others responsible for the lack of effective inter-agency collaboration.
The study findings have implications for social change because it will aid in
policy formulation for bioterrorism hardening among EMTs and other emergency
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medical responders through the procurement and servicing of preparedness equipment
and allocation of adequate funding. The study findings will also help sensitize both the
medical community and the general population in identifying bioagents and, therefore,
help prevent and mitigate secondary infections, which are critical to bioterrorism
hardening. The public knowledge and awareness will also bring about better information
sharing among the public, emergency dispatchers and the EMTs and other first
responders for better emergency response practices.
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Appendix A: Cover Letter
August 13, 2017.

Dear_______________________________________________

My name is Ndubuisi Ejike, and I am a doctoral student in the School of Public
Policy and Administration (PPA) at Walden University. My area of concentration is
Terrorism, Mediation, and Peace (TMP). My dissertation topic is Bioterrorism
Hardening: An Exploratory Study of EMTs Preparedness and Practices. The purpose of
the research is to examine and understand the bioterrorism preparedness and emergency
response practices (BT/ERPs) among emergency medical technicians (EMTs). The study
has the approval of the Walden University Institutional Review Board (IRB).
I am inviting you to participate in the study because you met the selection criteria
that include a minimum of five-year work experience as an EMT and employment since
the 2014 Ebola epidemic. Although there is no benefit for participating in the interview,
your participation will help improve the bioterrorism preparedness and emergency
readiness of EMTs in your county and community-wide readiness practices during
disease epidemic. There is also no known risk for participating in the research.
Participating in this interview is voluntary, and you may withdraw at any stage of the
interview process. Also, if you want to make an anonymous complaint about the manner
of the interview or you need additional verification, you may contact my Dissertation
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Committee Chairman. After the interview and you need any further clarification, you
may contact me.
The interview is estimated to last for one hour. The interview will be conducted in
in a public library conference or any other available secured room or space for your
safety and privacy. You may choose any time during library hours between 10.30 am and
7.30 pm during workdays and at a time most suitable for you that will not disrupt your
work schedule. The interview will be audio-recorded.
I appreciate your taking the time to assist me in this research. The information
you provide will be used only for the study and destroyed five years after the conclusion
of the study and graduation as required by the University IRB. In addition, all personal
information collected will be treated with utmost confidentiality, and I will destroy them
in accordance with the University IRB requirement.
Thank you.
Sincerely,

Ndubuisi C. Ejike (Researcher)

Prof. George Kieh (Dissertation committee chairman)
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Appendix B: Participants’ Demographic Information
I will administer the demographic survey orally to each research participant. The survey
is to ensure that participants meet the requirements to be eligible for participation in the
interview. The requirements include a minimum age of 25, minimum of five years of
professional experience, and employment during the 2014 Ebola epidemic. This survey
will help me collect data about bioterrorism and emergency readiness (BT/ER) in your
county vis-a-vis bioagent knowledge and training. The information gathered will be for
this study only.
1. Please indicate what area of emergency response you specialize on.
(a) Emergency medical technicians
(b) Paramedics
(c) Mobile intensive care nurses
(d) Advanced emergency medical technician
(e) Others (please indicate)
2. How long have you been employed in emergency medical response?
(a) Under 4 years
(b) 4 -10 years
(c) 10 - 15 years
(d) 15 - 15 years
3. Were you actively employed during the 2014 Ebola epidemic?
Circle one: Yes or No
4. In what category is your age?
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(a) Under 24
(b) 24 - 29
(c) 30 - 35
(d) 36 - 41
(e) Above 42
5. Please specify your race.
(a) African American
(b) Caucasian
(c) Hispanic
(d) Other. Please indicate:
6. Indicate your educational attainment.
(a) Certificate
(b) GED
(c) University Education: Bachelors
(d) University Education: Above Bachelors
7. Indicate your gender.
(a) Male
(b) Female
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Appendix C: Interview Questions
Research Topic: Interview Guide on Bioterrorism Hardening: An Exploratory Study of
EMTs Preparedness and Practices.
Introduction: The following questions will be used to examine and understand the
emergency preparedness and practices among emergency medical workers especially
when it involved bioterrorism. The findings should help increase EMTs’ knowledge of
biological agents, their characteristics, and their overall bioterrorism preparedness
readiness and response practices. This proposed study is germane following the
inadequate emergency responses during the 2014 Ebola epidemic.
Background
Interviewer:
Interviewee Name:
Address:
City,

state:

Telephone: home (

) _________

zip:
Work (

) _________

Sex: Female or Male (circle)
What is your current position in your organization?
Research Questions:
1.

How would you describe the existing emergency response practices in your

organization?
2.

How would you describe the preparedness practices in your organization for

biological attacks especially after the 2014 Ebola epidemic?
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3.

How will the knowledge of bioagents help you in emergency responses that

involve cutaneous diseases?
4.

What knowledge do you have about cutaneous forms of pathogens such as Ebola?

5.

How do your emergency response protocols prepare you for potential bioagent or

biological attacks?
6.

What kind of preparedness and training do you need for disaster response?

7.

What areas of training or tools do you think you will need for effective

bioterrorism and emergency response?
8.

What other suggestion would you proffer for adequate bioterrorism and infectious

disease response by emergency medical response?
9.

What would you say are the major obstacles for an effective emergency response

involving infectious diseases?
10.

What policy changes do you think can make your emergency response safer?
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Appendix D: Gatekeeper Information Form
Topic: Bioterrorism Harding: An Exploratory Study of Emergency Medical Technicians
Bioterrorism preparedness practices and policies
Introduction:
I am Ndubuisi Ejike. I am a student at the Walden University and conducting a
study in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. The
research is on the bioterrorism preparedness and practices of emergency medical
technicians (EMTs). I am requesting your permission to interview emergency medical
workers in your organization. With your permission, I will interview them in your
organization to avoid interrupting your organizational workflow.
I am requesting your assistance in identifying and selecting emergency workers
who have theoretical and practical experiences in emergency response for the study. I
have itemized some information about the study that will help you in the selection
process. They include the reason for the study, eligibility requirement, and how the study
will be conducted.
The rationale for the Study:
The purpose of the study is to examine the bioterrorism and emergency response
practices (BT/ERPs) in your organization and help increase EMTs bioagent knowledge
and improve EMTs BT/ERPs’ readiness given the heightened terrorism threats and the
higher risk EMTs face. The study’s findings will help in identifying the areas of
improvement in EMTs response and patients’ handling during cutaneous disease
epidemic and/or bioterrorism incidents.
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How and Where I need your assistance
I will need your assistance in identifying and selecting participants who met the
selection criteria. I will need five research participants. The criteria for eligibility for
participation in the study are a minimum age of 25; minimum work experience of five;
and the participant must have been employed/volunteered during the 2014 Ebola
epidemic. Please provide me the names, phone numbers and email addresses of the
participants who meet the requirements for me to contact them. You will also assist me in
identifying the areas the interview might take place with the least disruption to your daily
workflow.
The Role of the Research Participant
I will give the selected participants the informed consent form that will the state
the purpose of the study. The interview is estimated to last one hour. The interview will
take place during office hours from 10.30 pm to 4.30 pm. Participation will be voluntary,
and they will not be paid. There is no known risk participating in this study. However,
participants have the right to withdraw at any time throughout the interview stages. The
research questions will center on EMTs’ knowledge of bioagents; knowledge of
bioterrorism preparedness and practices; willingness to respond in the event of infectious
diseases epidemic and/or bioterrorism.
Safeguarding Confidential Information
All research materials and data collected will be treated with utmost
confidentiality. Participants name and your organization name and information will be
protected and not identified by actual names. Each participant will be assigned identities
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using alphabets. For instance: participant A; participant B; participant C and so on.
Similarly, your organization will not be identified by name. I will categorize participating
organizations as follows: Emergency Agency 1; Emergency Agency 2; Emergency
Agency 3 and so on. Besides me, the other persons who will access to the data are two
members of my dissertation committee. Please find the names of my dissertation
committee members:
Prof. George Kieh
Dr. Michael Brewer
After the study, I will make available a copy of the findings to your organization.
Please provide me with your contact information for follow up calls and future assistance.
I truly appreciate your assistance. Feel free to contact me at any time if you have any
question or need further clarification.
Thank you for your assistance.
Sincerely,
Ndubuisi Ejike
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Appendix E: Consent and Authorization Form
1.

I ______________________________ voluntarily give my consent to assist the

execution of this research study.
2. I have read and retained a copy of the cover letter detailing the purpose of the
study and areas I will be required to assist the researcher: Mr. Ndubuisi Ejike.
3. As stated I the cover letter, my roles will be to facilitate Mr. Ejike gaining access
to both the organization and the research participants; assist in identifying those
EMTs who are more knowledgeable and experienced and were employed during
the 2014 Ebola epidemic; and assist in locating a conducive area in the work place
that will not negatively impact the work activities.
4. Despite my signing of this agreement, I reserve the right to withdraw my
assistance at any time throughout the duration of the research study without any
consequences.
5. All information gathered through the participants or observed by the Mr. Ejike
will treated with utmost confidentiality and all participants names and the name of
the organization kept anonymous.
6. I understand that the research participants will be given the informed consent
form before participating in the study.
7. I have the right to, at any time, seek clarifications and ask questions if necessary
to protect my organization.
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Signature of Gatekeeper & Date:
_____________________________________________

Name and Signature of Researcher & Date:
______________________________________

